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Abstract 
Policing has been reconstructed from state provision to a mixture of public and 
private police providers. Bayley and Shearing (2001) have called for continuing 
research to enable a better understanding of the reconstruction. In addition, the 
transnational threat from organised crime groups (OCGs) and terrorists has 
increased (Lilley 2009). Therefore, this thesis examines a transnational police 
response to that threat and any resulting reconstruction of policing that occurs 
within a context of global policing theory.  
Transnational policing has previously been analysed by developing the 
Weberian theory of bureaucratisation. Police officers, with operational 
independence from their democratic nation state, meet to create transnational 
policing processes. This is known as 'Policeization' (Deflem 2002, p228) which 
is viewed by some critics as generating a loss of sovereignty and an increase in 
the global police state (Westmarland 2010). That tendency towards the global 
police state is confirmed more recently with a theory of global policing (Bowling 
and Sheptycki 2012). 
The increased threat from OCGs and terrorists has been accompanied by their 
increasing use of firearms (Bruggeman 2008, Jojarth 2009 and Rollins 2010) 
and my epistemological standpoint (Corbin-Dwyer and Buckle 2009) relates to 
the development of policing and intelligence gathering on the firearms threat. 
Therefore, this professional doctorate thesis has focused on the police 
transnational firearms intelligence network (the Network). Qualitative data has 
been gathered to establish whether the Network contributes to a reconstruction 
of policing. That data has been analysed using adaptive grounded theory 
(Chamaz 2006) and nodal network analysis (Shearing and Johnston 2010). 
As a result, this thesis articulates the UK firearms threat and the police 
response. The indications are that the Network is contributing to a glocal 
reconstruction of policing. The reconstruction includes pluralistic transnational 
action in partnership with other UK public organisations. There is no evidence of 
any privatisation of policing at the transnational level or any global control of UK 
policing through the Network. 
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through the final stages of completing the thesis. They include the rapporteurs, 
readers, previous supervisors and my current supervisors Dr Craig Paterson 
and Dr Ed Pollock  
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I sets the scene by way of introducing 
the thesis, defining key words,  the aim and objectives, the current literature and 
the methodology used to research and analyse the evidence for the thesis. Part 
II critically analyses the workings of the police transnational firearms intelligence 
network (the Network). It examines the threat from the criminal use and supply 
of firearms that the Network deals with, what nodes make up the Network and 
what drives the operation of the Network. Part III critically analyses whether the 
Network contributes to any reconstruction of policing. 
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PART I - SETTING THE 
SCENE 
Chapter 1 - Introduction to the Thesis 
1.1 Rationale  
The state is no longer the sole provider of policing. There is a mixture of public 
and private provision. This move is referred to as a 'reconstruction of policing' 
and there is a call for continuing research to understand what factors are 
shaping that reconstruction (Bayley and Shearing 2001). There is also an 
increasing transnational threat to global insecurity from organised crime groups 
(OCGs) and terrorists who are 'more in tune with globalisation' than those who 
police them (Lilley 2009, p137). This thesis examines a transnational police 
response to the OCG/terrorist threat and any resulting reconstruction of policing 
that occurs  within the context of global policing. It contributes to a professional 
need to understand policing networks and what impact they have on the future 
of policing. The results can inform the debate on the future of policing and the 
need to review the structure of policing in England and Wales identified by the 
Independent Police Commission (IPC) (Stevens 2013). 
The transnational threat is underpinned by globalisation, whereby OCGs and 
terrorists have embraced the increased connectivity between nation states and 
the ability to travel, using improved  networks and technology (Held and 
McGrew 2003, Levi 2007). Therefore, the transnational policing response and 
any reconstruction of policing should be examined within the context of 
globalisation (Castells 2004) and a theory of global policing. Bowling and 
Sheptyki (2012) propose such a theory of global policing, which weighs the 
direction of policing towards the global rather than the local.  
Knowledge on the reconstruction of transnational policing has previously been 
developed by comparing global security governance from within the nation state 
with state governance from a distance and governance across a network. The 
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15 
conclusion is that the spheres of governance overlap and should be examined 
in terms of a 'nodal network' (Shearing and Johnston 2010, p496). This requires 
an analysis of the network itself and it should be preceded by an analysis of the 
nodes within the network.  
Nodes are individuals, groups, organisations or states. Establishing the 
knowledge and capacity of each node provides a true picture of how security 
governance1 operates and where the operating power lies within the network 
(Shearing and Johnston 2010). However, there is little evidence on how such 
nodal networks should themselves be governed and held to account (Loader 
and Walker 2004). There is also evidence from failings in police investigations 
that governance of the police in the UK is flawed (Rowe 2014). Therefore, any 
network analysis needs to establish where and how the network is governed.  
Bowling and Sheptycki (2012, p3), define transnational policing as,‘any form of 
order maintenance, law enforcement, peace keeping, crime investigation, 
intelligence sharing, or other form of police work that transcends or traverses 
national boundaries’. Such transnational policing has been analysed by Deflem 
(2002) who developed the Weberian theory of bureaucratisation. Police officers, 
with operational independence from their democratic nation state, meet 
together, independent of the nation state, to investigate crime and create 
transnational policing processes. The police meet at various levels including 
bilateral meetings between police from two countries to investigate specific 
criminal activity and international police conferences to discuss options for 
dealing with trends in global and transnational crimes. Some of the meetings 
result in policy, enactments and international treaties by the respective nation 
state governments of the police involved. They can, in some cases, also lead to 
the creation of international organisations2. This process has become known as 
'Policeization' (Deflem 2002, p228).  
                                                          
1 Policing, state security and the responses to threats to the nation state in their widest sense. From the national to the 
international (Shearing and Johnston 2010).  
2 In 1923, an International Police Congress was held in Vienna attended by 131 police representatives from various countries in 
Europe, Egypt, Japan, China and the United States. The meeting was organised by police officials acting on their own initiative 
independent of their political centres and it led to the formation of the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC). The ICPC 
enhanced co-operation between police from different nation states to deal with ordinary crime subject to individual nation state 
laws. The ICPC was eventually renamed Interpol in 1956 (Deflem 2002). Interpol is an international organisation as opposed to a 
transnational organisation because, as explained by Bowling and Sheptycki (2012, p3), ‘international is interaction among nation 
states, while transnational denotes a phenomena that transgress national boundaries’. 
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According to Westmarland (2010), increased professional contact, by police 
from different nation states, might be perceived by some critics, particularly 
politicians, as generating a loss of sovereignty. As a result, those critics 
perceive that a global police state exists, where the police determine policing 
from beyond the nation state and the elected representatives of individual 
nation states no longer have a say in how they are policed (Westmarland 2010, 
p198). Therefore, this thesis will re-examine whether and how policeization 
continues and where the power to direct policing rests. 
In addition, a standpoint of critical investigative epistemology3 exists in relation 
to the development of police intelligence4 on the criminal use and supply of 
firearms. There is also an increased threat of organised criminals and terrorists 
using firearms (Bruggeman 2008, Jojarth 2009, Rollins 2010).  Therefore, this 
thesis focuses on the police transnational firearms intelligence network (the 
Network). Evidence has been gathered and subjected to adaptive grounded 
theory analysis and nodal network analysis to answer the central research 
question (CRQ):  
Does the Network contribute to a reconstruction of policing? 
Qualitative evidence has been gathered from interviews with United Kingdom 
(UK) based Network participants and from my experience as an insider with 
some knowledge of working with the Network.  Where I use evidence from my 
experiences, I have used the first person. The evidence has been analysed and 
corroborated with Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) drawn from rigorously 
researched and evaluated information from publically available sources (Tekir 
2009). Some OSINT is used to support the literature review but it is used 
extensively in the findings where it has been graded using a mixture of the 
police 5x5x5 intelligence grading system and the Maryland scale.  
                                                          
3 This is my standpoint. The professional investigative epistemology emerges out of a knowledge and experience of investigating 
the illicit firearms market and working with other professionals in that field. The epistemology also includes my own experiences as 
an investigator. I have been 'part of the scene' (Sugden and Tomlinson 1999, p390) as a police officer and I can relate my own 
experiences of the Network and empathise with the professional ethics and integrity of those taking part in it. However, as I am no 
longer a police officer or 'part of the scene', I can step back and take a more critical investigative standpoint (Sugden and 
Tomlinson 1999, Corbin-Dwyer and Buckle 2009). (This epistemology is explored further in the methodology chapter at 3.3).  
4 Intelligence is defined for the purposes of this thesis at 1.3.5 below. However, police intelligence is classed as intelligence that 
comes predominantly from the community that the police serve and a large part of it is converted for use as evidence in court. 
Only a small proportion of police intelligence is covert and it’s disclosure to the court is restricted. On the other hand, intelligence 
obtained by UK intelligence services is secret in order to protect sources and predominantly obtained by covert means (MacVean 
2008) with the intension of causing disruption (Sohi and Harfield 2008).  
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The 5x5x5 grading system is based on subjective evaluation, however, the use 
of such grading guides the reader on how much weight can be placed on the 
evidence used (see chapter 3.8). The A to E source evaluation code and the 1 
to 4 intelligence evaluation code is used from the 5x5x5 system (ACPO NPIA 
2010) and the dissemination code is replaced by the Maryland score (Civil 
Service 2010); with an addition of 0 where no research is involved or it cannot 
be ascertained. A Maryland score of 5 has also been used where the evidence 
has been the subject of a thorough police investigation that has been tested by 
the UK judicial system or where a thorough parliamentary or independent 
commission investigation has taken place5.  
                                                          
5 Evaluation of OSINT produced from ACPO NPIA (2010) and Civil Service (2010) and 3.6 herein. 
"5x5x5 Intelligence Report: 
SOURCE EVALUATION 
 A - Always reliable 
 B - Mostly reliable 
 C - Sometimes reliable 
 D - Unreliable 
 E - Untested source 
INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION 
 1 - Known to be true without reservation 
 2- Known personally to source but not to officer (in this case the researcher) 
 3 - Not personally known to source but corroborated 
 4 - Cannot be judged 
 5 - Suspected to be false or malicious" (ACPO NPIA 2010) 
HANDLING CODE 
 Replaced by Maryland scale score with the addition of 0 where quality of research cannot be assessed (or is not applicable) and 
Level 5 also includes where a thorough police, parliamentary or independent  investigation (including wide public consultation) has 
taken place: 
Level 1 Observed correlation between an intervention and outcomes at a single point in time. A study that only measured the impact of the 
service using a questionnaire at the end of the intervention would fall into this level. (For the purpose of this research where 
research other than evaluation research is carried out for academic or intelligence purposes it will receive a score of 1). 
Level 2 Temporal sequence between the intervention and the outcome clearly observed; or the presence of a comparison group that cannot 
be demonstrated to be comparable. A study that measured the outcomes of people who used a service before it was set up and 
after it finished would fit into this level. 
Level 3 A comparison between two or more comparable units of analysis, one with and one without the intervention. A matched-area 
design using two locations in the UK would fit into this category if the individuals in the research and the areas themselves were 
comparable. 
Level 4 Comparison between multiple units with and without the intervention, controlling for other factors or using comparison units that 
evidence only minor differences. A method such as propensity score matching, that used statistical techniques to ensure that the 
programme and comparison groups were similar would fall into this category. 
Level 5 Random assignment and analysis of comparable units to intervention and control groups. A well conducted Randomised Controlled 
Trial fits into this category." 
 
Therefore, where the source is reliable, the evidence is known to be true without reservation and it has been subjected to the 
highest degree of analysis it is graded the highest grade A15; The lowest grade is D50 when the source is known to be unreliable, 
the information is suspected to be false or malicious and no research methods have been applied or they cannot be ascertained. 
Where the evidence is drawn from a previously untried source it is graded E. This suggests a lower grade than D sourced evidence 
but, E sources, over time, may turn out to be always reliable (Civil Service 2010 and ACPO NPIA 2010). 
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The evidence from  the interviews, together with the insider and OSINT 
evidence, has helped to fill a gap in the literature on how theories of 
transnational policing are brought together and applied to police intelligence 
networks. There is also a gap in the literature on the threat to the UK from the 
criminal use and supply of firearms through an illicit firearms market (the 
firearms threat).The gap in the literature extends to how transnational police 
intelligence networks operate and how well organised or governed those 
networks are.  
This thesis starts to fill all the identified gaps in the literature and contributes to 
the debate on global policing. By researching the Network, from the point of 
view of UK based police officers and staff, evidence has been drawn to show 
that policeization (Deflem 2002) is still an important factor in explaining how the 
Network has developed. It is driven by competitive adaptation (Kenny 2008) 
where the police respond to the criminal threat by improving transnational 
networks. That threat and the response are shaped by globalisation (Castells 
2004).  
New evidence has been identified that affects the subject (Phillips 1992). It has 
been found that the Network involves nodes, rooted within the nation state, 
working from the bottom up, to drive international police organisations and in 
the words of Harfield (2008, p484), 'organize organized crime policing'. The 
governance, accountability and driving force of those nodes lies firmly within the 
nation state, which suggests a development of nation state policing rather than 
the establishment of a global police state. It is a glocal reconstruction of policing 
with identifiable roots in the UK that challenges Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) 
theory of global policing. 
The reconstruction is driven by the firearms threat and facilitated by ‘late 
modern cops’ (see chapter 8) with a mission to deal with the threat using 
available transnational pluralistic police resources. The resources are mainly 
public policing resources. However, they are assisted by other UK based 
government organisations and supplemented by IT developments supplied by 
the private commercial sector, which promotes specialised policing techniques 
on a transnational basis. 
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Theoretically, the reconstruction amounts to a pluralistic development of nation 
state policing rather than a reconstruction of policing from the outside in the 
form of a global police state. The Network is contributing to a glocal 
reconstruction of policing where the nation state police recognise the glocal 
threat of crime and the opportunities available globally to adapt to deal with that 
crime. As such, they decide from the local nation state which global 
opportunities should be used. Pluralistic transnational policing is part of the 
glocal process. 
1.2 Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to identify any reconstruction of policing that takes 
place because of the workings of the Network. 
 
To achieve that aim the following objectives have been set: 
 
 Theoretically; to establish how the Network operates within a globalised 
criminological framework and whether it contributes to a reconstruction of 
policing beyond the nation state.  
 
 To identify and share best practice from the Network on who develops 
policy and how it is developed. 
 
 Practically; to examine the implications for transnational police practice 
from a UK point of view, by understanding policing networks and what 
impact they have on policing. Such an understanding of networks can 
inform the debate on the future structure of policing. 
1.3 Definitions and Parameters 
1.3.1 Overview of Definitions and Parameters 
To achieve the aim and objectives resulting from the rationale, this thesis 
covers a snap shot in time between 1990 and 2015. It covers the period of my 
involvement in the detailed investigation of the firearms threat and gives an up 
to date perspective of the Network from those who take part in it. The emphasis 
is on what nodes make up the Network, how those nodes influence the Network 
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and how the Network affects the reconstruction of policing. It gives a voice to 
people involved on how they go about liaising with other nodes and making the 
links between the nodes to deal with the firearms threat.  
Most organisations consider the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats to their organisation and business, together with the political, economic, 
social, technical, legal and environmental issues (Johnson and Scholes 1993). 
Such issues have been drawn out in this thesis on the Network however, the 
focus is on the criminology of policing and how the Network is interpreted by the 
warranted and unwarranted police staff and associates involved in it6. 
Terminology has been used which needs an initial explanation to understand 
the scope of this thesis and introduce the reader to the subject area. In the 
sections that follow: 
 Illicit firearms and illicit firearms markets are defined as they form the 
firearms threat that the Network gathers information on.  
 Transnational police networks are defined as that is what the Network is. 
 Intelligence is defined as that is a core business of the Network.  
 The reconstruction of policing is explained, as this thesis seeks to 
establish if any reconstruction has taken place. 
All the terminology is explained from a UK point of view, which is where this 
thesis views the Network from. 
In summary, the scope of this thesis covers UK persons, who come together 
with persons from other countries, to form the Network, analysing information to 
produce new intelligence and exchanging existing intelligence on the firearms 
threat. The way the Network comes together and operates, is assessed to see if 
it impacts on the reconstruction of policing, which (in short) is the development 
of how policing is delivered, who delivers it and where it is delivered. 
                                                          
6 The detailed legal aspects of transnational policing are not within the scope of this thesis unless, as is the case with a later 
discussion on Bowling and Sheptyki's (2012) 'legal aces', it is relevant to the participants and how they work. It is however 
concerned with socially legitimate policing which includes abiding by a common code of rules (Bottoms and Tankebe 2012) and all 
the participants are keen to point out that they only act within the bounds of UK law. 
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1.3.2 Illicit Firearms 
The UK is subject to the strict control of firearms.  In 2004, a five-year 
mandatory sentence for unlawful possession of a prohibited firearm was 
introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 20037 (Hales, Lewis and Silverstone 
2006). The increased sentencing added to the strict control on firearms in the 
UK, which involves licensing and the enforcement of a number of offences. 
Those offences include the unlawful manufacture and supply of firearms 
(Sampson 2006, UK Government 2013).  
A firearm is defined in the 1968 Firearms Act: 
'……as any lethal barrelled weapon of any description from which any shot, 
bullet or other missile can be discharged and includes:  
(a) any prohibited weapon, whether it is such a lethal weapon as aforesaid 
or not; and  
(b) any component part of such a lethal or prohibited weapon; and 
(c) any accessory to any such weapon designed or adapted to diminish the 
noise or flash caused by firing the weapon. (Sampson 2006, p292). 
 
Firearms are then classified in the 1968 Act for UK licensing purposes; 
restricting the possession of shotguns8 and section one firearms9 to persons 
who hold the requisite firearms licence (BASC 2006, UK Government 2013).  
Prohibited firearms10 can only be authorised for use by the Secretary of State 
and that authorisation is generally only given to the military and the police in the 
UK (Great Britain, Home Office 2002, Sampson 2006, BASC 2006, CPS 2013, 
                                                          
7 UK gun control was already strict. The legislation, banning the use and possession of most types of firearms, had been tightened 
following the murder of 16 people in Hungerford in 1987 and 16 children and their teacher at Dunblane in 1996. 
8 A shotgun is a smooth bore gun (not being an air gun) which has a barrel not less than 24"in length and does not have any barrel 
with a bore exceeding 2" in diameter: It either has no magazine or has no detachable magazine capable of holding more than two 
cartridges; and is not a revolver gun…(UK Government 2013, BASC 2006) 
9 A section one firearm is a firearm that is not currently prohibited under section 5 of the Firearms Act 1968 and is usually a 
sporting or target rifle or a shotgun capable of holding more than two cartridges in a magazine. It can also include some high 
powered air rifles, muzzle loading pistols and flare guns (BASC 2006). 
10 Prohibited firearms are listed in the 1968 act and they include automatic weapons, self-loading weapons, pump action weapons, 
firearms less than 60 cm in length or with a barrel less than 30 cm long, smooth bore revolvers, weapons designed or adapted to 
discharge any noxious liquid, gas or other thing, air weapons designed or adapted to use a self-contained gas cartridge system, 
military weapons and ammunition including grenades and mortars (Great Britain, Home Office 2002, Sampson 2006, BASC 2006, 
CPS 2013, UK Government 2013). 
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UK Government 2013). Any firearm manufactured, supplied or held without the 
requisite authority or licence is illicit. 
Air weapons and ammunition are also restricted under the 1968 Firearms Act. 
The trade, certification and criminal use, manufacture and supply of all firearms 
and ammunition is policed by various UK law enforcement agencies (LEA) 
(Sampson 2006, ACPO 2007, Gregory 2008, ACPO 2011, Gore 2012, NABIS 
2012, SOCA 2012a)11. 
1.3.3 Illicit Firearms Markets 
An Illicit market involves any trading contrary to national or international law. It 
includes the illegal manufacture and supply of firearms (Jojarth 2009). As the 
Cold War ended the number of armed conflicts around the world increased. 
Those involved were armed by a number of sources. In particular, they were 
equipped by individuals and groups carrying out an illicit trade in firearms. The 
armed conflicts created a market for the illicit trade in firearms, which, in turn, 
fuelled conflict. In addition, there has been an increase in firearms violence 
away from conflict zones, some of which is attributed to OCGs and terrorists 
(Bruggeman 2008). This has been evidenced recently by the attacks in Paris, 
where a number of people were shot dead by suspected terrorists (BBC News 
2015).  
 
The increase in firearms violence also creates a market for the illicit trade in 
firearms that, again, fuels more firearms violence in cities around the world. The 
consequence of the increase in armed conflict and criminal use of firearms is 
that an estimated 500,000 people, worldwide, die from firearms injuries each 
year, 300,000 in conflict and post conflict zones and 200,000 from other 
firearms related homicides and suicides (Bruggeman 2008, Jojarth 2009, 
Rollins 2010). 
 
                                                          
11 UK LEAs include all UK police forces, the National Crime Agency (NCA), the UK Border Agency (UKBA) and Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs (HMRC). In carrying out this policing function the LEAs work in partnership with each other and with other agencies 
such as the UK Intelligence Agencies; the Security Services (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and government departments such as the Home Office and the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) (Sampson 2006, ACPO 2007, Gregory 2008, ACPO 2011, Gore 2012, NABIS 2012, SOCA 2012a). 
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The problems caused by the illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons 
(SALW)12, which includes the UK definition of firearms, were raised with the 
United Nations (UN) by a number of Non-Government Organisations (NGOs). 
They include, ‘Fundación Gamma Idear, International Physicians for the 
Prevention of Nuclear War, Russian Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear 
War, Leitana Nehan Women’s Development Agency, Christian Council of Sierra 
Leone, People with Disabilities of Uganda, South Asia Partnership International 
(on behalf of South Asia Small Arms Network)’ (United Nations 2001, p3).  
 
A series of conferences from 1998 to 2001 resulted in the UN adopting a 
Programme of Action (PoA) to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in 
SALW (Bruggeman 2008, Golding and McClory 2008, Jojarth 2009). The UN 
reviews the progress of the PoA on an annual basis with meetings of experts 
from member countries (United Nations 2011). However, this is generally based 
on PoA updates rather than evaluation research (Kytomaki and Yankey-Wayne 
2004). 
The strict firearms control that already exists in the UK restricts the availability 
of firearms. There is little evidence of firearms being illegally smuggled into the 
UK. Illicit firearms are supplied from the stock already in the UK, much of which 
is re-cycled for use by way of loan by illegal suppliers13. It includes re-activated 
firearms and converted weapons14, which are sought because of the lack of 
other firearms caused by tight control. The additional mandatory sentence, 
introduced in 2004, does not appear to have restricted the availability of 
firearms from the existing illicit UK stock (Hales, Lewis and Silverstone 2006). 
 
                                                          
12 SALW, are, ‘man portable, made or modified to military specifications for use as lethal instruments of war’. They include non-
military firearms. Small arms are designed to be operated by one person and light weapons by a small group. They are variously 
described as  arms, weapons, guns, firearms and sub classified as automatics, semi-automatics, pistols, revolvers, heavy and light 
machine guns, hand guns, rifles, shotguns, air weapons, stun guns, CS sprays, converted firearms, deactivated firearms, 
reactivated firearms, blank firers and include shoulder launched missiles (Jojarth 2009, p223). 
 For the purposes of this thesis, the legal definition of firearms used is the one contained in the UK 1968 Firearms Act.   
 
13 The current literature does not, however, specify or profile who the people are that are hiring out firearms. However, this is 
discussed in detail in the presentation of research findings on the current threat (see 5.4). 
14 Deactivated firearms can be held legally in the UK; however, it is possible to re-activate some to make them illegal prohibited 
firearms. In addition offenders talk of illegal conversions where legal blank firearms or legal air weapons are converted to make 
them into illegal prohibited firearms that fire bullets (Hales, Lewis and Silverstone 2006). 
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1.3.4 Transnational Police Networks 
Policing includes the wide concept of social control. Policing and the function of 
the police has been the subject of wide research (Paterson and Pollock 2011). 
There are different levels of democracy within the various nation state police 
forces around the globe (Haberfield and Cerrah 2008). The police are the key to 
any nation state keeping control of and interacting with its citizens and that 
interaction takes many forms (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). Generally, though, 
the police have the monopoly on the use of force within the state. In addition, 
they provide a social service and keep the peace (Reiner 1992).  
This thesis does not explore policing, transnational policing or social control per 
se, rather, it examines one area of transnational policing by the public police 
and the impact that has on the wider aspects of policing. The focus of the 
research is on the UK public police (warranted and unwarranted staff), who 
operate on a transnational basis, and any other individuals or organisations that 
make up the nodes in the network that the police staff operate. The public police 
are generally referred to as ‘the police’. 
The study and use of nodal networks to understand the knowledge and 
capability of policing is advocated in the literature (Burris 2005, Shearing and 
Johnston 2010). A network is an 'arrangement with intersecting lines, a complex 
system or a group of interconnected people or things' (Hawker 1996, p416) and, 
more specifically to this thesis, it is an interconnected group of people who 
come together to obtain information (Oxford English Dictionary 2003). A node is 
an individual, group, organisation or state that is part of the network (Shearing 
and Johnston 2010). 
The police who take part in transnational networks are usually part of a 
democratic state, they are not dictated to by the nation state and they do not 
separate themselves from the state, however, they do co-operate with police in 
other nation states. That co-operation relies on knowledge networks designed 
to prevent and detect transnational crime (Deflem 2002). It is driven by 
globalisation through increased interconnectedness facilitated by the use of, 
what Levi (2007, p775) defines as, 'tools of late modernity', such as improved 
travel and technology. 
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This thesis focuses on the policing carried out by nation state public police to 
prevent and control the firearms threat.  It includes the work of sworn police 
officers, those employed to work alongside them in a support function and those 
who work in partnership with police officers and police support staff. The 
evidence is drawn from people based in the UK, who are employed by or advise 
UK police forces. They facilitate the coming together of a group of 
interconnected people from various nation states, to gather intelligence to police 
the firearms threat, which includes crimes that affect more than one country and 
as such are transnational crimes (Reichel 2005). 
The intelligence agencies in the UK, including MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, have 
become increasingly pluralised into policing functions. As such, they have their 
own transnational networks, which include the function of gathering and 
exchanging information and intelligence on the illicit trade in firearms (Gregory 
2008, Andrew 2009, GCHQ 2010, MI6 2010, MI5 2012). However, intelligence 
agencies have not been included within the scope of the research except where 
they link to or otherwise impact on the Network. 
1.3.5 Intelligence 
Information, intelligence and evidence are terminologies used in this thesis. 
Intelligence is the focus of the research as well as a product of it. Evidence 
about the Network has been analysed to produce academic findings and 
recommendations and those findings could be classed as intelligence. 
Therefore, it is important to understand intelligence (Ronn and Hoffding 2012), 
especially when it is open to a number of interpretations and misinterpretations 
(Harfield et al 2008)15. 
Vincent (1881) stated, “police work is impossible without information”. Policing 
today, as in 1881, is just as impossible without information, but the capacity and 
capability for acquiring information and analysing it has improved and expanded 
(Harfield 2009). According to Bowling and Sheptycki (2012, p85), 'Information is 
the lifeblood of policing' in a late modern global world.  
                                                          
15 There are a number of ways of defining and understanding intelligence and what the user intends intelligence to mean (Sohi and 
Harfield 2008). Therefore, it is important to ask the provider of any intelligence what they mean when they say they are providing 
intelligence.  
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Information that has been subject to rigorous evaluation and risk assessment, 
so that it assists the police with decision making, is defined as intelligence. 
From that intelligence, decisions can be made on prevention, enforcement, and 
further intelligence gathering strategies (Harfield 2009). ‘All information leading 
to intelligence is always evidence’ (Harfield 2009, p366). For legal reasons and 
reasons of protection of sources not all information is used as evidence in court; 
some remains as information and is analysed to become intelligence (Billingsley 
2009).  
Harfield (2009) has defined intelligence for the police in the UK as an analysis 
of information from which decisions can be made. However, there is no clear 
overarching definition that can be agreed on. The US 'Commission of Terrorism' 
was established after the September 11th 2001 attack (9/11) and reported on 
failures to connect intelligence prior to the attack. They called for 
professionalisation and centralisation of intelligence in the US. This was to 
ensure that one organisation has an overview and is able to pull together all the 
intelligence. The professionalisation of intelligence requires an epistemological 
understanding of intelligence (Ronn and Hoffding 2012).  
To meet its aim and objectives this thesis will establish an epistemological 
understanding of the Network, which in turn requires an understanding of the 
intelligence that is the business of the Network. That includes what it is and how 
it is obtained, analysed and evaluated. Intelligence can be found on a 
continuum from raw data to information to knowledge. It can be between 
information and knowledge or after knowledge (Ronn and Hoffding 2012).  
Information is data with meaning and knowledge; it contributes to finding the 
right answer to a question. On one level, intelligence is the process by which 
information is turned into knowledge, at which point it is plausible information. 
Alternatively, it can be valid and actionable knowledge; where it is known to be 
true, it answers the question and action can be taken as a result. However, 
there is a further argument that states intelligence is the process of turning 
information into knowledge and then into actionable knowledge. In other words, 
it is a section of a continuum that extends further from raw data to actionable 
knowledge and it includes knowledge (Ronn and Hoffding 2012).   
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Knowledge is also a continuum in itself. In ascertaining the right answer, 
especially in relation to what might happen, the absolute truth cannot be stated 
until after that event. Therefore, knowledge can range from true to the best of 
an individual's belief, to absolutely certain. Whether intelligence includes 
knowledge or falls either side of knowledge, it is subject to error (in itself and by 
those judging it) so it is fallible (Ronn and Hoffding 2012) and it should be 
subject to a clear evaluation of the source and the product (ACPO NPIA 2010). 
In summary, intelligence is fallible and it is necessary to know how and why it 
was assembled to understand what it is and its value (Ronn and Hoffding 2012). 
In addition, and of importance to this thesis, it is necessary to know the impact 
intelligence has on individual nodes and nodal networks to understand where 
the power lies (Shearing and Johnston 2010, Castells 2004). Intelligence is not, 
as one former Chief Police Officer in the UK claimed, all information held on 
police computers (Haggerty and Ericson 2000); some analysis has to be made 
of that information for it to become intelligence (Harfield 2009, Ronn and 
Hoffding 2012). Thereafter, fully ‘analysed intelligence is more potent than 
coercive force for policing’ (Grieve 2008, p17). This thesis will show that the 
Network deals in the full continuum of intelligence from raw data to absolute 
knowledge. It is also a conduit for the exchange of knowledge, policy transfer, 
police disruption of the illicit firearms market and gathering of evidence for court. 
1.3.6 The Reconstruction of Policing 
The police existed in the UK in the 1800s but they were considered to be weak 
and liable to corrupt practices (Reiner 2010). Professional police forces also 
existed in other parts of the world in the 1800s. However, the launch of the 
Metropolitan Police in London (following enactment of the Metropolitan Police 
Act 1829) is perceived by many police officers to be the first professional force 
and is interpreted as the birth of the modern professional police; the ‘new police’ 
(Reiner 2010, p40). Even though there are differing views on why it was 
established (see Reiner 2010 for orthodox and revisionist views below), the 
Metropolitan Police, and other police forces that were subsequently formed in 
the UK, were more than just an organisation that enforced the law on behalf of 
the UK Government (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). UK police forces were 
accountable to a democratically elected government. They were professional 
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and co-ordinated (Reiner 2010) and policed with the consent of UK citizens 
(Rowe 2008).  
Policing in the UK is based on a social contract with the people. It empowers 
them to decide on the type of police and policing they want (Bowling and 
Sheptycki 2012). Policing by consent underpins community policing which is 
predominant in the UK (Maguire and John 2006, Waddington 2007, Savage 
2007, Baggott 2007, Tilley 2008) and it is important that all police research 
should consider the legitimacy of any policing that is being undertaken to 
ensure it is legitimate in the eyes of those who are being policed (Rumbaut and 
Bittner 1979, Bottoms and Tankebe 2012). 
The birth of the modern police force was driven by a combination of factors. 
Those factors included the industrial revolution, urbanisation and a class 
struggle, which were used to explain differing views. The 'Orthodox' view was 
that the modern police was brought about by way of a response to the increase 
in crime as a result of the industrial revolution and increased urbanisation in the 
UK. The protection of the UK upper classes against revolution by way of a new 
police force was known as the 'Revisionist' view. However, the current 
consensus is that the birth of policing was driven by a 'Neo Reithian Revisionist 
Synthesis' (Reiner 2010, p65), a synthesis of the orthodox and the revisionist 
theories (Reiner 2010). Interestingly, the continuing reconstruction of policing 
highlighted by this thesis appears to be driven by the threat of crime and 
whichever view is taken of the drivers behind the birth of modern policing they 
all contained an element of a threat. 
Globalisation has made it increasingly difficult for democratic nation states, such 
as the UK, to control and provide the police and policing demanded by its 
citizens (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). Held and McGrew (2003) state that 
globalisation is increased interaction between nation states. This means that 
what happens within the nation state is affected by what is happening in the 
wider world. According to Deflem (2010), there is also increasing interaction 
between police officers from different nation states, which is evidenced by, 
amongst other activity, the increased number of police International Liaison 
Officers (ILOs) stationed overseas by different nation states (Walker 2008, 
p125). This is particularly so with the police in democratic nation states as they 
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tend to have operational independence from their political centres (Deflem 
2002). For example, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) has counter 
terrorism intelligence officers stationed in 11 cities outside the United States 
(US) providing previously unavailable knowledge on terrorist attacks like 
Mumbai (New York City Police Foundation 2015). This thesis also includes 
other data on the number of UK ILOs stationed outside the UK (see chapter 6.3). 
Therefore, policing becomes global in nature and as stated by Bowling and 
Sheptycki (2012, p131), ‘While there is no global police force, there is global 
policing’.  
Over time, policing has become pluralised at all levels. A number of people and 
organisations, both public and private, local, national and transnational, have 
become involved in what the police do and in delivering what they do (Crawford 
2008). The reconstructing of policing is the development of how policing is 
delivered and who delivers it. Generally, there has been a move away from the 
nation state government being responsible for both authorising and providing 
policing to them steering policing (Bayley and Shearing 2001). The move 
reflects a wider move from centralized government to put the power and 
resources in the hands of those bringing about local delivery. Leaving those in 
the central government to steering rather than rowing. The move is driven by 
tighter budget constraints and a need to be more efficient (Osborne 1993).The 
reconstructed move away from nation state policing, and its pluralisation, can 
be viewed in a number of ways including the geographical reconstruction of 
policing. How policing is delivered transnationally within the geographical 
continuum from local to global, and who is involved in that delivery is the focus 
of this thesis (Crawford 2008, Bowling and Sheptycki 2012).   
The theoretical aspects of the reconstruction of contemporary policing and what 
impacts on and drives that reconstruction are discussed in more detail in the 
literature review that follows. Three themes are drawn from the existing 
literature. They broadly match the themes drawn from the research findings, 
which is in line with grounded theory research where the literature review is 
constantly reviewed in line with the findings (Glaser 2010). The first theme in 
the literature review examines the firearms threat. The second theme examines 
what the current literature says about the policing response to that threat. The 
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third theme provides a theoretical framework for this thesis by examining what 
the existing literature says about global policing, its outcomes and its impact on 
the reconstruction of policing. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction to the Literature Review 
Historically, the police in the UK, working with the consent of the public, take 
action in response to criminal threats. They respond by way of problem solving 
and the adoption of evidence based strategy and policy as part of a wider social 
control that is needed to maintain order (Paterson and Pollock 2011). In fact, 
the various responses to crime can fall anywhere along a continuum of crime 
control from dealing with the social causes of crime to the detection and 
bringing to justice of individuals by the police (Stenson 1991).  
The response to the threat sometimes involves the police working on a 
transnational basis through 'Policeization' (Deflem 2002, p228). Policeization is 
bureaucrat to bureaucrat contact drawn from Max Weber's 'bureaucratization' 
(Kalberg 2005, p47) which tends to persist, no matter who is in power (Deflem 
2002, Kalberg 2005). The UK police are a legitimate bureaucracy operating 
within a legal system that gives them a monopoly on the use of force to 
maintain order and control crime (Deflem 2002). They represent the 
government on the street by operationalising government policy and exercising 
the monopoly on the use of force (a concept identified by Max Weber) to deal 
with offenders within the sovereign nation state of that government (Rumbaut 
and Bittner 1979).  
The police also respond by assessing the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities 
and threats within their organisation with a view to working more efficiently. 
Such assessments, made in line with government policy in the UK, lead to the 
pluralisation of policing where more agencies, both public and private in nature, 
take responsibility for policing issues (Jones and Newburn 2006). In some 
cases, the shape of policing is reconstructed. The current emphasis is on the 
nation state government steering policing and other agencies providing policing 
services and in particular, there is a move towards the privatisation of policing 
(Bayley and Shearing 2001). However, there are indications that the nation 
state is finding it increasingly difficult to steer policing (Bowling and Sheptycki 
2012) and there is a perception amongst some politicians within nation states 
that a global police state exists (Westmarland 2011). 
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Stenning and Shearing (2012) see contemporary policing to be very wide in that 
“…the modern realities of policing (are) pluralised provision, not monopolised by 
nation states, serving a broad range of ends reflecting a broad range of public 
and private (state and non-state) interests, occurring in cyberspace as well as 
terrestrially, performed through technology as well as through human agency, 
and occurring transnationally as well as domestically” (p268).  
The aim of this thesis is to examine the extent that the Network, viewed from 
the point of view of the UK public police and their involvement as nodes in the 
Network, leads to a reconstruction of policing. In other words do the police who 
take part in policing the firearms threat engage in relationships and activity that 
promote Bayley and Shearing’s (2001), Westmarland’s (2011), Stenning and 
Shearing’s (2012) and Bowling and Sheptyki’s (2012) wider view of a 
reconstruction of policing. 
Stenning and Shearing (2012) state that transnational police research is in its 
infancy and there is a pre-occupation amongst academics with the transnational 
activities of the public police to the exclusion of transnational private policing. 
This thesis also focuses on the public police nodes but draws out the extent of 
their relationship with private nodes and the impact this has on the wider 
reconstruction of policing. To understand the impact, there is a need to show 
where the literature stands on the current firearms threat, as that is what the 
Network is dealing with. In addition, there is a need to show where the literature 
stands on the response to the threat and the theoretical impact of that response 
on the reconstruction of policing. Therefore, this review will critically analyse the 
existing literature on the firearms threat and the response to it. This includes the 
involvement of the Network in that response, the existing theoretical framework 
of global policing and what the theoretical outcomes are in relation to a 
reconstruction of policing.  
The review will show that, according to the current literature, there is a 
continuation of policeization and a reconstruction of policing in the form of 
pluralisation and privatisation, which extends to the transnational (Bayley and 
Shearing 2001, Deflem 2002, Jones and Newburn 2006). Sometimes, that 
reconstruction leads to influences by organisations not based in the UK, which 
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could add to the perception that a global police state exists (Westmarland 2011, 
Stenning and Shearing 2012, Bowling and Sheptyki 2012). 
2.2 The Threat According to the Current Literature  
There is an increasing threat to society from the illicit supply and use of firearms 
by organised criminals16 and terrorists17 (Bruggeman 2008, Jojarth 2009, Rollins 
2010). As well as the general global threat from the illicit firearms market, in 
2010, the media reported a threat of a 'Mumbai' style terrorist attack, on the UK. 
The attack would involve multiple murder using firearms (Hayman 2010 - B3018, 
BBC 2010a - B30, and 2010b - B30, Police News 2010a - B30 and 2010c - 
B30). The actual risk of a Mumbai style attack being launched in the UK by al-
Qaeda terrorists has not been made clear to the public. MI5, who are the lead 
agency on counter terrorism in the UK, specify the use of firearms by al-Qaeda 
as a threat (MI5 2012 - A40). Analysis of the research for this thesis shows that 
the Mumbai style threat has not been overlooked by the Network. However, 
operational security risks have prevented research participants from disclosing 
much detail on the assessment of the threat. 
A potential source of illicit firearms for terrorist use in the UK is the 
OCG/terrorist nexus, where OCGs and terrorists deal with each other to meet a 
specific need (Severns 2012). While the core leadership of al-Qaeda do not 
promote links with OCGs, there are many al-Qaeda inspired organisations and 
individuals who need to work with local OCGs for funding and logistics (Rollins 
2010). This was clearly evidenced by Operation Barker, a case I investigated, 
where a suspected al-Qaeda inspired individual purchased a deactivated 
firearm from an OCG in Derbyshire together with the means to reactivate it 
illegally. Having purchased the deactivated firearm with the equipment to 
                                                          
16 Organised crime is variously defined and can be summed up as, 'more than one person working together over a period of time to 
commit crime for personal gain. By committing crime, or in protecting their criminal enterprise, those persons present a serious 
threat to society by way of violence, corruption or damage to the economy' (Hobbs 1998, Levi 1998, SOCA 2009 - A10, Reichel 
2005, Levi 2007, Severns 2012). 
17 Terrorism can be summed up as 'any crime, including any preparatory crime,  that has the ultimate aim of instilling mass fear 
amongst opponents, in order to bring about regime change or impose a particular political or religious will’. Terrorists are ‘those 
persons who aspire to and carryout, or are party to, acts of terrorism’ (Hobbs 1998, Wilkinson 2003, White 2005, Clarke and Lee 
2008, Levi 2007, Bettison 2009, Severns 2012). 
 
18 Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) has been used throughout this thesis to support other research evidence and the academic 
literature. Where OSINT has been used (in the literature review onwards) it has been graded to make the reader aware of the 
strength of the OSINT evidence. The grading is explained in chapter 3.3 and in the introduction; however, A15 is the highest grade 
and D50 the lowest. Anything graded E means the source is untested. 
Richard John Severns 19035736 The 'Network' 
  
34 
reactivate it, the terrorist suspect also obtained the knowledge from the OCG to 
reactivate and produce a working prohibited firearm (Severns 2001 - A15, BBC 
2004 – B10).  
It can be inferred from the interviews with the OCG members and the literature 
on the terrorist suspect in the Barker case, that they were influenced by what 
was happening in the wider world (Severns 2001 – A15, Andrew 2009). That 
wider world impact can be explained by globalisation, which is the increased 
connectivity between nation states and the increased ability of criminals to 
move about embracing the use of improved travel networks and technology 
(Levi 2007). Similarly, what happens in one part of the world, such as 
Derbyshire, can have an impact on the wider world (Held and McGrew 2003).  
Similar global influences can be inferred from the murder of an off duty soldier 
(Lee Rigby) in Woolwich in 2013 (Malik and Walker 2013 - B30). There are 
claims that the terrorists, who carried out the murder, were radicalised into, 
what White (2005) refers to as, religious terrorism, by persons in the UK and 
elsewhere spreading the al-Qaeda ideology. As with the 7th July 2005 (7/7) 
bombers (BBC 2005 – B30, Bettison 2009), at least one of the Woolwich 
murderers, allegedly travelled abroad to make connections with al-Qaeda 
fighters. However, rather than use bombs for their attack in Woolwich they used 
a car, knives and a firearm (Malik and Walker 2013 - B30).  
The origin of that actual firearm is not known and may have been used by the 
terrorists to provoke the police into shooting them dead (BBC 2013a – B30). It 
has been described as 'a 9.4mm Dutch calibre KNIL Model 91 revolver '(Malik 
and Walker 2013 - B30). It is an old firearm but it could still be a lethal barrelled 
weapon and illegal in the UK (CorEden-Sterling 2013 – A10). It is not clear as to 
whether the Woolwich attackers had any intention to obtain more reliable 
firearms, which could have been used to kill other people. Their focus does 
appear to have been on killing a soldier in a symbolic way in order to terrorise 
those opposed to their views. However, the firearms element of the Woolwich 
attack cannot be ignored and one inference that could be drawn, which is in 
need of further research, is that al-Qaeda inspired terrorists in the UK do seek 
to use firearms, but they lack the means in the form of access to a stock of up to 
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date firearms and ammunition19. As outlined by Ronn and Hoffding (2012) 
further research would develop the intelligence into knowledge.   
The Woolwich murder is further evidence of the criminal threat to the UK from 
the criminal use of firearms, terrorism and organised crime. It also adds to the 
current knowledge that the main terrorist threat to the UK is from glocal Islamist 
terrorists who are local to the UK and are motivated by a global religious 
terrorist ideology to carry out terrorist attacks; in the UK or on a transnational 
basis from the UK (White 2005, Andrew 2009, Bettison 2009, Great Britain, 
Home Office 2011c - A15, MI5 2013 - A10). In addition, there is a threat from 
transnational Islamist terrorists who are residents of a country outside the UK 
and may be motivated by the global fight to attack the UK (Great Britain, Home 
Office 2011c - A15, MI5 2013 - A10). 
Levi (2007) includes terrorism in an analysis of organised crime. He argues that 
it operates in a similar way to other criminal groups using “tools of late 
modernity” (p775). These include the internet, air travel and global financial 
services. However, when he talks about the progression of former terrorists in 
Northern Ireland into organised criminals he does make the distinction that 
terrorists have “ideological motivations” in committing crime, whereas organised 
criminals are “motivated by personal financial accumulation” (p791). 
According to Levi (1998), organised crime is generally used to describe a group 
of people who act together on a long term basis to commit crimes for gain  and 
glocal organised crime takes many forms in the UK (Hobbs 1998). The 
organised crime activity linked to the Operation Barker illicit firearms market 
investigation was many and varied and influenced by global activity (Hales, 
Lewis and Silverstone 2006, Severns 2001 - A15).  
Hobbs (1998) coined the term ‘glocal’ in relation to organised crime. He showed 
that local organised crime is driven by what is happening globally, such as the 
global market in controlled drugs that supplies the local drug dealers in the UK. 
Those local dealers rely on that global market for their product. However, they 
organise themselves together locally to carry out their criminal activity locally. 
                                                          
19 They may also have been unwilling to deal with OCGs to acquire firearms (Rollins 2010, p27 – A25). 
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They are not part of a worldwide network of criminals. They deal with the global 
market but their organisation and impact is local. 
Operation Barker investigated a father and son team working as an OCG. The 
father and son operated from a rural workshop in Derbyshire unlawfully 
supplying deactivated firearms, with the means to reactivate them, to numerous 
UK criminals. The OCG purchased the deactivated firearms legally from an 
international arms dealer. So, whilst the OCG operated independently at a local 
level in the UK it was also facilitated by the global trade in firearms making it 
glocal. The other UK criminals that the father and son team supplied ranged 
from individual criminal armourers to murderers to organised drug dealers and, 
as already mentioned, a suspected al-Qaeda terrorist. Their firearms, which 
ranged from reactivated automatic handguns to reactivated Uzi sub machine 
guns, were also found in the hands of Unionist Terrorists in Northern Ireland 
(Severns 2001 – A15, BBC 2004 – B10, Hales, Lewis and Silverstone 2006, 
Morland 2011). 
Not all the criminals supplied by the OCG in Derbyshire were part of OCGs or 
glocal criminals, however, they are representative of those involved in the illicit 
firearms market in the UK. In addition, the Irish terrorist threat remains in the 
form of dissident republican terrorist groups who are also in the market for illicit 
firearms. That market and the available firearms in that market are a threat and 
it is investigated as a priority by UK police forces. The market, including the 
grey area, where it moves from the legal to the illicit black market dealing, also 
needs further academic research to enable the police and partner agencies to 
tackle it (Severns 2001 - A15, Hales, Lewis and Silverstone 2006, Golding and 
McClory 2008, Rothe and Collins 2010, MI5 2013 - A10). This thesis includes a 
more detailed examination of Operation Barker in the findings. It will show that 
the threat is glocal and that the firearms industry is criminogenic. 
Where firearms from the legal market of international arms dealing and the legal 
UK market in deactivated firearms are moved onto the illegal reactivation 
market, it is a grey area of the market and a threat. That grey area is evidence 
of the international arms trade facilitating the illicit firearms market. In other 
words the legal arms market creates criminogenic conditions. Therefore, that 
legal market should be held more accountable through 'system criminality'; a 
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whole system approach to dealing with crime (Rothe and Collins 2010, p2) and 
this thesis will show that the Network is involved in a developing glocal whole 
system policing response. 
Criminal users of firearms in the UK obtain their firearms in various forms from 
the illicit UK firearms market. In the main, the market is contained within the UK 
and trades in available firearms based on an internal supply and demand. There 
is little evidence in the UK of a cross border trade of illegal firearms. The main 
firearms traded and used illegally are converted imitation firearms, reactivated 
firearms and stolen firearms20. They are supplied by individual UK based 
criminal armourers (Hales, Lewis and Silverstone 2006). 
Hales, Lewis and Silverstone (2006) interviewed 80 persons imprisoned in the 
UK for the criminal use of firearms in a range of crimes including drug dealing, 
robbery and other violence21. Apart from some hearsay about importation of 
firearms into Liverpool from Europe, there is little evidence from the interviews 
of the illegal importation of new working firearms. The market is complex and 
varied. Supply is patchy in the UK and the majority of criminals have to make do 
with what they can obtain; which is usually a dangerously unreliable conversion 
or reactivation. Few criminal end users are well connected enough to obtain 
quality working firearms. Even when reference is made by interviewees to new 
9mm handguns, it could in fact be a good quality reactivated firearm, which 
looks new. This puts a different provenance on the source of a firearm when 
assessing the market threat and how to deal with it (Hales, Lewis and 
Silverstone 2006). 
There is some recent evidence of the illegal importation of firearms from the US. 
In one operation in 2010, (Operation Newhaven22) an illegal reactivation unit 
                                                          
20 Mainly stolen shotguns from house burglaries or firearms leaked from the military. 
21 One of those interviewed made mention of the Operation Barker subjects as a 'father and son team' (Hales, Lewis and 
Silverstone 2006, p55) importing and reactivating Uzi sub machine guns. 
22 Operation Newhaven is discussed further in the presentation of research findings at 5.4. It involves Steven Greenoe, a US citizen. 
He was jailed in the US for breaking down Glock pistols and hiding them in his luggage on internal US flights. He then transferred 
the luggage on to international flights to the UK where he reassembled and sold the firearms on to the illicit UK market. He was 
known to have sold at least 63 firearms on to the illicit UK market and some were used in the course of criminal activity. One was 
used in an attempted murder in Manchester. During that investigation a firearm from another source (Operation Lapworth) was 
recovered which indicated illicit UK armourers were obtaining firearms from different sources, as there was no direct connection 
between Greenoe and the Lapworth offenders  (Carter 2012 – B30, Public service 2012 – B30). 
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based in an engineering factory was identified and illegal handguns and sub-
machine guns together with homemade illegal ammunition were recovered. 
Three of the handguns recovered were found to be live working new Glock 
pistols, which had been purchased legally in the US and illegally imported into 
the UK inside stowed baggage on an aircraft (Harrington 2011). The research 
analysis for this thesis includes a more detailed assessment of the illegal 
importation of working firearms that confirms the threat exists, but it is not as 
extensive as the threat from conversion and reactivation. 
In summary, the current literature indicates there is a threat from the illicit 
firearms market in the UK. Criminals with the right contacts can obtain firearms. 
The illicit supply of firearms is limited to converted and reactivated firearms, 
stolen firearms and potentially some imports from Europe and the US. The UK 
market is UK centric and there is little  cross border dealing in illegal firearms. 
Apart from the Operation Newhaven US connection, the transnational 
connection tends to be legal imports of blank firearms and deactivated firearms 
which are then illegally converted or reactivated and diverted on to the illicit 
market in the UK. The strict gun control legislation in the UK restricts the size of 
the market and leads to a limited criminal use of firearms. However, when they 
are used, firearms have a serious impact on victims and their families and the 
fear of crime in the community increases (Hales, Lewis and Silverstone 2006, 
Golding and McClory 2008, Harrington 2011). 
The threat can be explained by ‘crime script analysis’ which Cornish and Clarke 
(2002, p42) use  to show how organised crime operates. A rational choice is 
made by older more determined criminals, to commit well-planned crimes. In 
committing crime they consider the risk of being caught and make adjustments 
to reduce that risk. The crime script breaks down the modus operandi of 
organised crime and it can be used to show how the illicit UK firearms market 
operates and how it is facilitated by organised criminals who form criminal 
nexuses with other criminals, including terrorists. It can also be used to identify 
those who need to be targeted to reduce the market and to prevent market 
displacement (Sutton, Schneider and Hetherington 2001, Cornish and Clarke 
2002, Severns 2012). 
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Rational Choice Theory (RCT) is based on the beliefs in Classical Criminology 
that people choose their behaviour freely based on avoiding pain (i.e. 
apprehension and sentence) and gaining or maintaining pleasure (getting away 
with criminal behaviour) (Cornish and Clarke 2014). RCT underpins Situational 
Crime Prevention (SCP), which is an approach to preventing crime, politically 
conservative in nature and situated within the Administrative Criminological 
theoretical perspective. SCP advocates implementing a range of techniques 
aimed at reducing the opportunity for criminal behaviour to occur. It includes 
cutting the murder rate by reducing ‘the availability of handguns’ (Clarke 1997, 
p5). RCT is about what criminals do rather than why they do it. By 
understanding what they do, criminal markets can be targeted by increasing the 
risk for the criminals (Sutton, Schneider and Hetherington 2001). 
The main premise of RCT is that criminals make decisions before committing a 
crime. They base those decisions on the risk of being caught weighed against 
the amount of reward they will receive as a result of committing the crime 
(Cornish and Clarke 1987, Clarke 1997). The fact that criminals make such 
rational choices means crime can be prevented by implementing situational 
preventative measures such as, "increasing the amount of effort involved (on 
the part of the offender) to commit the crime, increasing the perceived risks of 
being caught, reducing the anticipated rewards of the crime, reducing 
provocation and removing excuses" (Tierney 2009, p7). Despite it being about 
what criminals do, critics of RCT and SCP still argue that it is too simplistic 
because it does not consider the deeper motivations behind criminals making 
the decision to offend (Tierney 2009).  
Nevertheless, organised criminals do consider the risks, effort and rewards in 
choosing which field of crime to operate in and then choose the one that 
maximises their profit for minimal effort (Cornish and Clarke 2002). For 
example, someone with criminal contacts who has knowledge and experience 
of firearms and engineering, will find it easy to set up and cover an illegal re-
activation or conversion operation. Their script then involves following a process 
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that includes acquiring skills and resources and having the emotional capacity 
to carry out the crime23. 
The re-activation example is a simple example of a crime script. It shows how 
organised crime, including terrorism (Levi 2007) and the nexus between 
organised crime and terrorism (Makarenko 2004, Clarke and Lee 2008, Severns 
2012), can be broken down in order to understand and tackle the process. In 
the same way that Clarke 1997 suggests reducing the availability of handguns 
to make it harder for murderers to gain access to them, the identification of the 
who, what, where, when, how and (where possible, in acknowledgement of the 
RCT critics) the why24 of the reactivation process identifies a number of 
opportunities for preventing organised crime and terrorism25. The more links 
there are between people and groups involved in the organised crime, or in this 
case the illicit firearms market, the more complex the script becomes. There is 
an ever increasing amount of linked crimes, preparatory crimes, 'criminal actors' 
and 'criminal equipment' (Cornish and Clarke 2002, p58) making up a criminal 
nodal network.  
Knowing and understanding the complex crime script and the nodal network it 
forms can help in determining how to prevent and detect firearms crime and 
provide an effective policing response to the firearms threat (Cornish and Clarke 
2002, Kenny 2008, Shearing and Johnston 2010). In addition, by identifying the 
motivation for the crime, in response to the criticism of RCT, other distinctions 
can be made to enable wider social controls to be implemented from the causes 
of crime end of the continuum identified by Stenson (1991). According to Levi 
(2007), apart from the motivation, terrorism operates in a similar way to 
organised crime. Therefore, obtaining as much intelligence on criminal activity 
as possible can identify its many parts and where there is a blurring of 
                                                          
23 To complete the crime and the 'crime script' the potential re-activator will sound out their criminal contacts for outlets for sale 
of the finished product. They acquire further knowledge of re-activation from books, the internet or associates, obtain the 
required equipment, adapt their premises or acquire new premises to be able to run the operation covertly, test the 
manufacturing process and  the finished firearm. They then sell the required product directly to criminal end users or via one or 
more third parties.  
24 Who, what, where, when, why and how are the key questions of intelligence analysis (Kerr 2008) and they are also the key 
questions that are asked to draw out the grounded theory of this thesis. 
25 I.e. Strict control on the sale and ownership of deactivated firearms reduces access to them and prevents their reactivation 
(Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons 2011a, p46 - A15). 
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organised crime and terrorism, distinctions can be drawn and interventions 
made26. 
There is a traditional view in the literature that the threat from the growth in 
transnational crime, including the threat from trafficking in firearms, has driven 
the globalisation of policing. There is also a view that such problems as the 
illegal trade in firearms are a symptom of conflicts around the world. In defining 
the problem fully it is in fact the people involved in the conflict who are the 
problem and they drive the threat and the response by the police (Fijnaut 2012). 
Therefore, it is important to look at the problem holistically in order to establish 
what the policing response is or should be in terms of SCP, without it leading to 
tactical displacement (Tierney 2009) where the criminals adapt and remain one 
step ahead of the police (Kenny 2008). Both the research for this thesis and the 
literature review have considered the transnational policing response to the 
firearms threat in detail. 
2.3 The Response to the Threat According to the Current Literature 
According to the current literature, whilst the firearms threat has a transnational 
aspect and should be viewed holistically, there is a need for robust local policing 
structures to respond to where the threat impacts (Fijnaut 2012). The firearms 
threat is monitored by the National Ballistics Intelligence Service (NABIS) in the 
UK (Golding and McClory 2008) and they task UK police action on the illicit 
firearms market through the process of the National Intelligence Model (NIM). 
NABIS is an ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers) sponsored national 
police unit. NABIS focus on gathering and disseminating intelligence on the 
firearms threat in England and Wales and have recently expanded their area of 
business to include Northern Ireland and Scotland (NABIS 2012 - A10) .  
All UK police forces contribute financial resources to NABIS and some 
contribute human resources. The core responsibility of NABIS is the 
examination of ballistics material recovered at crime scenes and linking those 
results to other firearms intelligence (NABIS 2012 - A10). NABIS and other 
policing groups and organisations are the Network nodes that are studied in 
                                                          
26 I.e. In response to the motivation - stopping the radicalisation of youths in order to prevent them becoming involved in 
terrorism (Great Britain, Home Office 2013a – A40). 
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detail for this thesis. They are analysed from the point of view of the current 
literature then later by analysis of the research findings. 
NABIS was commissioned by ACPO in 2007 to address problems such as 
inefficient processing of forensic evidence and the lack of information sharing 
and linking of evidence between UK police forces (Herrington 2011). Gallop and 
Wilson (2014) state such inefficiencies are part of a wider problem of 
inefficiencies across the whole spectrum of forensic science, exacerbated by 
the 2012 break-up of the Government sponsored Forensic Science Service 
(FSS) in favour of free market private forensic providers. 
The implementation of NABIS was led by the ACPO Criminal Use of Firearms 
(CUF) group. Of particular importance, in securing a solution to the inefficiency 
and lack of information sharing, was proactive partnership engagement with all 
UK police forces. In addition, bringing firearms forensic examination back under 
the control of the police and engaging forensic partners in that process from the 
start, streamlined and accelerated the process of firearms examination 
(Herrington 2011).  
A new database underpinned the NABIS process that all law enforcement 
partners could update and search. The NABIS process has now become 
sufficiently efficient that, not only can it effectively manage recovered firearms 
and ballistic material to link crimes and other intelligence; it can also identify 
inferred firearms from ballistics intelligence. In addition, it can identify potential 
new criminal reactivation operations, as it did with Operation Newhaven in 
2009, which was a proactive operation that involved several police forces and 
NABIS in the UK. They collaborated to deal with the illegal reactivation and 
supply operation in the UK and liaised with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) in the US for them to deal with the US suspect 
for the Glock importation (Herrington 2011).  
The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) had staff working within NABIS 
(NABIS 2012 - A10). Even though SOCA might appear to have been a police 
force to ‘the reasonable man on the Clapham omnibus’ (Harfield 2006 p743), it 
was championed by UK Government ministers as a new type of agency which 
was not a police force. SOCA was run by former MI5 and MI6 officers with a 
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focus on intelligence. It had the aim, set by the Government, of reducing harm 
caused by crime, taking it away from criminal investigation and prosecution and 
allowing it the scope to intervene in and disrupt organised crime in other ways 
(Harfield 2006, p748 and 2008, p489). SOCA focused on serious organised 
crime, had a UK wide responsibility, with a strategic priority for firearm crime 
and they deployed liaison officers overseas as part of the SOCA Liaison 
Network (SLN) (SOCA 2012 - A10). The SOCA officers operating the SLN were 
ILOs (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). This thesis will show that SOCA and its 
liaison network has now been taken over as a valued asset by the National 
Crime Agency (NCA) and it is an active part of the Network. 
SOCA was tasked, with improving knowledge on how organised crime operated 
(Great Britain, Home Office 2004). Little progress has been made on improving 
that knowledge and there is a call for better organisation of the policing of 
organised crime by police and other agencies on a transnational basis. To date, 
NIM in the UK and the European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM), 
implemented by the European Police Office (Europol), is as far as the 
organisation of policing has gone and it needs to go further (Harfield 2008). 
However, there are signs of increased organisation with the implementation of 
NABIS (Herrington 2011) and (as will be shown) with the introduction of the 
NCA.  
The ILOs working within the SLN are a key component of intelligence led 
policing (ILP) which is the model of policing supported by NIM and ECIM. The 
deployment of ILOs in Jamaica on behalf of Operation Trident, a Metropolitan 
Police Operation tackling shootings in London Jamaican communities, was 
seen as a key strategic intelligence led initiative in dealing with firearms crime in 
in the Metropolitan districts (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012, p80). ILOs are 
expected to secure timely, actionable intelligence on specific crimes and 
criminals. They also contribute to multi source intelligence that informs the 
transnational strategic response to crime and the criminals that perpetrate the 
crime. ILOs first started to liaise on transnational drug trafficking and this has 
expanded into the wider activities of OCGs and terrorists. They are important 
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‘fixers’27 (Block 2008, p185) who meet face to face with police from other nation 
states.  
Bigo (2000) perceives ILOs to be facilitators of knowledge communication who, 
in some instances, contribute to the spread of insecurity and the subsequent 
securitisation of Europe. They pursue their own agenda and make work in order 
to justify their existence. However, the analysis of the research evidence for this 
thesis will show that organised crime policing is more organised through the 
work of ILOs and other individuals in the Network who occasionally work on a 
transnational basis. All are similar to the boundary agents identified by Kelly 
(2008) who are key links in partnership networks, holding the partnerships 
together and acting as conduits for information, intelligence and knowledge. 
The UK intelligence agencies responsible for national security (MI5, MI6 and 
GCHQ) also have ILOs (Gregory 2008) but they are not police agencies and 
they do not have police powers of arrest and detention. However, they do 
contribute to policing by providing intelligence to assist the police. They are 
increasingly pluralised into policing, where the resources of a number of 
agencies are pooled to increase efficiency and provide more for less (Jones and 
Newburn 2006). This is particularly so in the case of MI5, where former MI5 
staff were influential in the formation of SOCA (Harfield 2006, Bowling and 
Sheptycki 2012). MI5 are also the lead agency for gathering intelligence on 
terrorists and running operations, in close partnership with the police, to disrupt 
terrorist activity and bring terrorist suspects to justice (Brodeur 1999, Andrew 
2009, MI5 2012 - A10).  
It is not clear from the current academic literature or from the thesis research 
evidence what specific firearms intelligence is gathered by the intelligence 
agencies. However, the gathering of information within any of the police and 
intelligence agencies is directed in line with the priorities of the particular 
agency. Those priorities are published in the agencies’ plans together with an 
intelligence requirement.  All the agencies interact with each other through 
                                                          
27 Block (2008) has in mind ILOs working in Russia when he describes them as ‘fixers’. They are able to circumvent the mindless 
Russian police bureaucracy through personal contact and knowledge of the Russian systems. 
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NIM28, which, as already stated and according to the literature, 'is as far as the 
organisation of organised crime policing has gone' (Harfield 2008). 
The full implementation of NIM for UK police forces in 2004 was treated with 
scepticism by some police officers because it was the domain of intelligence 
officers and detectives. It was also seen as conflicting with other priorities such 
as community policing (Maguire and John 2006). Despite these conflicts and 
the empire building tendencies of NIM; where an array of computers, analysts, 
financial investigators, researchers and source handlers, amongst others, have 
replaced the criminal biographical expertise of the loan collator29 (Smith 2009), 
NIM is now established in the UK. It is operated at all levels of policing by UK 
police forces and their partner agencies (Maguire 2008).  
ECIM is similar to NIM (Brady 2008). It is a means of implementing intelligence 
led European wide policing. It is based on the intelligence cycle. Trends, gaps in 
knowledge and intelligence gathering requirements are identified for members 
of Europol to collect. This leads to the production of intelligence products that 
inform the co-ordinated targeting of organised criminals by Europol and 
Eurojust30 members, by way of enforcement and disruption. The results of the 
enforcement and disruption are analysed and the cycle starts again with the 
further intelligence requirements (Hauschild 2009).  
ECIM should form the basis of European policing led by Europol. Europol 
should be a mature community of police officers making sound intelligence 
based judgements rather than striving to be a supranational police force (Brady 
2008). However, there are frustrations amongst those working for Europol and 
                                                          
28 Harfield (2009, p352) describes NIM as ‘a business process designed to facilitate the prioritization of tasks based on current 
intelligence and the consequent allocation of resources’; co-ordinating activity on a local (level 1), regional (level 2), national and 
international basis (level 3). Information is gathered by police and partnership agency systems. The information is researched and 
analysed to develop intelligence. Strategic and tactical assessments together with subject and problem profiles are produced from 
the intelligence. These products are then actioned at tasking and co-ordinating meetings held at all three levels. Tasking results in 
further information gathering, prevention initiatives and enforcement. The results of the tasking are then reviewed, researched 
and analysed for consideration of further action. 
29 A single sub-division based 'information entrepreneur' with responsibility for and an overview of all the intelligence on the sub-
division… Collators(had) an encyclopaedic knowledge of criminals in their area. Although they were shown …to be not very good at 
disseminating their wealth of knowledge, collators were able to relate criminal biographies because they knew and had interacted 
with them…Such biographies have gone with the demise of the collator and would be a useful addition to the NIM process (Smith 
2009, p194). 
30
 Eurojust is the Judicial Co-operation Unit for the European Union. Eurojust assist the competent authorities of EU Member States, 
when they deal with serious cross-border and organised crime, such as terrorism, trafficking in human beings, drugs and arms, the 
sexual exploitation of women and children, cybercrime, various kinds of fraud and money laundering (Eurojust 2013).  
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even misunderstandings on the definitions of information, intelligence and 
knowledge (Kleiven and Harfield 2008). In addition, the research evidence for 
this thesis shows that Europol are facilitators, rather than leaders, when it 
comes to the firearms threat and they are by no means a supranational police 
force. 
The majority of police forces in Europe believe that criminals use and transport 
illicit firearms across the EU and those police forces collect data on the illicit 
firearms market. However, they do not share that data across borders, mainly 
due to security concerns. Therefore, the Odyssey project was funded by the EU 
to focus on the collection and exchange of data relating to firearms crime across 
the EU. Odyssey was set up with a view to suggesting solutions and building a 
prototype information technology (IT) system for managing and exchanging 
ballistics and other firearms related intelligence (Yates et al 2011a). This 
needed to be done against a backdrop of different policy, legal and data sharing 
issues and different IT and non-IT systems run by individuals performing one or 
more functions (Yates et al 2011). That backdrop is good evidence of 
disorganised organised crime policing alluded to by Harfield (2008). 
According to Yates et al (2011) Odyssey developed a useful prototype IT 
system capable of being deployed with an organisation such as Europol. 
However, before it can become operational it needs to overcome the non-
technological issues. The different legal, policy and organisational issues still 
remain and in particular there is a need to develop agreed policy among EU 
users on 'key standards of data exchange' (p32). The technology is available to 
improve transnational policing but people cannot agree how to use it. This is a 
'millstone' (p33) around the neck of transnational policing and evidence that 
transnational organised policing can still be disorganised even when solutions 
are offered. The research participants for this thesis were in fact silent on 
Odyssey and ECIM. 
Further afield, the UN PoA to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in 
SALW includes actions, for member state police, on OCG and terrorist use and 
supply of firearms (UN 2001 - A10, Golding and McClory 2008, Jojarth 2009, 
Spicer 2010 - A10, Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons 2011a - A10, 
UN 2011 - A10). The UN also recognises that there is increasing globalisation 
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of organised crime and terrorism. OCGs and terrorists no longer recognise 
nation states. Therefore, a global response to the OCG/terrorist threat is 
required (UNODC 2009 - A10, UN 2009 - A10). 
The SALW PoA is reviewed on an annual basis with meetings of experts from 
member countries (UN 2011 - A10). However, this is generally based on PoA 
updates rather than evaluation research (Kytomaki and Yankey-Wayne 2004). 
One update by the UK specific point of contact (SPOC) for the PoA, at the 
Foreign Office, indicates that NABIS co-ordinate police action inside the UK 
(Spicer 2010 - A10). A later Foreign Office update focuses on the illegal supply 
of firearms to other countries involving UK nationals and the illegal passage of 
firearms through UK territory (Gore 2012 - A10). Neither give any updates on 
UK police activity targeted against the firearms threat. This is despite the fact 
that the PoA suggest actions31 for member state law enforcement agencies (UN 
2011 - A10). The research participants for this thesis confirm that the UN SALW 
PoA has little impact on the Network from a UK point of view. 
In summary, according to the existing literature, there is a strong UK police and 
policing response to the firearms threat and it forms part of a wider global 
policing response to crime (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). However, there is still 
a suggestion that the response could be more organised (Harfield 2008, 
Golding and McClory 2008) and it is not clear how the Network operates within 
Bowling and Sheptyki’s (2012) global policing. In order to understand further 
how the Network does operate within the global policing context, where it fits 
and whether it contributes to a reconstruction of policing, it is necessary to 
understand the theory of global policing and its outcomes.     
2.4 The Existing Theoretical Framework According to the Current Literature 
According to the literature there are no global police forces although global 
policing does exist in the guise of transnational policing that is delivered locally. 
                                                          
31 Those actions are mentioned in the Preamble to the SALW PoA. Actions include: 
 (a) Strengthening or developing agreed norms and measures at the global, regional and national levels that would reinforce and 
further co-ordinate efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects; 
(b) Developing and implementing agreed international measures to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit manufacturing of and 
trafficking in small arms and light weapons…. 
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Police officers and staff working on a transnational basis make decisions that 
have an impact on how policing is delivered at the level of the Basic Command 
Unit (BCU) within a nation state. Therefore, the theory of global policing is best 
explored within the glocal, national, regional and global geographical spheres of 
police operation (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). Intelligence is important to each 
of those spheres of policing. Intelligence and the knowledge that is produced 
from it lead police actions (Akhgar and Yates 2011a). 
According to Bowling and Sheptycki (2012), policing takes place in a number of 
geographical spheres from the local to the global. Global policing is complex, it 
is facilitated by an ‘occupational subculture of policing’ (p28) and includes a 
subculture of police personnel who operate in the different spheres of policing. 
In some cases, those police personnel take part in poor policing, which leads to 
insecurity and, with the increasing inter-connectedness of globalisation, the 
insecurity becomes global and influences nation state policing. That influence is 
delivered via transnational policing through links to the different geographical 
spheres of global policing, which have several centres of control. As a result, the 
nation state is undermined by a global network of policing (Bowling and 
Sheptycki 2012). 
Therefore, to understand where the power lies within the transnational police 
system and the different spheres of global policing and how that impacts on 
policing structures, it is important to examine different aspects of transnational 
policing by way of Shearing and Johnstone’s (2012) nodal network analysis. 
Such analysis has taken place for this thesis. The area of policing that has been 
subjected to nodal network analysis is the transnational policing of the criminal 
use and supply of firearms by way of the police transnational firearms 
intelligence network (the Network). 
Bowling and Sheptyki’s (2012) spheres of policing in which transnational 
policing operates, include the global, the regional, the national and the glocal. 
Global spheres of policing have a global range and include organisations such 
as Interpol. However, global spheres do not put the global in global policing, 
and organisations such as Interpol, which is included in the global sphere, do 
not dominate global policing. Instead, as with organisations and operations in 
the other spheres, global sphere organisations like Interpol, are nodes, which 
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form part of a complex network that is global policing. Regional spheres in the 
network are concerned with the security of a particular region of the world and 
include Europol. National spheres are concerned with the security of the nation 
state and include organisations such as the NCA in the UK and glocal spheres 
include local police forces and operations with transnational links. For example, 
they include counter terrorism units and the London Metropolitan Police’s 
Operation Trident. 
The term glocal, which Hobbs (1998) used to describe the impact of global 
activity on local criminal activity can also be used to describe the policing of 
criminal activity at this level. According to Bowling and Sheptycki (2012), police 
forces in the UK, US and Australia respond to local crime such as drugs, with 
an understanding of the wider global influences of drug trafficking through a 
network of trafficking routes. As such, they take part in transnational policing 
throughout the different global spheres of policing to help deal with the local 
threat from drug crime and related criminal activity. This makes them glocal in 
nature. 
This thesis has found that the policing of the firearms threat is dealt with by 
glocal policing. As a result, the Network contributes towards a wider glocal 
reconstruction of policing delivered by an organised subculture of police, 
anchored in the nation state and dominated by diplomatic policing methods. The 
indication from this thesis is that glocal policing is dominant. It is not, as argued 
by Bowling and Sheptycki (2012), an element of global policing. They argue that 
global policing is dominant and is delivered by a subculture of police, led by 
enforcers who spread global insecurity through a global network and undermine 
nation state policing. 
Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) subculture that exists within global policing 
impacts on world order and it consists of police officers and police staff working 
across nation state boundaries, using surveillance and coercion, to deal with 
criminal threats. According to the literature, in some instances, police officers 
use evidence available in other nation states that is not available under their 
own nation state criminal law to control crime. For example, during the 1990s 
when the interception of telephone conversations was not allowed in Belgium, 
the Belgian police requested that other nation states carry out the intercept for 
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them, which they then used as evidence in Belgium Courts (Bowling and 
Sheptycki 2012, p19).  
Global policing is, therefore, more than just law enforcement. It involves a 
variety of techniques driven by a subculture of police personnel who are fallible 
and do not always operate as they should. Those police and their subculture 
are examined in more detail by this thesis and the evidence from the Network 
challenges the subcultures analysed by Bowling and Sheptycki (2012).  
The evidence from the research participants for this thesis also enhances the 
general literature on police culture and, as indicated by Westmarland (2008), it 
is varied and draws a variety of opinions and outcomes. The existing literature 
tends to suggest that the culture of the police in the UK and elsewhere results in  
mainly negative outcomes and there is evidence to suggest that it does 
(Heidenshon 2008).  
According to Rumbaut and Bittner (1979), the police see themselves as 
shunned by society for upholding law and order. This makes them pariahs who 
develop their own cultures to cope with the work they do and those cultures 
tend to present a negative outcome, such as wide spread cynicism and 
solidarity leading to covering up bad practice. Such negative cultures persist 
and ‘serve as a collective imprint on how we think about the topic’ (Campeau 
2015, p671). However, as identified by Campeau (2015), the culture of solidarity, 
which has in the past led to a cloak of silence to cover misdemeanours, is also 
adaptable in the face of increased governance and accountability, towards 
achieving a justified legitimate result. As one of Campeau’s (2015, p678) 
participants puts it: 
‘…this (police) service is only strong (when) the people …are doing the 
right things’. 
Police culture is 'loosely defined'  (Chan 1996, p111) as the way things have 
always been done. It features a number of negative outcomes such as 
cynicism, racism, sexism and insensitivity that are obstacles to change and 
improvements in policing.  The culture can have positive aspects in terms of it 
engendering team bonding that results in the team pulling together to deal with 
dangerous police work; but that can also lead to the team pulling together to 
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cover up bad practice. However, police culture varies. It is diverse, it is not the 
same throughout police organisations, it differs individually, collectively and 
hierarchically and is subject to outside influences. There are different ways of 
theorising about police culture and therefore the solution to dealing with the 
negative aspects of it is not just to simply change the rules or the policing 
philosophy, instead it requires a holistic approach and a full understanding of 
why it exists (Chan 1996).  
There is some literature that is more appreciative of why police cultures exists. 
There is an acknowledgement that 'culture does not exist in a vacuum' 
(Waddington 1999, p295) and that police talk in the canteen that demonstrates 
a particularly negative context does not always transfer into action on the 
streets. The talk or canteen banter associated with police culture is in fact a 
coping mechanism for doing what is often a dirty, mundane but sometimes 
dangerous job (Waddington 1999).  
There is also evidence of the existence of positive aspects of police cultures. 
According to Heeres (2012) culture underpins policing at all levels and it is an 
important aspect of leadership to manage that culture, to move policing forward 
for the better. Glosmeth, Gottschalk and Soli-Saether (2007) identified that 
investigative team work culture impacts positively on the investigation of crime. 
A good team work culture leads to the frank exchange and sharing of 
knowledge and that enables the police to perform well and bring about a 
successful conclusion to the investigation. Such a culture exists among groups 
of police officers who are engaged in various complex investigations including 
trafficking in illicit commodities. The culture exists because there is an identified 
goal to aim for. This thesis will extend the evidence on the positive aspects of 
police culture by examining what that goal is and suggesting that generally 
there is a culture of wanting to be the best, to do the best for victims. That 
culture exists within the Network and facilitates the operation of the Network. It 
contributes to the development of nation state policing in the UK and, as 
indicated by Campeau (2015) positive aspects of police culture arise against a 
backdrop of increased governance and accountability. 
The delivery of local policing in the UK from BCU to the national level has 
become pluralised. UK policing has been a political priority for the past 30 
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years. This period coincides with late modernity, which began with the 
prioritisation of the neo liberal free market and privatisation in society in general 
in the 1970s. Neo liberalism has its foundations in Adam Smith’s writing of ‘The 
Wealth of Nations’ (Clarke 2010, p50). It was the political ideology followed by 
prime minister Margaret Thatcher in the UK and president Ronald Reagan in 
the US, whereby market solutions and individual responsibilities were 
prioritised. Decision making moved from the professional middle class to 
management professionals who favoured just desert solutions for crime 
problems. Politicians saw this as a vote winner and so championed the cause of 
just deserts and law and order as a whole. This led to a call for more police 
resources (Garland 2000).  
The UK Government chose not to fund the demand for extra resources. Instead, 
they followed a policy of spending less on public services and looked for other 
ways of identifying resources to meet the demand. This included boosting the 
number of volunteer special constables, the introduction of police community 
support officers (PCSOs) and making other government agencies, such as MI5, 
responsible for some policing functions. It also included partnership working in 
order to pool resources and the privatisation of some policing functions such as 
fraud investigation and security patrols. This spread of policing to produce more 
for less with a view to improving efficiency is pluralisation (Jones and Newburn 
2006). 
The privatisation aspect of pluralisation was explained in terms of 
'multilateralization' by Bayley and Shearing (2001, p1), as they hypothesised 
about what was happening in relation to the reconstruction of policing in 
democratic countries at the same time as inviting others to research the 
reconstruction of policing. Like governments, private providers can be the 
‘auspices32’ (Bayley and Shearing 2001, p3) or providers of security; or both, 
which suggests that policing organisation and provision could be controlled from 
a private organisation based outside the sovereign nation state.    
                                                          
32 Auspices are public or private groups of idividuals who take it upon themselves to organise and direct there own protection. 
Sometimes auspices and providers of policing are the same (Bayley and Shearing 2001, p3).  
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'Without close scrutiny, it has become difficult to tell whether policing is being 
done by a government using sworn personnel, by a government using a private 
security company, by a private security company using civilian employees, by a 
private company using public police, or by a government employing civilians' 
(Bayley and Shearing 2001, p15). However, it is not clear within the literature 
that this comment applies to transnational policing.  
The research evidence for this thesis includes a more detailed examination of 
who actually does the policing and shows that it is the police, who work on a 
transnational basis in partnership with other UK public organisations, that make 
up the nodes in the Network. In carrying out such pluralistic transnational 
policing the police make use of private commercial resources where necessary. 
Those private commercial resources are one part of private multilateralization, 
which also includes private non-government agencies, private individuals, and 
the private provision of services for a fee by the government provided public 
police (Bayley and Shearing 2001). 
According to the literature there is a blur between the public and private 
auspices and providers of policing under multilateralization. There are a number 
of suggested reasons for the multilateralization of policing including political, 
economic and social reasons and a rise in crime and the fear of crime (Bailey 
and Shearing 2001). Other research suggests a political and economic bias in 
the reasons for multilateralization (Garland 2000, Jones and Newburn 2006). 
Whatever the reasons, governments have encouraged multilateralisation and 
'denationalised' policing (Bayley and Shearing 2001, p5). This then causes an 
erosion of the monopoly on policing being held on behalf of the nation state.  
Multilateralization can be viewed as an erosion of sovereignty that has an 
impact on who receives the best policing. In particular, with the rise of private 
commercial policing, the rich and the large corporations will be able to afford the 
best that the private providers can provide, giving them the most effective 
policing and leaving the rest to whatever the nation state government can 
provide. As that best provision and control could be controlled and provided 
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from outside the nation state there is a need for private policing to be 
researched and held to account33 (Bayley and Shearing 2001).  
Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) acknowledge the existence of some pluralisation 
in transnational policing. They evidence the existence of co-operation and 
private policing within high34 and low35 policing and at the global, regional, 
national and glocal levels. They state that the US is the market leader in the 
commercial privatisation of transnational policing activity and have been 
throughout history. The Pinkerton Detective Agency36 was founded in the US in 
the early 1900s and Blackwater US (now known as Academi37), was used by 
the US Government and private corporations to secure and train a number of 
interests overseas. O'Reilly and Ellison (2006) cite the use of such private 
organisations as a challenge to Brodeur's (1983) original concept of high 
policing which was the maintenance of the sovereign state, its leading 
politicians and its economy by the state itself; using covert tactics of 
surveillance and tasking of informants to collect intelligence on state security 
and disrupt any activity undermining state security (O'Reilly and Ellison 2006). 
Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) also evidence how intelligence agencies, such as 
MI5 and MI6, co-operate together, and with the police, to prioritise transnational 
police activity through intelligence gathering and how military tactics are being 
used by the police to reinforce their enforcement of the law.  
In summary, pluralisation, according to the literature, has led to transnational 
policing that is weighted towards enforcement and the 'militarisation and 
securitisation of police intelligence' (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012, p52). There 
has been little research on transnational private policing. Therefore, whilst it is 
accepted that private policing plays a part in facilitating transnational policing, 
the main focus of global policing theory is on how police officers and police staff 
from the public police shape global policing (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). 
                                                          
33 Especially when the likes of G4S a private commercial policing company are working in several countries and employ 530,000 
staff working on public and private contracts (Stenning and Shearing 2012). 
34 Preserving national security (O’Reilley and Ellison 2006). 
35 Law enforcement to prevent and detect crime and disorder (O’Reilley and Ellison 2006). 
36 Now known as Pinkerton.  They manage risk for organisations around the world (Pinkerton 2013 - A10). 
37 Originally set up to train local and regional LEAs Blackwater became Academi in 2011 (BBC 2011c - A20). 
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Greater co-operation between police from different nation states exists and this 
could lead towards the creation of supranational police forces that have 
executive powers in various nation states (Fijnaut 2012). However, there is little 
evidence of such supranational policing from the research evidence obtained for 
this thesis and the facilitation from the private industry is not in the form of 
policing, it is in the form of products that support policing. 
According to Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) global policing does not consist of 
one global police force but consists of local police officers and staff engaged in 
global police activity beyond the nation state. They are bureaucrats working 
across nation state boundaries (some as ILOs). They have a 'sense of mission' 
(Reiner 2010, p119) as part of their subculture to achieve results. In achieving 
their mission ILOs can be divided into technicians, diplomats, entrepreneurs, 
public relation experts, legal experts, spies, field operators and enforcers 
(Bowling and Sheptycki 2012, p87-92) and those subcultures are discussed in 
more detail in the analysis of the findings. They are challenged by this thesis. 
All ILOs and transnational police bureaucrats work with and manage 
intelligence at different levels from the operational to the strategic. Generally, 
intelligence about a criminal threat, leads the action they take (Bowling and 
Sheptycki 2012) in line with ILP (Maguire and John 2006, Maguire 2008, Akhgar 
and Yates 2011a, Fijnaut 2012). However, there should be more emphasis on a 
holistic epistemological approach to strategic intelligence management rather 
than a limited ontological approach (Akhgar and Yates 2011a, Ronn and 
Hoffding 2012). This was seen as of importance in the design of the Odyssey 
prototype IT system for the management of EU transnational firearms 
intelligence. Questions of 'why', 'what if' and 'what next' were asked to add value 
to the process and produce strategic intelligence, which leads to a strategic 
proactive policing approach (Akhgar and Yates 2011a).  
Law enforcement strategy can vary, it is dependent on the level at which it is 
drawn up. There is no agreed academic definition of strategy (Ratcliffe 2004, 
Akhgar et al 2013). Strategy tends to have a long term aim that combines a 
series of actions and objectives to be achieved at set times towards reaching 
the aim. It is subject to regular review, evaluation and management of 
resources (Johnson and Scholes 1993). Strategic intelligence also depends on 
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the level at which it is drawn up. It is intelligence that informs the formulation of 
strategy (Ratcliffe 2004). 
UK national strategies link the local to the global as they act as a 'bridge 
between governmental policy or high order goals for maintaining and preserving 
national interests on the one hand and concrete actions on the other' (Akhgar et 
al 2013, p2). The police deliver policing on a national basis to a national 
strategy within the context of a recognised policing philosophy. In doing so, they 
also operate on a glocal basis. As an organisation, they have a local impact but 
what they do is influenced by global and transnational issues (Bowling and 
Sheptycki 2012) of a 'world risk society' (Beck 2002, p1) where some issues 
present risks that are difficult to control.  
The risk is managed in the UK by a national philosophy of community policing. It 
is delivered locally in the UK in the form of neighbourhood policing by 43 Home 
Office controlled police forces in England and Wales, one in Scotland, and one 
in Northern Ireland and by non-Home Office controlled Forces such as the 
British Transport Police (BTP) (Maguire and John 2006, Waddington 2007, 
Savage 2007, Baggott 2007, Tilley 2008). Although the IPC found that the 
structure of policing through 43 police forces in England and Wales is not fit for 
purpose (Stevens 2013), they found Neighbourhood Policing at BCU level in the 
UK works. The police, to a large extent, understand the policing needs of a 
particular neighbourhood or community. Police officers then work in partnership 
with neighbourhoods and communities and other agencies to solve crime and 
disorder problems (Harfield 2009). Some problems such as the drugs and 
firearms markets have a global influence (Hobbs 1998).  
Intelligence is an important factor in minimising risk and identifying and solving 
policing problems. Therefore, the deployment of neighbourhood policing teams 
is intelligence led through the NIM process (Harfield 2009). The gathering and 
use of intelligence and working in partnership is just as compatible with 
neighbourhood policing (Maguire and John 2006) as it is with the investigation 
of serious and organised crime (Great Britain, Home Office 2011b – A15). 
SOCA operated on a national basis within the UK and its priority was to police 
serious organised crime. It was introduced by the Government as an 
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intelligence-led organised crime disruption agency; a different type of LEA 
(Harfield 2006) and an example of what O'Reilly and Ellison (2006) would class 
as an agency using high policing covert tactics to manage risk. However, in 
reality, they operated as a police force bringing people to justice (Harfield 2006).  
SOCA and some of those working in partnership with it were brought together 
under one organisation (the NCA) on 7th October 2013 (BBC 2013 - B10). The 
NCA has a national crime fighting culture working in partnership with 
'International Forces' (Great Britain, Home Office 2011b, p12 - A15) and it is 
expected to have an impact in local communities by working in partnership with 
local UK police forces. The international/local partnership suggests they will 
take the lead in delivering glocal policing in line with the UK Government's local 
to global organised crime strategy. They will also take the lead in co-ordinating 
ILP and 'co-ordinate the whole operational law enforcement effort against crime' 
(Great Britain, Home Office 2011b, p12 - A15). SOCA facilitated access to the 
wider world of policing for other UK forces, to enable them to police the glocal 
organised crime threat in a glocal way (SOCA 2012b - A10) and the NCA has 
continued to enhance this. 
ILP was introduced into the UK with the establishment of the Regional Crime 
Squads (RCS), from 1965 onwards. RCS targeted the criminal rather than the 
crime with the aim of reducing serious organised crime. In the 1990s, the Audit 
Commission further promoted ILP and the policy of targeting the criminal rather 
than the crime (Harfield 2010). However, ILP came to the fore for all police 
forces targeting all levels and types of crime in the UK and other nation states in 
the early 2000s. Police forces, in partnership with other agencies, began to act 
proactively in response to perceived risks. They assessed those risks using 
intelligence and took action to catch criminals in the act of committing crime or 
preparing to commit crime. They also used intelligence to prevent crime by 
target hardening and high visibility policing. The emphasis was on proactive 
identification, analysis and management of recurring and developing risks rather 
than reactive detection work. It underlined Ericson and Haggerty's (1997) 
assessment of police forces as a 'risk business' (Maguire and John 2006, p68). 
The findings for this thesis will confirm that transnational policing is intelligence 
led. Despite different understandings of intelligence by the police, who still (at 
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times) act in silos and fail to fully engage with partners (Sheptycki 2004), the 
literature confirms ILP now operates at all levels in the UK through NIM 
(Maguire and John 2006, Maguire 2008). However, according to the literature 
ILP and the community policing philosophy that it supports, does not always run 
smoothly. It results in conflicting demands on police resources between high 
policing functions of preserving national security and low policing functions of 
law enforcement to prevent and detect crime and disorder. Both high and low 
policing exist in the UK just as much as in other nation states (Brodeur 1999, 
Brodeur and Leman-Langlois 2003).  
The competing demands between high and low policing could be brought into 
sharper focus with the introduction of the NCA as they have the power to direct 
local police forces to take action based on intelligence, which they assess. 
Currently, they are making demands in favour of low policing functions but, in 
the future, they may also be given responsibility for the high policing function of 
CT policing. There are proposals for re-locating CT Command from the 
Metropolitan Police to the NCA and the NCA  taking over the lead on terrorism 
from ACPO TAM (Terrorism and Allied Matters) and MI5 (Great Britain, Home 
Office 2011b - A15, Pearson 2012 - A10, ACPO 2014 - A10, Casciani 2014 – 
B30). Such proposals are taking place amid talk that the police counter-
terrorism capability needs to increase to manage the intelligence flow from MI5 
(Gregory 2008). 
High policing and low policing are clearly separated in some nation states 
(Brodeur and Leman-Langlois 2003). However, the pluralisation of MI5 into 
policing in the UK (Andrew 2009) has meant that high and low policing in the 
UK and the intelligence gathering tactics employed in both cases, are closely 
aligned. They are even sometimes blurred, as policing the community impact of 
a terrorist attack is viewed as low policing (Innes and Thiel 2008). Brodeur 
accepts cross overs between high and low policing but he tries to maintain a 
renewed distinction that high policing is about the absorption of intelligence 
rather than making use of it to build a criminal case to bring offenders to justice 
(Brodeur 2007). However, the fact remains that in the UK the police and MI5 
work closely together. MI5 agents now attend court to give evidence from their 
covert activities in order to bring suspects to justice (Andrew 2009).   
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The distinction that can be made is that low policing is 'intelligence led' and high 
policing, in the guise of MI5 as the lead, is 'intelligence leading'  (Brodeur and 
Leman-Langlois 2003, p15). Since 9/11 the investigation of terrorism has 
become a high policing function (Brodeur and Leman-Langlois 2003, Brodeur 
2007). If the NCA take over the responsibility for counter terrorism then high 
and low policing in the UK would be fused together in some areas not just 
blurred. A blurring that O'Reilly and Ellison (2006) advocate as the current 
direction.   
The gathering of intelligence for ILP, particularly for high policing reasons, can 
also lead to communities being estranged. The Muslim Community in the UK 
saw the gathering of community intelligence to prevent extremism as spying on 
their community and resulted in them being suspicious and reluctant to engage 
in prevention of terrorism initiatives (Great Britain, Home Office 2011a - A15). In 
addition they have become the new 'suspect community' in the UK (Pantazis 
and Pemberton 2009, p646) . This was a label held by the UK Irish community 
during the height of terrorist activity emanating from Northern Ireland during the 
1970s, 80s and 90s and led, in a large number of cases, to people being 
stopped, checked and detained by police just because they were Irish (Hillyard 
2005, Pantazis and Pemberton 2009).  
Despite potential negative outcomes from introducing policies that lead to 
suspect and suspicious communities (Hillyard 2005, Pantazis and Pemberton 
2006), community policing prevails in the UK (Baggot 2007). ILP is an important 
part of community policing and all other levels of policing including the 
transnational level. The impact of ILP should always be considered, particularly 
when the legitimacy of policing is brought into question by the actions of the 
police.  
There are a number of tests of police legitimacy and legitimate policing, 
including the adherence to a recognised democratic rule of law. It is possible for 
the police to be legitimate, even if those they police do not communicate with 
them or agree with their policing methods. Similarly, it is possible for the police 
not to be legitimate even if the majority of those they police agree with and 
communicate with them (Bottoms 2014). Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) cite 
Tyler (1990) to say that, ‘procedural fairness, if present, is more likely to lead to 
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(1) immediate decision acceptance, and (2) an initial ascription of legitimacy to 
the law enforcement authority’ (p121).  
However, the willingness of the community to freely engage with the police and 
provide them with information is a main test of legitimacy. Legitimacy should be  
part of a two way conversation between those who police and those who are 
being policed and it should be based on shared beliefs (Bottoms and Tankebe 
2012 and Bottoms 2014). Therefore, in analysing the research evidence for this 
thesis, the impact of ILP on the willingness of the community to engage and the 
two way conversation has been considered. It has been considered from the 
point of view of the police who Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) consider to be 
junior frontline power holders. They act on behalf of the government who are 
the power holding ruling elite. The police do, however, remain operationally 
independent in the way in which they use the power (Deflem 2002).   
As intelligence informs decision making it also influences priorities. Therefore, 
dependent on the intelligence, national priorities could be placed higher than 
local priorities and in favour of high policing. The tipping of the balance towards 
the national and high policing can also be influenced by the Home Secretary 
who works at the national level, is responsible for national priorities and holds a 
key position that influences all other areas of policing. The Home Secretary is 
one part of the tripartite system of governance of the Police Forces in England 
and Wales together with individual force Chief Constables and Police and Crime 
Commissioners (PCCs). In addition, SOCA were only accountable to the Home 
Secretary (Harfield 2006) and the Home Secretary also appoints the Director 
General of MI5 (MI5 2013a - A10). Therefore, intelligence and the Home 
Secretary’s interpretation of that intelligence and any resulting knowledge, 
shapes UK policing from the national to the BCU level (Waddington 2007, 
Maguire 2008, Harfield 2009). 
Intelligence inevitably leads to the police in the UK  taking part in transnational 
policing in order to deal pragmatically with transnational threats (Walker 2008). 
The Weberian theory of bureaucratization is used to explain the development of 
transnational policing (Deflem 2002). Bureaucracy was presented by Max 
Weber as the favoured and dominant theoretical model of organisation. It has 
had an impact on social sciences since Weber's work was translated into 
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English in 1947 even though it has since been found, by some, to be inefficient 
(Gajduscheck 2003).  
Weber identifies a division of labour, specialization, rules that adhere to the one 
best way, subordination and a lack of personal influences as the elements of 
the existence of a bureaucracy. These elements are still seen as the basis for a 
strong organisation (Kelly 2008), however, in order to adapt to differing needs 
they have been later refined by different schools of thought. The lack of 
personal influences was challenged as it was proved that cultures evolved 
amongst the participants in any bureaucratic organisation and they influenced 
the direction of the organisation (Lipsky 1983, Gajduscheck 2003). As already 
explained, such cultures exist in policing that have both positive and negative 
impacts (Chan 1996, Waddington 1999, Glosmeth, Gottschalk and Soli-Saether 
2007).  
The one best way was also challenged in that it did not allow for flexibility in a 
changing environment  (Gajduscheck 2003) and the police, as a bureaucracy 
need flexibility in dealing with any criminal threat by way of problem solving 
(Paterson and Pollock 2011). Political scientists favour public bureaucracy that 
acts in the public interest but they separate it from the government stating that a 
public bureaucracy is an executive organisation that carries out the will of the 
government. Therefore Weber's theory of bureaucracy only offers a starting 
point for various interpretations of bureaucratization (Gajduscheck 2003).   
Deflem (2002) adopts the political scientist model of bureaucratization in that he 
sees the police as a public bureaucracy that acts independently of the 
government. As highlighted by Osborne (1993), Bayley and Shearing (2001) 
and Shearing and Johnston (2010) the government steer policing and police 
bureaucrats row. Deflem (2002), as with other social science schools and 
organisational theorists, has evidenced a different interpretation of Weber's 
theory of bureaucratization. He compares the development of policing in 
Germany and the US and shows that the police are a bureaucracy as they have 
most of the elements drawn out by Weber. The police are a bureaucratic 
organisation with the specialist function of maintaining order and controlling 
crime within a legal system that gives them the monopoly on the use of force. 
They have a hierarchy, disciplined structures, formal training with a division of 
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labour that includes specialist training. They operate under a system of rules 
and aim to be efficient in delivering their function. Deflem (2002) then shows 
that the police in democratic countries like the UK operate in an environment 
that allows them to work beyond the nation state as they have a degree of 
operational independence from the government. The police then engage in 
knowledge exchange and co-operation with similarly independent police 
bureaucracies in other nation states.  
The police who are able to take part in transnational activity have achieved the 
'policeization of the state' (Deflem 2002, p228). They are not dictated to by the 
nation state and neither are they separate from the state. They tend to be within 
nation states with democratically elected governments. They have a level of 
bureaucratic independence from the politicians that enables them to create 
networks that allow for co-operation beyond political allegiance. That co-
operation relies on knowledge networks designed to prevent and detect 
transnational crime (Deflem 2002); it is driven by globalisation through 
increased interconnectedness facilitated by the use of the tools from late 
modernity, such as improved travel and technology identified by Levi (2007). 
Policeization exists within the transnational aspect of UK policing (Deflem 2002). 
While the police are accountable to elected officials in various guises, they 
maintain operational independence (Harfield 2006, Jones 2008). As such, UK 
police officers, have practical aims in relation to preventing and detecting crime. 
They have  solidarity and engage with police officers seeking similar outcomes 
in other nation states. That engagement is on a professional rather than a 
political basis and involves one or more states. Sometimes, when it involves 
more than one nation state, regional collaborations are formed.  
Europol is evidence of a regional collaboration and, in its early stages, so was 
the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol). Interpol developed 
beyond regional collaboration from its beginnings in Vienna in 1923 to become 
a truly international professional exchange with 190 nation state members 
(Walker 2008, Interpol 2013 - A10). However, Interpol is, at best, a professional 
club and an information exchange that does not dominate the shape of policing 
(Walker 2008).  
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Interpol is supranational and independent of nation states. However, it is not a 
supranational police force. Even though there are some within Interpol and at 
the UN who have ambitions for the creation of a global police force, such a 
move is problematic (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012), particularly with nation state 
politicians who see global policing as a loss of sovereignty (Westmarland 2010). 
However, those ambitions and the perceived loss of sovereignty can be allayed 
by the fact that territory is needed to impose jurisdictional law within a defined 
boundary and territory re-inforces sovereignty. Interpol does not have any 
territory in which to deploy a global police force, whereas politicians do have 
territory in which they can bring their police to account (Bronitt 2012). The 
research analysis will show that to be the case with the Network. 
Like Interpol, Europol is not a supranational police force even though it operates 
within the EU, which is a 'self-standing security community' and a 'state-like 
entity' (Walker 2008, p131 and 133). It operates against a backdrop of 
differences among member states on a number of policies. This includes the 
apparent Europol sceptic views of the former Metropolitan Police Deputy 
Assistant Commissioner John Yates. He was filmed live, on behalf of 
Parliament, by the BBC (2009a – B10) answering questions before the Home 
Affairs Select Committee about terrorism investigations and the use of Europol.  
In response to a question about the use of Europol, Commander Yates gave a 
dismissive answer of, "Oh we use them".  
Commander Yates then emphasised that bilateral agreements38 arranged by 
the UK with other countries are the best way forward to investigate terrorism 
(BBC 2009a - B10). The research evidence for this thesis provides evidence 
that the emphasis is on a mix of a bilateral policy and pragmatic networked 
nodes that operate outside Europol and Interpol. 
The EU does, however, have a common approach to a series of common 
criminal threats and it supports the operation of Europol as a permanent agency 
                                                          
38 Deflem (2010, p131) gives an example of bilateral agreements where, 'In matters of police co-operation, the EU framework 
decisions call for an improvement of co-operation among the counterterrorism units of the EU member-states. To this end, joint 
investigation teams can be set up by the security forces of two or more EU member states for a specific purpose and for a limited 
period. Among the requirements, the leader of the team operating in any one EU country must be from that country, and the team 
must always abide by the laws of the member state in which it operates' (Deflem 2010, p131). According to Commander Yates it 
appears the UK police follow this procedure but make their own arrangements, rather than seeking the assistance of Europol (BBC 
2009a – B10) (Also see footnote 39 on JITs).  
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within the established Justice and Home Affairs bureaucracy of the EU. Whilst 
the EU and its police agency Europol does not have a monopoly over the 
legitimate use of force across its membership, (that remains firmly within the 
nation state police forces of the individual members) it does take increasing 
collaborative police action, particularly in relation to EU wide initiatives. When 
the majority of EU member states adopted the Euro it became a Europol 
function to take the lead in co-ordinating activity in dealing with counterfeiting of 
the Euro (Walker 2008). In addition, Europol promotes the use of Joint 
Investigation Teams (JIT). Despite the difficulties of operating 29 different legal 
systems (3 in the UK) in various member states speaking 23 official languages 
(Horvatits and de Buck 2007), joint investigations are set up between two or 
more member states to investigate transnational crime operating across the 
member states concerned (de Buck 2007, Europol 2010 – A10). They can be 
staffed by representatives of LEAs and other organisations such as Eurojust 
(Block 2012). 
Europol is therefore an agency, which supports the internal security 
bureaucracy of the EU, provides a facility to carry out EU policy related policing 
functions and  is a symbol of a fully established European State. The EU is 
becoming an autonomous force that contributes to Europol becoming a more 
autonomous police agency (Walker 2008). However, Europol still only provides 
support rather than action. This is confirmed in the analysis for this thesis and is 
highlighted in the latest amendments to the JIT protocol, which state that 
Europol can provide support to JITs but cannot take part in coercive action. 
That support amounts to facilitating access to information, providing a picture of 
international crime, arranging operational meetings, providing analytical and 
technical support, search advice and assisting in the administration of JITs (de 
Buck 2007)39.   
According to Deflem (2002), after the 9/11 terrorist attacks the police were 
drawn more to their political centres. Their respective governments had greater 
                                                          
39 The popularity of JITs is not advanced by the support only function of Europol. JITs were a promising political ambition but in 
practice, they are difficult to establish due to the different nation state laws, practices and procedures. At best they have 
improved information sharing. However, there is little UK involvement and none have been set up to investigate the illicit firearms 
market. They can be efficient and practical but other well-established bi-lateral agreements such as International Letters of 
Request (ILORs) which establish real time co-operation and simultaneous targeting of the same crime problem with police 
operating in their own nation states (Block 2012) support John Yates bilateral transnational policing policy. 
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influence on anti-terrorist police co-operation. In some circumstances, 
international criminal justice and police co-operation was replaced by military 
tactics and a real war on terror. Despite this, the police in democratic countries 
such as the UK sought to resist such 'politicization' and continued with 
policeization (p228). The police continued to engage in transnational co-
operation to police terrorism and other crime. They liaised with their 
counterparts in other nation states to establish systems and processes that they 
brought back to their nation state for formalisation in law and policy by the 
political centre (Walker 2008, Deflem 2010). The findings for this thesis show 
that UK policing of the firearms threat continues to be a bureaucratic criminal 
justice process rather than militaristic. 
Such a policing process does, however, need to be subject of good governance 
(Findlay 2008). Writing on the subject of accountability and governance 
Westmarland (2010) agrees that policeization exists. She states that there is 
every day interaction between police organisations of different nation states in 
response to increased organised crime and terrorism. However, as already 
stated in respect of ambitions to create a global police force (Bowling and 
Sheptycki 2012), people within the nation states see the increased transnational 
policing co-operation as a loss of sovereignty (Bayley and Shearing 2001, 
Westmarland 2010). There is therefore, a call, as well as a need, for good 
governance of transnational police networks. 
Despite the existence of territorial legal jurisdiction that underpins the sovereign 
nation state (Bronitt 2012), policeization is viewed by some politicians as an 
increased global police state where police operating outside the nation state 
determine the policing needs of the state (Westmarland 2010). There is an 
indication of this happening amongst a subculture of police officers and staff 
who have used evidence obtained under other nation state laws to control crime 
in their own nation state, as previously shown by Belgium’s use of intercept 
evidence (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012, p19). Others argue this subculture is an 
extension of the nation state's power and influence (Fijnaut 2012). However, 
there is an increasing amount of law that can be applied extra-nationally. As 
well as international treaties and conventions that shape law and policy in 
nation states (Bronitt 2012) such as the UN PoA on SALW (Jojarth 2009). 
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Therefore, Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) call for a global social contract to 
prevent breaches of sovereignty and legitimise the actions of transnational 
police actors. They prefer a global social contract, based on the democratic 
'constabulary ethic' (p136), to the creation of a global police force. They 
evidence that the transnational police actors classed within their subcultures as 
diplomats, field operators and problem solvers should be brought to the fore 
rather than the enforcers. The findings in this thesis confirm this already 
happens in the Network and transnational UK police operating in the Network 
are clear that they are always accountable to their own nation state. 
Kenny (2008) adopts a differing view to Bowling and Sheptyki (2012). He 
suggests in his explanation of competitive adaptation that the police are 
restricted in their ability to use the law to their own benefit and act beyond the 
nation state. He explains organised crime and terrorism policing as a process of 
learning. The police and criminal groups around the world learn from one 
another and drive each other's actions through competitive adaptation (Kenny 
2008).  
What exists is a constant game of competitive adaptation between the OCGs or 
the terrorists and the police. The traffickers (who are representative of OCGs) 
and the terrorists are free to operate beyond territorial boundaries whilst the 
police are 'sovereignty-bound' (Kenny 2008, p103). Drug trafficking and terrorist 
networks have flat structures that enable them to make quick decisions. Those 
involved in the criminal networks are compartmentalised by way of family, 
friendship or geographical connections. Facilitators bring groups together or 
pass information or commodities between loosely connected groups as and 
when necessary to meet the goals of the network. If one group in the network is 
disrupted by the police the network adapts and switches action via another 
group in the network. They also gather their own intelligence. They analyse 
information on police activity to learn how the police operate and make 
adjustments to avoid detection based on the knowledge they gain from that 
intelligence (Kenny 2008). 
According to Kenny (2008), criminals make sense of what has disrupted their 
activity. They share stories among themselves and develop different practices 
and routines. For example, increased surveillance and disruption of a particular 
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smuggling route by LEAs will cause them to change routes, methods of 
transportation and seek ways of corrupting LEAs. They develop their 
organisational learning and a broad range of skills to adapt to ever changing 
circumstances. Such learning and development of flexible skills is known 
as ’metis’ (Kenny 2008, p52); a concept devised by ancient Greek philosophers. 
Metis is then spread through criminal networks and collectively criminals adapt 
their methods. Terrorists are particularly adept at developing metis in relation to 
firearms as they test them out in real life conflicts40 (Kenny 2008). Metis is a part 
of Bourdieu’s broader concept of Habitus where society as a whole acts in a 
particular way as a result of collective learning over time. Habitus is also used 
as a theoretical basis for the development of organisational cultures, which 
includes police culture (Chan 1996, Powercube 2014) therefore, metis, culture 
and organisational theory are closely aligned. 
The metis of the police and policing in relation to intelligence has developed and 
is underpinned by ethics and proportionality. Whilst the metis of intelligence has 
continued to develop, it has been as a result of learning from mistakes made by 
the police into specific enquiries. Examples are the Stephen Lawrence murder 
investigation and the death of Victoria Climbie. Both enquiries added to the 
learning and stressed the importance of intelligence; its sharing and the 
decisions made as a result. Such enquiries also highlight the difference 
between police metis and criminal metis. The police are bound by ethics and 
proportionality and are expected to get it right all the time. Criminals only have 
to get it right once and are not bound by any code other than those that they 
invent and twist to justify criminal activity, particularly terrorism (Grieve 2008). 
It is important for the police to be a ‘learning organisation’ (Bowers 2008, p271) 
to develop metis by gaining knowledge on crime and criminals as well as 
knowledge on how to respond to the criminal threat. Generally, the police have 
more efficient but lengthy bureaucratic ways of storing and analysing 
                                                          
40 Like drug traffickers, terrorists learn metis by  doing: building bombs and detonators, discharging rifles and handguns, engaging 
in actual armed combat, infiltrating "enemy" lands…Unlike law enforcers who go undercover for short periods of time to arrange 
drug deals, professional terrorists must convincingly play their  roles for …months at a stretch, sometimes while living in  foreign 
countries. Such deep undercover assignments require talents not readily imparted in training programs, including mental alertness, 
prudence and emotional stamina. Clandestine militants must be able to interact repeatedly with a variety of individuals, 
neighbours, fellow workers, mosque acquaintances, family members-as they gather intelligence and otherwise prepare for terrorist 
operations, all without raising suspicion regarding their true intentions and activities (Kenny 2008, p144). 
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information to produce intelligence and knowledge and to train their staff in skills 
for flexible deployment (Kenny 2008). For example, they will adapt and use 
more sophisticated covert electronic surveillance techniques and innovative 
undercover deployments to gather information. 
Not all metis that is developed by the police is considered legitimate, some 
leads to a negative police culture and poor policing outcomes. The policing 
agencies representing high policing, usually in the form of intelligence agencies 
such as the CIA, have also pushed the boundaries in some nation states. They 
have used their skills to take part in secret renditions of terrorist suspects for 
interrogation (Kenny 2008). Renditions are, according to Bowling and Sheptyki 
(2012), limited by nation state laws and policy, although there are many 
examples where that is not the case and depending on the type of rendition 
some, particularly secret or extraordinary renditions, are outside the law41. Laws 
and policies also limit the deployment of covert surveillance and undercover 
deployments in the UK where they are subject to strict authorisation processes, 
as discussed by Billingsley (2009).  
Kenny's (2008) theory is that criminals and police develop metis, which is the 
embedded organisational learning of new flexible skills alongside established 
older skills. This enables the police and criminal groups to improve their 
knowledge and to adapt to try and exploit an advantage over each other. The 
OCGs and terrorists have an information advantage, in that they know what 
they are going to do, whilst the police have a monopoly on force. The police try 
to exploit their advantage of force into an information advantage. The OCGs 
and terrorist organisations have flatter structures. Those structures are not 
subject to hierarchical governance and accountability systems that are imposed 
on the police, meaning the police are not as free to operate beyond nation state 
                                                          
41 Extradition is included in the definition of rendition (Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons 2007 – A25) and the case of 
Chinoy v UK is an example of a case, which was apparently not fully compliant with the law. It involved the extradition of Mr. 
Chinoy to the US where the UK Courts were prepared to allow the extradition despite the fact that the request  by the US was 
based on illegal recordings (van Hoek and Luchtman (2005, p16). The Intelligence and Security Committee used various different 
terms of rendition when it investigated the involvement of UK intelligence and security agencies in rendition. However, they were 
more concerned with, ‘Extraordinary Rendition (which is) the extra-judicial transfer of persons from one jurisdiction or State to 
another, for the purposes of detention and interrogation outside the normal legal system, where there is a real risk of torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’ (Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons 2007 – A25, p6). The committee found no 
evidence that any UK agencies were complicit in extraordinary rendition (Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons 2007 – 
A25, p64). 
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law (as suggested by O'Reilly and Ellison 2006 and Bowling and Sheptycki 
2012). As such, the police are more reactive than proactive with the emphasis 
being on reacting to crime within the nation state. This gives an advantage to 
the OCGs and the terrorists (Kenny 2008) boosted by the assertion that they 
are, 'more in tune with globalisation' (Lilley 2009, p137).  
OCGs and terrorists move about more freely and acquire up to date technology 
without budget constraints and the need to seek authorisation for deployment. 
They operate complex flat networks that continually adapt. If one link is 
removed another will appear in its place. The police need to study the 
complexity of those criminal networks and adapt and re-organise their own 
networks accordingly to avoid operating in hierarchical silos, which is a 
'competency trap' (Kenny 2008, p24) that the police keep falling in to. 
Globalisation should provide opportunities for more efficient network policing by 
transnational police actors (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012), provided it is 
accountable, governed and not rushed into. Above all, liberal democratic states 
must prevail and work together, subject to due process (Sheptycki 2004, 
Findlay 2008, Kenny 2008, Leary and Thomas 2011, Bowling and Sheptyki 
2012).   
As stated, Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) favour a transnational social contract 
based on a democratic constabulary ethic. That ethic should transcend the 
global policing networks and all nation states need to ensure such a 
constabulary ethic exists within nation state policing. As indicated earlier, 
Harfield (2006) analysed the 2006 establishment of SOCA, which was only 
accountable to the Home Secretary and its own Board. In fact, the Home 
Secretary appointed, and was able to dismiss, the Chair and the Director 
General of SOCA (Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons 2012 – A10). 
This was a move away from the UK constabulary tri-partite system of 
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governance42, 'a corner stone of traditional policing legitimacy in the UK' 
(Harfield 2006, p749). It took away local accountability to individual Chief 
Constables and Police Authorities and weighted SOCA's agenda in favour of 
national interests and control by the Home Secretary.  
Therefore, policing in the UK moved away from the traditional constabulary 
ethic and it has continued to do so with the merging of SOCA into the NCA. The 
Home Affairs Select Committee on the New Landscape in Policing found, in 
2012, that despite the lack of tri-partite governance, SOCA had been subject to 
oversight from a number of regulatory and other bodies. Rather than pushing for 
tri-partite governance, the Committee called for assurances from the Home 
Office that the governance and accountability arrangements for the NCA should 
be ‘at least’ the level of those that were in place for SOCA (Great Britain, 
Parliament, House of Commons 2012 – A10).     
To understand the knowledge, capability and accountability of global policing 
networks there is a need to study 'nodal networks' (Shearing and Johnston 
2010, p496). A competition exists between organisations, which can be nodes 
in networks or networks themselves. Organisations stretch beyond nation states 
and undermine the competition between those nation states. Nation states have 
also reorganised themselves into transnational networks to make them more 
effective and this is evident in transnational policing. The hierarchical LEAs 
mentioned by Kenny (2008) are crisscrossed by transnational communications 
that bind them together and drive power away from the centre (Bowling and 
Sheptycki 2012). Therefore, there is a need to guard against a threat to civil 
liberties from nodal network policing (Shearing and Johnston 2010, Burris 
2005). Poor policing techniques transposed through transnational networks can 
lead to insecurity, meaning there is a need for strong governance of the policing 
networks (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). 
                                                          
42 'The system of holding the 43 forces of England and Wales accountable has been characterised as the tripartite structure of 
police accountability. Established under the 1964 Police Act, following the deliberations of the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police, 
it remains the fundamental basis of police governance. The tripartite system distributes responsibilities between the Home Office, 
the local police authority, and the chief constable of the force' (Mawby and Wright 2005, p4). 
Since 2012, as a result of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, police authorities within the tripartite system have 
been replaced by directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners as representatives of the local population (Reiner 2013).  
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As stated by Bayley and Shearing (2002) there is also a need to understand 
what factors are shaping the reconstructing of policing within those networks; 
how policing is delivered and by whom. It will show where the auspices of 
security lie and confirm whether there is a move away from the nation state 
government being responsible for both authorising and providing policing, to 
steering policing. Also, whether policing has become pluralistically 
'multilateralized and denationalized' (p5) and weighted towards 'militarisation 
and securitisation of policing intelligence' (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012, p52).  
Shearing and Johnston (2010) examined three models of global security 
governance and it’s delivery. This followed critical analysis by Loader and 
Walker (2004) and Lea and Stenson (2007) on the importance of the role of the 
nation state in the governance of security within and outside the nation state. 
Shearing and Johnston (2010) claimed that nation states who steer global 
security governance from a distance overlap with nation states that retain a 
strong sense of governance by the state and global security governance 
delivered by networks. They concluded that the way global security governance 
is delivered is overlapping, therefore, it should be examined in terms of a nodal 
network to see how the networking affects sovereignty.  
Nodes are individuals, groups, organisations or states. Establishing the 
knowledge and capacity of each node provides a true picture of how global 
security governance operates and where the operating power (Castells 2004) 
lies within the network. The concept of nodal networks promoted by Shearing 
and Johnston (2010) does not prescribe how such networks should themselves 
be governed and held to account (Loader and Walker 2004). Such governance 
and accountability is important to politicians representing nation states, 
dependent on their view of globalisation (Held and McGrew 2003) and how it 
impacts on policing. As already stated, some object to what they perceive as 
the formation of a global police state (Westmarland 2011). Whatever their 
viewpoint they need to understand the network and where the power lies 
(Castells 2004, Shearing and Johnston 2010). Therefore, as stated previously, 
this thesis includes a nodal analysis of the Network to see how the nodes are 
linked and how each node influences the rest of the Network.  
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The theoretical framework for this thesis is a ‘theory of global policing’ (Bowling 
and Sheptycki 2012, p3). Transnational policing is predominant within global 
policing and a subculture of police actors push policing towards policing beyond 
the nation state. They do that in the belief that they have a mission to prevent 
and detect crime using all available methods (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012) 
based on intelligence and the knowledge that results from it (Akhgar and Yates 
2011). Their mission is delivered by using policeization to develop links with 
like-minded police, in different nation states, who subsequently develop policy 
with their political centres (Deflem 2002). They adapt to the intelligence on 
criminal threats by forming nodal networks. Those networks are restricted by 
hierarchical nodes but those hierarchies do not always retain the power and 
control over the network that is formed. Other nodes within the network can 
influence where the power lies. This includes private providers of policing and 
police technology (Bayley and Shearing 2001) and private high policing 
contractors protecting the interests of corporations. They overlap with the 
interests of nation states, supranational organisations and NGOs making for a 
symbiotic relationship between the public and the private (O'Reilly and Ellison 
2006). 
The UK works within the global policing framework. The UK police work to 
national strategies and adopt a model of community policing, led by intelligence 
that accentuates the pull between high and low policing, influenced by 
transnational and glocal threats. This leads to the UK working on a transnational 
basis, which includes both public and some private police actors, to gather 
intelligence to mitigate and deal with various threats such as the firearms threat. 
Intelligence is well embedded into policing and shapes the way it is delivered. 
Despite some dissenters, the literature appears to emphasise the weight is in 
favour of the existence of global policing facilitated by privatisation (Appendix 
11.1). However, this thesis is on the side of the dissenters. It evidences the 
weight of the Network to be in the favour of the UK nation state, glocal policing 
and it has control of which privatised support products it uses (Appendix 11.4). 
2.5 Conclusion on the Current Literature 
The firearms threat is identified in the literature but this thesis articulates the 
threat by showing how it is viewed by the UK police working at the national and 
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transnational level. The UK police respond to the firearms threat, by taking a 
proactive intelligence led approach. However, according to the literature, the 
response to the firearms threat and organised crime in general, particularly at 
the transnational level, requires further organisation (Harfield 2008). This thesis 
will show that policing in the Network is becoming more organised and the 
formation of the NCA could be a catalyst to even greater organisation of 
national and transnational policing. 
Theoretically, the literature paints a picture of a global networked police world, 
instigated by Deflem's (2002) policeization, but where the control of policing is 
moving away from the nation state. The analysis of the development of 
transnational policing is influenced by globalisation and the global network 
society, which adapts in line with increased knowledge drawn from intelligence 
(Castells 2004) (Appendix 11.1). This perspective is concluded by O'Reilly and 
Ellison (2006) who refer to the contemporary literature on global security and 
policing. They point out that sovereign states no longer have the monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force and are no longer at the centre of public authority. 
Private non-state nodes, alone or in partnership with one or more nation states, 
in numerous forms and at all levels of policing, take the power away from the 
nation state through nodal networks.  
However, more empirical research is required within a global policing theoretical 
framework to understand how policing networks operate and how they might 
lead to a reconstruction of policing. The reconstruction of policing at the 
transnational level and its organisation is not clearly understood. This thesis 
provides a clearer understanding of the reconstruction through an examination 
of the Network, which is clearly driven by the firearms threat. The UK 
transnational police work to national strategies and are steered by the nation 
state. Their mission is to work for the best interests of the nation state. This is a 
development of nation state policing and evidence of a glocal reorganisation of 
policing. It is contrary to the global police state view. 
Hufnagal et al’s (2012) book on cross border law enforcement, brought  
together the views of practitioners, policy makers and academics, in the hope 
that evidence based policy making could be advanced by the three communities 
coming together. In addition, the introduction to the book states that: 
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‘The borders that those engaged in law enforcement must transverse are 
not merely geographical and jurisdictional but are also the fault lines 
between research, policy and practice. Our hope is that this volume may 
assist in bridging that gap’ (Hufnagal et al 2012) 
Heeres (2012) is one such practitioner who contributed to Hufnagal et al (2012). 
Based on his experiences, Heeres (2012) calls for glocal policing to take place 
based on a culture of police who are 'willing and able' (p118). The police at all 
levels should target the local impact of the transnational threat whilst fully 
understanding any global influences. Bowling and Sheptyki (2012) argue that 
glocal policing already exists but only as part of a theoretical mechanism 
through which to view aspects of global policing rather than a dominant police 
model. Glocal policing needs further articulation. This thesis combines my 
experiences as a police practitioner with qualitative research focused on a 
specific area of transnational policing, the Network, to start to bridge the gap 
between research, policy and practice on glocal policing.  
Although further evidence is required to establish whether glocal policing is 
general across all areas of policing, there is evidence within the Network that 
such policing is being practised by people who are willing and able, which is 
what Heeres (2012) experience states should be happening. The evidence has 
been drawn out by including my experiences as part of the research and it is 
presented in the following chapters by way of an adaptive grounded theory 
methodological approach (Chamaz 2006). 
A theory of glocal policing is grounded in this thesis. Glocal policing exists within 
the Network and the indication is that it is more prominent than global policing. 
This leads to a conclusion that the Network has contributed towards a glocal 
reconstruction of policing and hypothetically, other areas of policing are more 
glocal than global. 
 
 
 
 
Richard John Severns 19035736 The 'Network' 
  
75 
Chapter 3 - Methodology 
3.1 Introduction to the Methodology 
This thesis will explain how and where the Network contributes to a theory of 
glocal policing. It examines where the power lies within the Network and what 
impact it has on the reconstruction of policing. Interview data has been gathered 
from people who contribute to the Network. The data has then been triangulated 
by using OSINT and my own experiences as a former insider, occupying the 
space between the inside and the outside. The data has also been subjected to 
nodal network analysis and as a result, a challenge to the existing theory of 
global policing has been ground out (Sugden and Tomlinson 1999, Chamaz 
2006, Corbyn-Dwyer and Buckle 2009, Westmarland 2011).  
New evidence has been identified which impacts on the literature, theory and 
practice relating to transnational policing and answers calls for more theoretical 
research into policing and the reconstruction of policing (Phillips 1992, Reiner 
1992, Bayley and Shearing 2001). Policing in the UK continues to be plagued 
by controversy, particularly in relation to recurrent revelations about the integrity 
of investigations and the use of covert intelligence gathering methods (IPCC 
2013 - A10, Laville 2013 - B30). Therefore, Reiner's (1992) call for theoretical 
research is just as important today as it was in 1992. The same issues keep 
arising and the Network needs to take into account integrity issues; especially 
when the police in the UK promote ethical values and seek legitimacy (Bottoms 
and Tankebe 2012, ACPO 2013 - A10). 
3.2 Methodological Considerations 
The research data provides an answer to the CRQ and brings new evidence to 
bear on the literature on transnational policing from a global criminological point 
of view (Phillips 1992). It is relevant to the UK as the research was based in the 
UK and only UK participants were accessible for face-to-face interviews. 
Therefore, the findings from the research must be viewed as findings from a UK 
perspective. Similarly, the research focuses on one area of transnational 
policing (the intelligence gathering network) and one crime problem (the 
firearms threat).  
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As well as adding to the academic literature, the findings could be used to 
develop further comparative research with other areas of transnational policing 
or the structure of policing networks from the perspective of other nation states 
(Pakes 2004, Bryman 2008, Nelken 2012). For example, Hufnagal et al (2012) 
have compared cross border LEA co-operation in Europe with that in the 
Australian and the Asia-Pacific regions. They accept that their account is not 
definitive and to avoid over generalisation they call for further regional and 
micro level comparative research on cross border policing. This thesis could 
contribute to that research, especially in developing practitioner views to include 
them as part of the research, as this thesis does. 
There are good reasons for researching the firearms threat and it should be 
researched from a number of perspectives. This includes the need to 
understand the market in order to prevent the illicit trade in firearms for criminal 
use, which can result in death and serious injury. This was evident in the gang 
related use of a Mac 10 sub-machine gun in the murder of two innocent 
bystanders at a new year party in Birmingham in 2003 (Herrington 2011), the 
firearms murder of unarmed police officers in Greater Manchester in 2012, by a 
suspected organised criminal, (BBC 2012b – B30) and the possession of a 
firearm in the course of the terrorist murder of a soldier in Woolwich in 2013 
(Malik and Walker 2013 - B30). 
Researching those involved in the operation of the illicit market was considered 
but access to those individuals is limited. Similarly, access to current 
intelligence on the market is limited (Cornish and Clarke 2002). Therefore, it 
was decided to use adaptive grounded theory methods to research those 
involved in gathering intelligence on the firearms threat. Grounded theory 
corresponds with my professional background as a former police detective 
skilled in gathering information to be used as evidence or intelligence. I have 
kept an open mind in gathering and analysing the research evidence, however, 
I did have prior knowledge of the workings of the Network and associated 
theory43 and that prior knowledge makes the grounded theory adaptive 
(Chamaz 2006). 
                                                          
43 See policy decision 9 in Appendix 11.6 
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Qualitative evidence was preferred to quantitative evidence as it provides a rich 
picture of the dynamics (who, what, where, when, why and how) of the Network, 
which according to Shearing and Johnston (2010) is an important aspect of 
network analysis. Xu and Hsinchun (2005) confirm that reliable evidence is 
required in order to visualise criminal networks and disrupt them. They promote 
network analysis by gathering and analysing information to highlight 'regular 
patterns about the structure, organization, operation and information flow in 
criminal networks' (Xu and Hsinchun 2005, p102). In order to disrupt criminal 
networks the police also need to understand the best way to form their own 
networks (Kenny 2008). Therefore, this research is subject to grounded theory 
and network analysis; two methods which complement each other (Xu and 
Hsinchun 2005, Shearing and Johnston 2010). 
Purposive sampling was used to identify participants for semi-structured 
interviews to gather qualitative data on how the Network operates (Bryman 
2008). The participants are credible, reliable and knowledgeable sources; 
however, they are limited in number. Therefore, to saturate grounded theory 
categories, to build a rich picture and ensure the validity and reliability of the 
research, there was a need to gather further qualitative data from other sources 
(Chamaz 2006).  
It is accepted by academics, who research organised crime and those who 
research intelligence gathering methods, that access to those who police and 
gather intelligence on organised crime is difficult and limited (Cornish and 
Clarke 2002, Rollins 2010). Even though there has been a reluctance to use 
open source evidence for academic research, (particularly web based evidence) 
(Education for Change 2012) OSINT research was proposed as a solution to 
the limited access (Best and Cumming 2007, Robert 2008, Bean 2007 and 
2011, Tekir 2009, Rollins 2010).  
OSINT research was used in the research to gather further qualitative data on 
the Network. Intelligence is an important aspect of decision making in a number 
of domains (Ronn and Hoffding 2012) and OSINT can be embraced as an 
important tool for academic researchers provided the product is valid and 
reliable (Cornish and Clarke 2002, Bryman 2008). 
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My critical investigative epistemology also provides supporting evidence. That 
epistemology emerged out of a knowledge and experience of investigating the 
firearms threat and working with other professionals in that field of investigation. 
I was 'part of the scene' and can relate to their experiences of the Network. 
However, as I am no longer a police officer, I have been able to take a more 
critical investigative standpoint (Sugden and Tomlinson 1999). 
That critical investigative standpoint brings personal experiences to bear as 
evidence for the research. It is also part of the practical gathering and analysing 
of the evidence about the Network and to do that I used two methods I learnt as 
a detective. First, I used the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System 
(HOLMES) to action the gathering of evidence and to record and analyse that 
evidence (Unysis 2010 - A10). Second, I used my knowledge of interviewing 
suspects and witnesses to prepare semi-structured interviews and my 
knowledge of gathering and analysing information from various overt and covert 
sources to gather and grade OSINT (College of Policing 2013 - A10). 
3.3 Epistemology/Research Philosophy 
Research into policing in the UK increased from the 1980s. This followed a cut 
back in social sciences research in favour of a focus on criminal justice and the 
police, in paricular, were put under the research microscope44. This was as a 
result of a crisis in police legitimacy brought about by reports such as Lord 
Scarman’s report on the 1981 Brixton riots. The number of police officers with 
degrees, especially among Chief Officer Ranks, increased45 and they facilitated 
police research, particularly by police officers on the inside. The majority of that 
research focused on management issues and was based on quantitative data, 
which resulted in target setting around performance and costs. It needed to be 
balanced with a greater degree of qualitative research to enhance the 
understanding of policing and the sharing of best practice (Reiner 1992). 
                                                          
44 According to Reiner (1992), a register of research being undertaken by UK universities, polytechnics and other institutions in 
1987 listed, ‘184 separate projects being being carried out in sixty-nine different institutions’ against, ‘ten essays representing all 
important research’ in 1979 (p438). 
45 According to Reiner (1992, p438), ‘in 1981, there were 2,610 college graduates in the police, but by 1988 this number had risen 
to 7,409’. In addition, by 1988, forty percent of Chief Officers were graduates. 
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Current research is now focused on best practice and evidence based policing 
(College of Policing 2014 – A15). 
I viewed the increase in police research from the inside as I spent 30 years as a 
police officer, mostly in a detective role. I did not carry out any academic 
research whilst I was on the inside. I retired as a Detective Inspector in 2009 to 
become an academic researcher and I can still recall my experiences. As 
argued by the barrister Harry Potter (BBC 2015 – A10), it has to be accepted 
that even the most honest witness can be mistaken in their recollections. 
However, all incidents I have dealt with are recorded in pocket notebooks, 
policy books and papers used in court, such as the R v Greenwood case papers 
(Severns 2001 – A15). 
Some experiences increased my determination to bring firearms offenders to 
justice. For example, attending a double post-mortem of a victim of a shooting 
and the offender (who took his own life) and dealing with their families, whilst 
working non-stop for 24 hours. You do not forget such experiences and they will 
inevitably influence how you police. However, you have to control the personal 
impact of such experiences. I worked to do the best to achieve justice for 
victims and their families because of my experiences. I ensured an ethical and 
impartial investigation took place by making sure the human rights of suspects 
and the accused were given the same priority as the victim. The rights of 
suspects and the accused must be preserved to prevent any miscarriages of 
justice (Kennedy 2004). If you do not do that, and you take short cuts in favour 
of the victim, then you are failing the victim, especially if an innocent person is 
convicted. 
The fundamental basis of detective work is to keep an open mind (Newburn, 
Williamson and Wright 2007, Milne and Powell 2010) and I have kept that 
philosophy whilst researching the Network. Whilst I had knowledge of policing, 
intelligence and of investigating the firearms threat, I kept an open mind on the 
results of the research46 and as stated by Corbyn-Dwyer and Buckle (2009, 
p56): 
                                                          
46 As promoted by Chamaz (2006) in line with grounded theory and evidenced in my research policy entries (see policy decision 9 
and 19 in Appendix 11.6).  
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‘I leave it up to the reader to decide if my insider status would improve or 
impede my ability to carry out the study’.  
Unlike Corbyn-Dwyer and Buckle (2009), though, I do offer an explanation as to 
how being an insider, still gravitating towards the inside, assisted the research. 
As well as guiding the research, my insider epistemological standpoint provides 
supporting evidence and assessment skills. The epistemology includes my own 
motivations and experiences as an investigator, as well as experiences gained 
from observing the actions and motivations of others during my career, in 
particular being motivated by wanting to do the best for victims.  
I have been 'part of the scene' (Sugden and Tomlinson 1999, p390) as a police 
officer and I can relate my own experiences of the Network and empathise with 
the professional ethics and integrity47 of those taking part in it. However, as I am 
no longer a police officer or part of the scene, I can step back and take a more 
critical investigative standpoint (Sugden and Tomlinson 1999), whilst being 
aware of failings in police investigations and flawed governance of the police in 
the UK, articulated by Rowe (2014). I can look at the wider implications of what 
is happening to policing, be investigative in my approach and follow a 
philosophy of investigative epistemology (Sugden and Tomlinson 1999).  
I was an insider who moved towards the outside as an academic researcher. As 
a retired police officer and a fully paid up member of the National Association of 
Retired Police Officers (NARPO) I still consider myself a member of the police 
family. I am in the space between the inside and the outside; still gravitating 
towards the inside. It is an interesting space in which to dwell. I have a deeper 
knowledge of the Network, however, prior to completing this thesis I did not fully 
understand it (Corbyn-Dwyer and Buckle 2009).  
Gravitating to the inside suggests that the research will result in an insider 
police research biased conclusion that the Network is working well, as opposed 
                                                          
47 The police in England and Wales have recently (2014) been given a new code of ethics to follow as part of the 
professionalization of policing promoted by the college of policing. The code is based on the Nolan principles of accountability, 
integrity, openness, leadership, honesty, objectivity and selflessness and includes extra principles of fairness and respect. The 
intention is that it should be more than a set of words and all policing decisions and activity should be based on the code (College 
of Policing 2014b – A15), it should not serve a narrow public relations purpose, which Kleinig (1990, p14) argues is a problem with 
police codes of ethics. The code articulates professionalisation of decision making which, although not universal, has existed and 
developed within the police throughout late modernity (see chapter 8).  
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to the general independent police research bias conclusion that nothing works 
(Reiner 1992). However, operating in the space between the inside and outside 
assists in producing a balanced conclusion (Corbyn-Dwyer and Buckle 2009) on 
what can be learnt from how police organisations operate (Reiner 1992). In 
particular, I have been able to draw out the existence of positive aspects of 
police culture within the Network. Police culture is often portrayed as negative 
within the current literature (Heidenshon 2008). However, there is evidence 
emerging of some police cultures having a positive impact on investigation. This 
is especially so with an investigative police team culture, which leads to the 
sharing of knowledge and results in offences being detected, offenders being 
brought to justice and victims being supported (Glomseth, Gottschalk and Solli-
Saether 2007).  
The research has gathered qualitative rather than quantitative data on the 
Network. It is set in the context of wider global policing issues, which enables a 
greater understanding of transnational policing. In line with Reiner's (1992) call 
to sort the policing wood from the trees it examines not just the tree but also 
where its sits in the forest.  
I have knowledge of the firearms threat and the developing police responses to 
it. I can evidence earlier competitive adaptation (Kenny 2008) that has taken 
place within the UK police service, which led to the establishment of NABIS and 
its subsequent involvement in the Network (Severns 2001). I supported the 
establishment of NABIS and provided evidence to support the rational for 
establishing such a police agency. Therefore, I am complicit in a desire for 
NABIS, ACPO CUF and the Network to be successful. However, as I have 
never been a member of those or any of the key nodal organisations in the 
Network, I have been able to look at the progress that has been made by such 
organisations and critically analyse how the Network operates and what the 
outcomes are.  
3.4 Research Design 
The research design is cross sectional, which is a snap shot of what is 
happening at a specific point or small period in time (King and Wincup 2008). 
The research interviews, which led to the gathering of evidence from OSINT 
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and the application of my experiences, were carried out in 2012. The evidence 
gathered from the interviews highlighted the development and implementation 
of NABIS, which, as will be shown, is a key node in the Network. That 
development and implementation covers the years 1998 when I became 
involved in Operation Barker (Severns 2001 - A15) to 2012 when the research 
interviews were carried out. Overall the analysis dates back to 1990, which is 
the extent of the Operation Barker criminal activity (Severns 2001 - A15). It is 
brought up to date (2015) with the inclusion of relevant OSINT and updates 
from research participants who were asked to feedback on a full draft of the 
thesis. 
Cross sectional design was the most feasible research design due to the limited 
resources available. It would have been desirable to extend the design and 
carry out comparative research by comparing the Network from the UK point of 
view with the point of view of the network from one or more other countries 
(Pakes 2004). That comparative research would have been enhanced by 
following Nelken's (2012) methodology to avoid ethnocentrism and relativism; 
that the UK view of the Network is shared by other nations or that it is not 
possible to understand the view of other nations. It would have been done by 
comparing the understanding of what the actors involved in the network are 
trying to do. Such understanding has been highlighted in this thesis by 
interviewing UK personnel who are part of the Network. Therefore, the research 
results for this thesis could still be compared with research of the Network from 
the point of view of other countries, provided the same overall methodology is 
followed (Nelken 2012). Also, provided it is carried out in those countries by a 
similarly positioned researcher in the space between the inside and the outside 
(Corbyn-Dwyer and Buckle 2009) 
3.5 Sampling  
Random sampling of police officers and staff on their knowledge and potential 
involvement in the Network would have produced limited results as the Network 
is a niche area, with limited UK participants. Therefore, my knowledge and 
experience was used to provide access to UK participants in the Network. 
Securing a sample from the police depends a lot on who you know and being a 
former insider (Noakes and Wincup 2004); I knew who to approach and where 
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to go to obtain the sample. This was purposive sampling and it identified 
participants for semi-structured interviews to gather qualitative evidence that 
builds a clear picture of how the Network operates (Bryman 2008). 
Purposive sampling is a non-probability form of sampling and is determined by 
the needs of the research (Waters 2009). The use of knowledge of the subject 
and the range of people involved who can supply the best information is a 
useful aid to purposive sampling (Denscombe 2009). Bryman (2008) describes 
purposive sampling as the interviewing of people chosen for their relevance to 
the research question. Therefore, two UK based police employees who were 
known to take part in transnational liaison with police in other countries were 
approached. As a result of interviewing them, it became apparent that other 
persons were important to the operation and initial development of the Network. 
Therefore, other persons were approached to participate in the semi-structured 
interviews. Some agreed to take part and were interviewed whilst others did not 
reply to requests.  
Based on the results of the interviews, purposive sampling was used to gather 
other research evidence by way of OSINT research and from my experience of 
policing and the Network. This followed a grounded theory strategy of 
populating the themes drawn from the interviews with triangulated evidence 
from elsewhere (Chamaz 2006). For example, the interviewees talked about the 
importance of the group of European Firearms Experts (EFE); therefore, further 
evidence of that group's importance as a key node in the Network was obtained 
from the House of Lords Select Committee. This was available as open source 
information on the internet (See Great Britain, Parliament, House of Lords 2011- 
A15). This evidence contributed to populating the theme on the 'Transnational 
Nodes in the Network that Develop Nation State Policing'. 
3.6 Method of Data Collection 
Data was gathered by way of semi-structured interviews (Remenyi 2011) with 
persons connected with the operation of the Network. Their views of the 
Network were captured as qualitative evidence with a view to analysing it to 
draw out grounded themes (Chamaz 2006). Some interviews were recorded by 
way of a digital recorder direct to an encrypted computer. Others, at the request 
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of the interviewees, were recorded in the form of notes made at the time of the 
interview, although to enable the interview to flow freely, they were not a 
contemporaneous record. Finally, due to the restrictive cost of travel to carry out 
the interview, one was carried out on the phone and by email. Although that 
interview was largely in the form of a questionnaire using the semi-structured 
interview questions, additional probing questions were asked by email and 
phone to seek clarification and ensure there was no confusion (Remenyi 2011). 
The UK participants in the Network are small in number and it has not been 
possible to gain access to them all. Six agreed to be interviewed and provided 
good evidence towards answering the CRQ. Those six included key nodal 
participants in the Network and some who were involved in the setting up of key 
nodes and initial transnational links48. 
The questions for the semi-structured interviews were formulated based on a 
knowledge of the relevant literature on the Network and my own experience 
(Milne and Powell 2010). Open questions were used to draw out the fullest 
possible answers that could then be probed by further open questions (Remenyi 
2011). In line with the overall philosophy of the research all the questions were 
asked with an open mind unless a closed question was needed to seek 
clarification (Milne and Powell 2010). 
Prior to the interviews taking place a set of questions were prepared based on 
my knowledge and an initial literature review (Appendix 11.2). They were 
designed to elicit the dynamics (who, what, where, when, why and how) of the 
Network operation with a focus on answering the CRQ and filling the gaps in the 
literature. However, at the same time, they allowed the interviewees to speak 
freely of their experiences of the Network and to allow new ideas to emerge that 
could possibly be grounded into theory. Therefore, whilst the interviews were 
semi-structured their direction was not controlled, other than to keep the 
interviewees within the parameters of talking about the Network (Milne and 
Powell 2010, Remenyi 2011). 
                                                          
48 One law enforcement organisation did not allow access to its employees by outside researchers. Attempts were made to gain 
access to the organisation, however, letters and phone calls were not returned. Therefore, research evidence on that organisation 
was obtained from other participants and OSINT. The organisation is not named herein as it adds to preserving anonymity of the 
research participants as discussed by Remenyi (2011). 
Richard John Severns 19035736 The 'Network' 
  
85 
To enhance the evidence and draw out grounded themes, the themes drawn 
from analysis of the interviews were populated with evidence (Chamaz 2006) 
from OSINT research on the Network. OSINT research is research of evidence 
from publicly available information (USA Congress 2007)49. Access to the 
participants in the illicit firearms market and those who police it and gather 
intelligence on it is difficult and limited. This is accepted by academics who 
specialise in researching organised crime (Cornish and Clarke 2002) and those 
who specialise in researching intelligence gathering methods (Best and 
Cumming 2007, Robert 2008, Bean 2007 and 2011, Tekir 2009, Rollins 2010). 
They propose OSINT as a solution, where evidence is gathered and analysed 
from a variety of open sources, including the media, social networks and police 
and government documents published on the internet.  
Intelligence used to be confined to national security. However, intelligence, 
including OSINT, has also become an important aspect of law enforcement and 
it is increasingly an important decision making tool in other spheres (Ronn and 
Hoffding 2012). In addition, OSINT is gradually being accepted as research 
data for use by doctoral students, despite the fact it is ‘discouraged’ on the 
basis of ‘citation-based assessment and authenticity criteria’ (Education for 
Change 2012, p6 - A10, O’Dochartaigh 2007).  
For this thesis, OSINT has been drawn, predominantly, from recognised UK 
Government, law enforcement and academic websites and it includes some 
factual commentary from the media. I have also taken part in academic 
conferences by attending in person or taking part in internet webinars (CEPOL 
2013 - A10). I asked impromptu questions of speakers at the conferences and 
made a written record of the answers (Remenyi 2011). In addition, some of the 
question and answers have been published on the internet (CEPOL 2013 - 
A10). Those written records and the internet publications have been used as 
evidence for the formulation of OSINT. As already stated, intelligence is 
                                                          
49 OSINT has also been deemed by Juett et al (2008), when discussing consilient thinking between partner agencies, to include ‘any 
source of information that is readily available’. This then could include intelligence that is extracted from information that is 
readily available to me as an insider with a particular set of contacts. Not information that is passed with any expectation of 
privacy but information that I pick up because I move in a particular circle of academic and police contacts and attend a particular 
set of conferences and events. It includes information on one discipline that might inform the work of another discipline. 
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information from various sources that has been subject to a rigorous evaluation 
and risk assessment process to assist with decision making (Harfield 2009). 
OSINT research provides evidence that is already in the public domain. Any 
OSINT that has been used is graded in respect of provenance and the methods 
used to gather the original information. This enables anyone relying on the 
findings to judge the weight of the evidence before taking any decisions based 
on the findings. Such decision making and risk analysis takes place in any 
professional practice and the Professional Doctorate is designed to enhance 
such practice. This includes enhancing police practice (Lee 2009). 
The grading system used is a combination of the NIM 5x5x5 system and the 
Maryland research evaluation scale. The A to E source evaluation code and the 
1 to 4 intelligence evaluation code is used from the 5x5x5 system (ACPO NPIA 
2010 - A10) and the dissemination code is replaced by the Maryland score (Civil 
Service 2010 - A10); with an addition of 0 where no research is involved or it 
cannot be ascertained. A Maryland score of 5 has also been awarded where the 
research evidence used has been the subject of a thorough police investigation 
that has been tested by the UK judicial system or where a thorough 
parliamentary or independent commission investigation has taken place based 
on evidence from a number of reliable sources.  
Therefore, where the source is reliable, the evidence is known to be true without 
reservation and it has been subjected to the highest degree of analysis it is 
graded the highest grade A15; The lowest grade is D50, when the source is 
known to be unreliable, the information is suspected to be false or malicious 
and no research methods have been applied or they cannot be ascertained. 
Where the evidence is drawn from a previously untried source it is graded E. 
This suggests a lower grade than D sourced evidence but, E sources, over 
time, may turn out to be always reliable50 (Civil Service 2010 - A10, ACPO NPIA 
2010 -A10). 
                                                          
50 There is some subjectivity involved in the grading method used and the Maryland score tended to be either 0 or 5, apart from a 
score of 1 for research for a Home Office document based on public consultation as against 5 for one based on full analysis to 
produce a threat assessment. Nevertheless it does enable anyone relying on the findings to judge the weight of the evidence 
before taking any decisions based on the findings – please also see footnote 5 that reproduces the 5x5x5 and Maryland scale 
(Author’s note). 
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HOLMES manual document reading and indexing methods were used to 
gather, store and categorise evidence drawn from the interviews, OSINT and 
my own experience (Unisys 2013 - A10). A record was made of any evidence 
relating to the Network and it was placed in a word searchable excel database 
which also contained evidence drawn from the literature review (Appendix 
11.3). Research evidence was drawn from the interviews by transcribing them 
in full and identifying the answers, relevant to the operation of the Network, by 
way of line by line analysis with a view to identifying themes for further 
population and analysis (Chamaz 2006). 
Shearing and Johnston (2010) also advocate using in-depth evidence from a 
range of qualitative research methods to map networks and evaluate the 
importance of nodes within those networks. Whilst it is important to visualise 
criminal networks, it is also important to visualise policing intelligence networks 
to see if they are structured in a way that is effective in gathering relevant 
intelligence on the criminal threat. Therefore, as the evidence was collected it 
was used to map out the Network, identify the nodes within the Network and 
analyse the effectiveness of the Network (Xu and Hsinchun 2005, Kenny 2008) 
(Appendix 11.4).  
3.7 Data and Network Analysis  
Analysis has been carried out based on the steps suggested by Bryman (2008) 
on the processes and outcomes of grounded theory and complemented by the 
guidance given on grounded theory research by Chamaz (2006). The way this 
analysis has been carried out, adds to the kudos of thematic analysis in general 
(Braun and Clarke's 2006). It shows how thematic analysis is enhanced by 
grounded theory methods and how such methods are put into practice in the 
workplace in the form of HOLMES. In summary: 
 The evidence obtained was coded as it was collected. 
 The results of the coding were reviewed to draw out categories and 
identify whether new evidence was required.  
 Through constant comparison of the evidence, categories became sub 
categories of various master categories relating to the Network. 
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 Themes and hypotheses emerged from the relationships between the 
various categories.  
 Hypotheses were drawn out as broader evidenced themes and saturated 
with my experience and further OSINT to prove or disprove the 
hypothesis. 
 The saturation of the themes has, in line with grounded theory research, 
drawn out new evidence to challenge existing theory and fully answer the 
CRQ (Chamaz 2006, Bryman 2008). 
 Analysis continued during the writing up of the thesis. The evidence 
drawn from the research was compared with the existing literature to 
provide a critical explanation for the challenge to existing theory and the 
answer to the CRQ (Chamaz 2006). 
 In addition, a map of the Network confirming the strength of the individual 
nodes and their connection was developed. This enables the reader to 
visualise the Network to see where the power lies and whether it is 
structured to deal with the UK firearms threat. It is nodal network analysis 
in action (Xu and Hsinchun 2005, Kenny 2008, Shearing and Johnston 
2010). It also acts as a useful guide to practitioners embarking on 
transnational policing activity (Appendix 11.4). 
This method of combined data and nodal network analysis has enhanced the 
evidence on the Network to theoretically and practically answer the CRQ. To 
understand how the themes were drawn out and saturated with further evidence 
to answer the CRQ, it is necessary to understand the actual detailed analytical 
process that has taken place (Chamaz 2006). 
I brought my detective experience of investigation to bear on the analysis of the 
evidence gathered on the Network (Sugden and Tomlinson 1999). The work of 
a researcher is very similar to that of a police detective. Detectives are trained 
to keep an open mind when gathering evidence and to follow lines of enquiry. 
They gather the evidence in a methodical way and analyse it as they go along. 
As a result, new lines of enquiry are identified, prioritised and followed and 
existing lines of enquiry are evidenced as much as possible to establish the 
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facts of the case. The facts are based on witness testimony (whether that 
witness is an evaluated confidential source or someone who is willing to give 
open evidence of what their senses tell them or what forensic analysis they 
have carried out).  
As well as using practical experience of HOLMES to gather and store data in a 
searchable form, I also used my experience as a former HOLMES indexer, 
document reader and action allocator/receiver, to analyse the research 
evidence (Unisys 2013 - A10). I set out a number of actions (Appendix 11.5), 
based on developing grounded theory research policy (Appendix 11.6), to 
prioritise the gathering of research evidence. 
Actions were regularly reviewed in line with the research policy to see what 
further actions were required. Where an action was completed a decision was 
made on whether any product, from carrying out the action, was relevant to the 
research subject, whether it required indexing on to the database and whether 
further action was required (Appendix 11.3). 
To ensure evidence is readily available for research and analysis and to keep 
track of evidence gathering in a HOLMES incident room, a systematic process 
is in place. All actions and documentation are read by the action 
allocator/receiver and the document reader who mark them up for further 
actions and categorisation. The categories and linked evidence are recorded on 
the HOLMES database by indexers and the series of categories build to form 
master categories and themes.  
For example, licensed premises may feature as a theme in a murder 
investigation. This would be shown as a master category on the HOLMES made 
up of individual categories of ‘named premises’, ‘types of premises’ ‘premises 
frequented by a suspect’ and ‘premises visited by the victim’. There may then 
be a thread connecting the victim and the suspect within those licensed 
premises that is not immediately obvious. However, with further gathering of 
evidence around the categories it may become apparent that both victim and 
suspect were dealing controlled drugs at the same licensed premises and were 
in conflict with each other. This could form a motive for the murder that needs 
further investigation. 
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Similarly, in gathering evidence on the Network in line with grounded theory 
methods (Chamaz 2006) I indexed the product of my actions on to my 
database. This followed a systematic process of breaking down the primary 
evidence from the research interviews into manageable extracts that identified a 
specific issue. These were then coded by labelling them with a specific category 
(Appendix 11.3). For example, "NABIS staff can search the Interpol server 
without reference to originating country" from the interview with Alex, was 
labelled with three categories potentially relevant to the CRQ i.e. ‘Interpol’, 
‘Function’ and ‘IT’. These categories and coded extracts were also considered, 
along with other categories and coded extracts, to identify master categories 
that they were all relevant to. In this case, ‘NABIS’ was added as a master 
category as that was the subject of the discussion in the extract and one 
function of NABIS staff is to research the Interpol database. In addition NABIS 
became a key feature of the analysis and in effect a powerful node (Castells 
2004).  
Thereafter, when the coded extract was further analysed, with other categories 
and master categories, it became apparent that ‘NABIS’, ‘IT’ and the ‘functional 
link with Interpol’ was part of more than one theme in that they were a 'Driver' of 
the Network and they might have an impact on the 'Reconstruction of Policing'. 
Therefore, ‘Driver’ and ‘Reconstruction of Policing’ were added as cross cutting 
themes. 
Then, in order to ground hypothetical themes for discussion and further analysis 
for connecting threads that would answer the CRQ, further reading and analysis 
of all the evidence was carried out. Who, what, where, when, why and how 
questions (Shearing and Johnston 2010), based on the literature research, were 
asked of the evidence and it became apparent that a number of hypothetical 
overarching grounded themes could be drawn from the evidence. In this case, 
the extract, "NABIS staff can search the Interpol server without reference to 
originating country" went towards evidencing the grounded hypothesis that 'It is 
the people and the "Tools of Late Modernity" that facilitate the Network'. 
Other open source extracts providing evidence to prove or disprove the 
hypothetical overarching themes were linked to the relevant overarching themes 
on the database. In addition, they were drawn from the database and placed on 
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a separate word document to show which were the strongest overarching 
hypothetical themes and what the key messages were, that supported the 
theme (Appendix 11.7). 
Once this process was completed in respect of the primary evidence, other 
evidence was sought from OSINT and my experience to populate and prove or 
disprove the identified grounded hypothetical overarching themes (Chamaz 
2006). For example, OSINT evidence stating, "INTERPOL Ballistic Information 
Network (IBIN) provides a global platform for collecting, storing, and comparing 
ballistic data…." (Interpol 2012 - A10); supports the grounded hypothesis that, 
'It is the people and the "Tools of Late Modernity" that facilitate the Network'. My 
experiences of observing (throughout my career) police officers wanting to do 
the best for victims, also added to the wider motivation behind the people 
facilitating the Network.  
Each hypothetical theme was saturated with other evidence to prove or 
disprove whether they existed. Then, when analysed together, grounded theory 
was drawn out, which suggests a glocal reconstruction of policing is taking 
place. 
The evidence in the database was also used to identify the nodes in the 
Network and how they were connected. The Network was drawn up using 
power point software and a node and a connection were not added unless it 
was evidenced in the database (Appendix 11.4). 
3.8 Limitations, Validity and Reliability  
The evidence drawn from the interviews is the primary evidence in this research 
and the participants have their own standpoint on the subject. Therefore, as well 
as cross checking interviews and analysing them using grounded theory 
thematic analysis (Chamaz 2006), the reliability and the validity of the evidence 
is corroborated by my experiences and supported by OSINT research (Sugden 
and Tomlinson 1999, Tekir 2009). This provides evidence towards answering 
the CRQ and a reliability and validity audit of the primary evidence (Bryman 
2008).  
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There are limitations in using my experiences, which are part of my 
epistemology and are detailed in chapter 3.3. In summary, personal 
experiences rely on my memory, which is fallible (BBC 2015 – A10). However, 
the experiences I have used can be corroborated by police documents, such as 
the Operation Barker case papers (recorded in Severns 2001 – A15). They are 
also corroborated by the experiences of the interview participants and OSINT. 
OSINT in itself is also limited. In a number of cases OSINT is not primary 
evidence and it relies on a 5x5x5 evaluation system, which is subjective and 
does not ‘evaluate the information per se’ (Joseph and Corkill 2011, p100). The 
5x5x5 system does, however, put a value on the strength of the intelligence, 
which assists in decision making and it is still the accepted form of grading of 
police intelligence in the UK (ACPO NPIA 2010, Joseph and Corkill 2011). What 
the decision maker and the researcher needs to ask before using and 
evaluating intelligence is how and why it was assembled (Ronn and Hoffding 
2012). In making my subjective 5x5x5 evaluation and determining what OSINT 
to use I have asked that question. If the answer cannot be fully ascertained it is 
reflected in the grading (see also chapters 1.1, 1.3.5 and 3.6). 
The research could have been complemented by further qualitative empirical 
research with terrorists, organised criminals and other police practiced in 
gathering information and producing intelligence for the Network in countries 
outside the UK. However, tracing, arranging access to, and interviewing 
subjects would have been time consuming, costly and in need of significant risk 
assessment. In weighing this against the potential of the evidence obtained for 
analysis, the time was best spent assessing the available evidence. In fact, the 
results serve as a basis for future fieldwork research with offenders and 
practitioners. In particular, this thesis will provide evidence for comparative 
research with a view of the Network by Network participants based in countries 
other than the UK. Consideration should also be given to comparing the 
Network to the workings of other transnational intelligence gathering networks 
focused on other crime types.  
Reliability has been ensured by having a consistent methodical approach to the 
evidence gathering and analysis (Appendix 11.5). Validity is ensured by 
showing there is a good match between the evidence extracted from the 
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research and the theory applied (Bryman 2008). This was achieved by following 
the grounded theory analysis model (Chamaz 2006, Bryman 2008).  
According to Bryman (2008, p153), “Validity presumes 
reliability….reliability refers to the method of measurement that is used; if 
the measure is not stable over time then it cannot be reliable”. 
In using the word ‘measurement’ Bryman (2008, p153) tends to suggest validity 
is more akin to quantitative realist research than the qualitative interpretivist 
research undertaken for this thesis. However, some quantitative evidence has 
been used as a measure to corroborate the research evidence. In addition, a 
numerical value has been used as a measurement to grade the qualitative 
evidence that has been found. The way this research has been undertaken can 
also be tested against confidential research and internal audits held by UK law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies (Lewis 2011 - B30). This will show that 
the research has been carried out with a high degree of integrity so that the 
product from it can be used for practical or academic application and further 
research (ESRC 2012). 
3.9 Access, Ethics and Politics 
As already stated, the UK participants in the Network are small in number and it 
has not been possible to gain access to them all. Six agreed to be interviewed 
and provided good evidence towards answering the CRQ. Those six included 
key nodal participants in the Network and some involved in the setting up of key 
nodes and initial transnational links. Two others, who were directly accessible, 
did not reply to requests to take part in the research.  
In addition, one agency, which is a key node in the Network, did not reply to 
written or phone requests to interview their staff. They emphasised their 
reluctance to take part in research with an automatic telephone answer 
message stating they would not disclose information about their organisation. 
Direct access was gained, by way of inside connections, to a person from that 
agency. However, they were adamant that the only way to obtain interviews 
with staff was to write and receive a positive response. That response was 
never received and it is evidence of the difficulties of accessing some UK police 
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agencies even for former insiders with experience of working closely with the 
organisation (Cornish and Clarke 2002, Noakes and Wincup 2004). 
OSINT is part of the solution to limited access; alongside my own knowledge 
and experience (Sugden and Tomlinson 1999, Cornish and Clarke 2002, Best 
and Cumming 2007, Robert 2008, Bean 2007 and 2011, Tekir 2009, Rollins 
2010). OSINT is a source of evidence to corroborate and add to evidence 
obtained from those who took part in the interviews. It has been collected 
openly and recorded accurately. It includes what is posted and has been 
transmitted on the internet rather than the internet being used as a tool to 
collect data. Evidence has only been used if it is already in the public domain 
(Bryman 2008). All the OSINT has been graded using the 5x5x5 system and the 
Maryland scale (ACPO NPIA 2010 and Civil Service 2010).  
The use of the internet is criticised by some researchers as over used, 
particularly when it is used as a means to answer questionnaires (Bryman 
2008). However, as already stated this research has focused on knowledge that 
is already posted. The internet does provide a wealth of evidence that has 
already been collected and collecting it again, for the subject of this thesis, 
would have resulted in a number of researchers travelling at great expense to 
various parts of the world (Smith and Leigh 1997, p496). In addition, in line with 
Askitass and Zimmermann’s (2015) assertion that internet data ‘can be 
restudied’ (p2), a fresh question has been asked to fill a gap in the literature. 
Therefore, the use of internet evidence does not plagiarise what someone else 
has already done; asking a fresh question of the knowledge that is already 
available makes good use of that knowledge. 
As well as considering the reliability of internet sources through the use of the 
5x5x5 system, consideration has also been given in the research to whether 
anyone displaying anything on the internet did so in the reasonable expectation 
of some privacy. If so, consent would be required to use it as evidence in this 
thesis (Bryman 2008). A similar process was applied in relation to evidence 
gathered from people speaking at public events or conferences. As is 
customary at conferences, in the age of social networking, the issue of privacy 
is clarified to allow tweeting and in many instances, the conference speeches 
are filmed and posted on line and reported on in the media. All of the evidence 
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used was from conferences where it was clear that anything said would be 
placed in the public domain. Therefore no consent was required. Where 
relevant information was picked up by me in the course of day to day 
conversations with persons directly or indirectly connected to the Network that 
has only been included in this thesis with their consent (see Thurman 2014). 
In addition to the ethics of OSINT, ethical issues have also been considered 
and managed in relation to the wider research. Mitigation of the issues was 
agreed with the Sheffield Hallam University (SHU) Ethics Committee. The wider 
research ethical issues concerned interview participants and as with all ethical 
decisions and actions, people should be respected (Kleinig 1990, p3). In this 
thesis, there is a risk in disclosing the participants identity and damaging their 
professional reputation. Their participation was, therefore, based on a 
judgement as to whether it is morally right or wrong and what is reasonable or 
unreasonable (MacVean and Neyroud 2012, p2). People are at the centre of 
ESRC ‘principles, procedures and minimum requirements’ (ESRC 2012, p2), 
which include informing participants of the research methods, how the research 
will be used, how their information and identity would be protected, the 
voluntary nature of their participation and the risks or harm from taking part in 
the research. There are those who suggest ethics stifle freedom of research 
(Noakes and Wincup 2004, p38), however, that has not been the case with the 
research for this thesis. Adhering to a code of ethics has increased the trust 
between the researcher and the participants in what has already been identified 
by Cornish and Clarke (2002) as a difficult area to research.   
 Confidentiality of interview material has been managed on a university supplied 
encrypted lap top computer. In addition, none of those interviewed were 
questioned about operational tactics. Consent was obtained from the 
interviewees using the SHU consent form. They were supplied with questions in 
advance of the interview and they were invited to review the questions and to 
eradicate those questions that could have led to them disclosing operational 
tactics or sensitive sources. This resulted in the eradication of the same 
questions by some of the interviewees (Appendix 11.2) (ESRC 2012).  
The anonymity of the interviewees is being managed by not disclosing their 
personal details or their roles in this thesis or any subsequent publications 
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(Remenyi 2011). The participants have been provided with non-gender specific 
pseudonyms51 within the text of this thesis and have been provided with 
advanced extracts of the thesis where evidence from their interviews has been 
used. They were invited to confirm that they were happy that it did not disclose 
their identity and that it will not lead to professional embarrassment or disruption 
of the Network.  
The fact that I am a former insider who remains in contact with the participants 
and other serving police officers and staff has meant that the participants have 
trusted me with the data they have supplied. Nevertheless, there is limited 
access to UK participants within the Network  and six have been interviewed 
who are, or have been in the past, directly or indirectly involved in the Network.  
Therefore, the small number of participants interviewed was discussed at a 
presentation, to the doctorate supervision team and rapporteurs, in respect of 
whether this would provide sufficient evidence for the research.  
Grounded theory scholars do support obtaining data from only a small number 
of participants provided it is well analysed by the researcher (Chamaz 2006). 
Those present at the presentation also accepted that six interviews would 
provide sufficient evidence, especially with the inclusion of OSINT evidence and 
my experiences, but the consensus was that the supervision team, rapporteurs 
and Research Committee, should be given some indication as to the status of 
those interviewed to show the quality and validity of the interview evidence. 
Therefore, in the knowledge that three of the interviewees stated they had no 
problem with being named, even though they were aware of the blanket 
anonymity policy and the risk of damage to personal reputation, their roles were 
disclosed for the information of the supervision team, rapporteurs and Research 
Committee only and their details have not been disseminated further. This 
disclosure led to further agreement that the evidence from the interviews was 
valid and reliable.  
Some of the interviewees are senior and perform a niche role. Therefore, to 
ensure continued anonymity no interview quotes have been used that are role 
                                                          
51 They are known as Jordan, Alex, Geri, Billy, Chris and Jean. Gender spellings of the names are mixed and do not necessarily 
relate to the gender of the participant. 
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specific and could lead to the identity of the participant. Where it has been 
necessary to talk about roles, the evidence has been sanitised in such a way 
that it could have come from any number of sources (Remenyi 2011). 
With a view to potential future publication, a practical recommendation has been 
made in respect of a missing link between the police in the UK to wider global 
networks to reduce the illicit supply of firearms. The recommendation has been 
carefully explained to ensure it does not embarrass those involved or sour 
relationships between the police and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO), where the link should exist. The interviewees were made aware that an 
objective of the research was to enhance professional practice, by evidencing 
good practice and potential areas for development. The participants welcomed 
this objective as they seek to provide an excellent service and would welcome 
any recommendations to improve the Network; even though it could mean 
asking difficult questions as to why improvements have not been made earlier. 
As evidenced, contact has been maintained with the participants to debrief them 
and provide them with regular updates. They were informed on the interview 
debrief that the research is a developing process and they have been updated 
on the progress including the development of the central research question and 
of the aim and objectives. No participants have withdrawn from the research. 
However, they were informed that they could withdraw at any stage and if so, 
action would be taken in favour of the participant and their data destroyed, even 
though EU legislation allows for retention (Macaskill 2013 - A10). Access to 
such participants is rare (Cornish and Clarke 2002); therefore the research 
should be carried out with the balance in their favour. 
Finally, in evaluating the theme on the ‘firearms threat to the UK’ it is possible to 
name a known terrorist suspect. That suspect is well named in the literature 
(Andrew 2009). However; as they have never been convicted as a terrorist they 
have not been named in this thesis and will not be named in any subsequent 
publications. 
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PART II - THE 
NETWORK 
Chapter 4 - Presentation of the Research Findings 
Part II of this thesis presents the grounded theory research findings, which 
critically analyse the workings of the Network, from the UK standpoint. It 
examines the firearms threat (which is the policing problem the Network deals 
with), which nodes make up the Network to respond to the threat and what the 
motivation is that facilitates the operation of the Network. Four main themes 
emerge from the data, which explain how the Network operates from the local to 
the global and vice versa:  
 The first theme presented in chapter 5 is the firearms threat. It is 
necessary to clearly state what the threat is, in order to understand what 
the Network is dealing with and to assist in suggesting ideas to mitigate 
the threat. The findings show that the firearms threat shapes and drives 
the operation of the Network. The threat is clearly articulated within the 
findings and the Network participants demonstrate that they understand 
the threat. They are using the Network to enhance that understanding . 
 The second theme, in chapter 6, explains the key UK nation state nodes 
within the Network. The existing literature touches on the existence of 
these nodes. However, the findings on the UK nodes are more detailed 
and clearly articulate their existence, their influence on the Network and 
the fact that they anchor the UK's participation within the Network in the 
UK.  
 The third theme, in chapter 7, explains the transnational nodes in the 
Network. Again, such nodes are not clearly articulated in the existing 
literature. However, the findings explain the key UK nodes, which foster 
the transnational aspect of the Network, and the nodes from outside the 
UK nation state that join the Network. The findings also demonstrate that 
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the Network operates in such a way that it develops UK nation state 
policing rather than controlling it from the outside. Themes two and three 
amount to a nodal network analysis (Shearing and Johnston 2010).  
 The fourth theme to emerge in chapter 8 is that the Network and, as a 
consequence, the development of nation state policing is facilitated by 
people and the tools from late modernity. The literature overlooks how 
networks are developed and tends to demonstrate that policing is slowed 
down by a negative police culture. However, the presentation of this 
theme evidences the existence of positive aspects of police culture, 
which embrace change and facilitate the development of the Network 
and the development of UK nation state policing. 
Analysis has continued during the writing of this thesis. This is in line with 
grounded theory analysis as proposed by Chamaz (2006). Any further relevant 
evidence or literature pertinent to proving or disproving a finding was recorded 
in the HOLMES style actions and data bases and included in the text of the 
thesis. As the findings are presented their contribution to the thesis are 
reviewed in the text. The evidence drawn from the research has been compared 
with the existing literature to provide a critical explanation, which answers the 
CRQ and challenges the literature and theory (Chamaz 2006). When analysed 
together in chapter 9 of part III of the thesis, the firearms threat causes the 
police to adapt. Through a process of policeization, late modern cops using the 
tools from late modernity and wanting to do their best for the victims, facilitate 
the development and operation of the Network. As such, the Network 
contributes to a development of nation state policing rather than a 
reconstruction of policing from the outside in the form of a global police state. 
Theoretically, this suggests a glocal reconstruction of policing is taking place. It 
includes transnational policing led by the UK public police, in a pluralised 
partnership with other UK public organisations, and steered by the UK 
Government. 
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Chapter 5 - The Firearms Threat to the United Kingdom (UK) 
5.1 Introduction to findings on the UK Firearms Threat 
When they are used firearms have a serious impact on victims, their families 
and the fear of crime (Golding and McClory 2008). Therefore, it is necessary to 
clearly state what the firearms threat is and, to date, that threat has not been 
clearly articulated in the literature. However, this thesis shows the UK 
participants in the Network do have a clear understanding of the threat as a 
problem that needs to be dealt with. The data collected for this thesis enhances, 
rather than challenges, what is already in the literature. It articulates the fact 
that the biggest threat comes from deactivated and converted handguns.  
Understanding the threat leads to opportunities to manage it by ILP, both locally 
and transnationally, using access to globally available resources. The data also 
shows that the Network participants have a mission (self-appointed and in line 
with various nodal plans) to deal with the threat and they are determined to 
carry out that mission. Such cultural missions are identified as an element of 
transnational policing subcultures (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). Subcultures 
are discussed and analysed at various points in this thesis and it will be shown 
that the firearms threat is driving the Network. The Network is facilitated and 
developed by people and is an example of competitive adaptation in action 
(Kenny 2008) where the police adapt to be one step ahead of the criminals in 
dealing with the firearms threat.                                                 
5.2 The Threat to the UK from Converted and Reactivated Firearms 
One research interview participant52, Jordan, summarised the importance of the 
firearms threat when discussing their function:  
"We have to provide reassurance into the Home Office that the threats to 
the UK from the criminal use of firearms have been identified and 
tackled…". 
                                                          
52 As per the previous footnote the research interview participants are known as Jordan, Alex, Geri, Billy, Chris and Jean. 
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Jordan then went on to say they were held accountable for dealing with the 
threat by a Home Office Threat Reduction Board (TRB). TRBs are included as 
part of the process in the UK strategy for dealing with organised crime. The 
strategy involves the government, academics, police and other agencies 
coming together at various organised crime TRBs to clearly state the threat and 
identify priorities and gaps in the knowledge on organised crime. The threat is 
then managed by the TRBs (Great Britain, Home Office 2011 –A11). 
The firearms threat is dealt with under the 'Gun Crime, kidnapping, violent crime 
and gangs' TRB category (Great Britain, Home Office 2011d, p10 - A11). TRB 
categories mirror the UK Threat Assessment (UKTA) and former SOCA53 
activity was linked to TRBs, which support the partnership working between 
SOCA, NABIS, other UK police forces and other partner agencies (SOCA 
2012d - A15). The significance of TRBs is expanded, later in this analysis, as 
the TRB that generates activity54 to deal with the firearms threat is a key UK 
node that helps anchor UK transnational policing firmly within the UK nation 
state. 
Jordan also summarised the nature of the firearms circulating in the illicit UK 
market, that present a threat, confirming the main threat comes from UK centric 
reactivated and converted handguns. The strict UK legislation on possession 
and use of firearms reduces their availability to criminals. Therefore, they resort 
to using whatever they can obtain. Clarke (1997) uses the reduction of firearm 
availability to reinforce his point about taking situational preventative action 
against criminals. By knowing what tools they use in crime, action can be taken 
to make it harder for criminals making rational choices to access those tools.  
However, what Jordan says also shows that criminals will adapt, as 
demonstrated by Kenny (2008), to find new sources. Criminal markets can be 
displaced to include such new sources and they need to be monitored to 
prevent displacement. Such displacement towards new methods or new 
geographical areas of operation call for partnership responses (Clarke 1997, 
Sutton, Schneider and Hetherington 2001). This is something which the 
                                                          
53 Incorporated into NCA in October 2013. 
54 The type of activity generated by the TRB and its forunner are discussed at chapter 6.2. 
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Network participants appear to be aware of in relation to criminals looking 
beyond the UK centric illicit firearms market. Jordan states:  
"I have to be honest …. Because of the unique nature of the criminal use 
of firearms in the UK, our very strong licensing laws and the type of 
weapons that are available here it is very different to most of Europe and 
certainly to America. …a lot of the stuff … is naturally very UK centric 
….things like reactivated weapons, converted weapons …you don't have 
access to the number of good quality original firearms that you would get 
elsewhere…(but) we've had a major problem with the …. supply chain in 
from Lithuania with a gun called a Bikel handgun, we still have a problem 
with conversion with more conventional things like starting pistols …and 
we have seen a couple….of importations from the States of good quality 
Glocks ….but if you had to say where is the major thrust; it's still on 
converted and reactivated weapons and broadly pistols."  
When referring to ‘the unique nature of the criminal use of firearms in the UK’, 
Jordan is referring to the type of firearm used. Jordan gave a specific example 
of the Olympic .380 BBM blank firer (BBM)55 as a problem firearm in the 
converted category (unique to the UK). Jordan describes the impact the BBM 
had and the support given by the “pro-gun lobby” in dealing effectively with the 
BBM problem. The pro-gun lobby56 support was a result of the police being able 
to evidence the BBM as a specific threat. What Jordan says confirms the use of 
partnership problem solving by the police (Paterson and Pollock 2011) and the 
involvement of the pro-gun lobby is an example of the pluralisation of other UK 
public organisations in policing (Bayley and Shearing 2001, Jones and Newburn 
2006):  
"We had an instance before Christmas with a gun called ….an Olympic 
bbm ….basically it was a gun that was being used by a load of people for 
shootings in London. …It was a starting pistol that was being converted. 
It was a really easy weapon to convert and people had latched on to this 
                                                          
55 The BBM is also discussed (in chapter 6) in relation to other UK nation state nodes in the Network. 
56 Organisations such as the Gun Trade Association (GTA), the British Shooting Sporting Council (BSSC) and the British Association 
of Shooting and Conservation (BASC), which are non-profit making bodies funded by member’s subscriptions (Great Britain, 
Parliament, House of Commons 2010b – A10). 
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and what we had to do is look at the legislation. …Actually it fitted in 
existing legislation as a weapon which was readily convertible but it had 
previously been judged by forensic scientists as not being readily 
convertible. So we did a new test using the (fact) …that ten years on you 
can buy (conversion) stuff much more readily …we got it independently 
tested by the forensic science service who said yes in our opinion its 
readily convertible."  
As the gun was classed as readily convertible the BBM was banned (CPS 2013 
- A15). The gun trade and other partners supported an amnesty, which led to a 
positive outcome. Most BBMs, that were known to have been imported from 
Bruni, the legitimate manufacturers in Italy, and sold legally in the UK before 
they were banned, were handed in to the police. This prevented the 
criminalisation of lawful firearms users and reduced the illicit supply of firearms, 
whilst at the same time increasing the risk to the criminals by confirming the 
BBM was illegal per se (NABIS 2010 - A15). This was Clarke's (1997) SCP and 
Sutton, Schneider and Hetherington’s (2001) criminal market reduction in 
action.  
Before the ban, BBMs could be bought from legal dealers for up to £90 and 
when they were illegally converted they could fetch up to £750 on the illicit UK 
firearms market (NABIS 2010 - A15). Prior to the amnesty, the police had 
recovered a significant number of illegally converted BBMs, mainly in the 
London area, where they had been used in various offences including 
attempted murder and grievous bodily harm (GBH) (NABIS 2010 - A15).   
The same threat from converted and reactivated firearms is supported with 
evidence from other participants. Alex gave more evidence about the BBM and 
compared how cheap it was on the illicit UK market (even at a £750 high) 
compared with fully working original firearms:  
"We knew when we ran Olympic BBM that they were going for between 
three and five hundred pounds. Now, Olympic BBMs were held together 
with mobile phone sim cards and they had a tendency to explode. (They) 
were hugely inaccurate and we had one case of a woman who was shot 
three times in the head and still survived. But, they were trading for five 
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hundred quid and we knew the purchase price was about ninety or less 
in a registered firearms dealer so there was a substantial mark-up…And, 
without going into too much detail, for a really good handgun in the UK 
you are looking at several thousand pounds…."  
Billy stated:  
"The bulk of weapons that are available are converted and reactivated 
weapons and also now the pre-ninety five standard is hugely convertible 
and they are really sought after now57."  
The evidence from the data on the threat from converted and reactivated 
firearms is supported by evidence given by ACPO, NABIS and other experts to 
the Home Affairs Select Committee in 2011. The Select Committee highlight the 
threat from replica firearms (that look real and can be used by criminals to 
threaten victims), blank firers and air pistols that can be converted to fire live 
bullets and deactivated firearms that can be reactivated to their original live 
state. They quote ACPO and NABIS leading sources who state:  
"The picture that is emerging is very much that there are a small number 
of weapons out there; handguns are the major problem—blank firing, 
converted or deactivated weapons. They are being used on four, five or 
six different occasions, and the guns move around the country." (Great 
Britain, Parliament, House of Commons 2011a, p45 - A15). 
The lack of firearms available for criminal use is confirmed by one of the 
participants. Alex compares the current picture with the time of the Operation 
Barker investigation (to which I contributed in my role as a police detective with 
Derbyshire Police) :  
"One of the things we have probably done ….is we have driven down the 
availability of converted weapons and more of the (dangerous) junk that 
you certainly would have remembered from your old jobs. We've taken a 
huge amount of that out of the system."  
                                                          
57 In 1995 the standards of deactivation of firearms were tightened to try to prevent reactivation. However, even though standards 
were tightened nothing was done about pre-1995 deactivations already in circulation and a large amount of pre-1995 deactivated 
firearms remain lawfully on the collectors' market. They were and still are sought after for criminal reactivation (Severns 2001 - 
A15). 
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Although referred to as "junk", the Operation Barker firearms were still 
dangerous lethal barrelled weapons that needed taking off the street to reduce 
the threat. Operation Barker is mentioned in the literature review, but, it is worth 
examining in more detail how the Operation Barker market worked and where it 
fitted within the overall illicit UK firearms market between 1990 and 2004. 
However, before moving ahead with that discussion it should be emphasised 
that the threat from converted and reactivated firearms is clearly understood by 
the Network participants and that SCP has led to the reduction of the availability 
of such firearms. Even though the situational prevention has led to 
displacement in the form of potential competitive adaptation to new sources, the 
Network participants appear to be aware of that displacement and are taking 
proactive action through the Network to deal with emerging trends. There is also 
evidence in this section of pluralisation of policing in active support from the gun 
trade associations for public police action. 
5.3 Operation Barker, The Glocal Threat and the Blurring of the Licit and the 
Illicit Firearms Market.  
Operation Barker dealt with the organised criminal supply of firearms which 
ended up in the hands of various criminals including terrorists, drug dealers and 
murderers. It is an example of a glocal criminal network (Hobbs 2008, Xu and 
Hsinchun 2005) (Appendix 11.8). There is a continuum of organised crime 
activity dependent on the type and seriousness of crime, the amount of 
violence, corruption or economic damage caused and whether it is glocal or 
transnational in nature. That continuum also extends into the involvement of 
organised criminals in terrorist activity and/or working in partnership with 
terrorists as a nexus (Makarenko 2004, Clarke and Lee 2008, Rollins 2010, 
Severns 2012). Both organised crime and terrorism featured in Operation 
Barker which proved to represent an OCG/terrorist nexus. 
The main subjects of the Operation Barker investigation were a father and son, 
Bill and Mitchell Greenwood, who worked together over a number of years 
supplying firearms from premises in Derbyshire. They were organised criminals 
who dealt with other organised criminals and terrorists. In the first instance, their 
business was legal and over the years it became criminal and resulted in them 
both profiting from their criminal enterprise. Bill Greenwood could be affable, 
Richard John Severns 19035736 The 'Network' 
  
106 
particularly towards fellow gun enthusiasts and that extended to police officers 
who were interested in shooting; however there is no evidence to show he ever 
corrupted any police officer.  
Bill was also not averse to using violence and in 1981 he received a police 
caution for shooting a burglar entering premises near to his. As a result of the 
shooting he was struck off, as a Registered Firearms Dealer (RFD), from the 
then Section 1 Firearms Dealer Register. Up to that point he had been running 
a legitimate business selling various firearms, which at the time included hand 
guns and rifles which have since been prohibited by law. They are now classed 
as prohibited firearms under section 5 of the 1968 Firearms Act (Sampson 
2006, BASC 2006, UK Government 2013). The legitimate firearms business 
was family run and was allowed to continue with Bill's son Mitchell being the 
RFD (Severns 2001 and 2008 - A15). 
However, in 1994, in a joint operation between the Ministry of Defence (MOD) 
Police and Derbyshire Constabulary, Bill and Mitchell Greenwood, together with 
others were arrested and convicted for possession of a prohibited weapon after 
they became involved in an illicit firearms deal with an MOD employee. The 
sentencing court chose not to impose a custodial sentence but Mitchell was 
struck off as a RFD. This meant that all the live firing stock he held had to be 
disposed of (Severns 2001 and 2008 - A15). 
As he held a large quantity of firearms Mitchell was given time to dispose of the 
stock under the supervision of Derbyshire Police Firearms Licensing Officers 
and the serial numbers of all the firearms held by Mitchell were recorded by 
those officers. Mitchell, with the assistance of Bill and his contacts, disposed of 
the firearms to other RFDs. However, they also had a large amount of the stock 
deactivated so that they could carry on a business of trading in deactivated 
firearms (Severns 2001 and 2008 - A15).  
Despite many calls for changes in the law on deactivated firearms (in line with 
Clarke's (1997) SCP), the trade in them is lawful in most parts of the UK and it 
is not licensed. With the exception of persons in Northern Ireland, anyone can 
hold a deactivated firearm of any type without a licence provided it has proof 
house markings confirming it is deactivated and incapable of firing. The trade is 
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aimed at collectors, particularly those involved in the collection of military 
equipment, many of whom are involved in battle re-enactment (Severns 2001 
and 2008 - A15, Great Britain, Home Office 2002 - A15, BBC 2008 – B30, 
Barrett 2009 – B30, Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons 2010 - A15, 
CPS 2013 - A15).  
Generally the trade in deactivated firearms and the collection and use of 
deactivated firearms in battle re-enactment is carried out lawfully. However, it is 
possible, with minimal engineering knowledge and the correct tools and 
equipment, to reactivate a deactivated firearm. This is usually carried out 
illegally and the reactivated firearms are then used in crime. In 1995 the 
standards of deactivation of firearms were tightened to try to prevent such 
reactivation. However, even though standards were tightened nothing was done 
about pre-1995 deactivations already in circulation and a large amount of pre-
1995 deactivated firearms remain lawfully on the collectors' market. (Severns 
2001 and 2008 - A15, Great Britain, Home Office 2002 - A15, BBC 2008 – B30, 
Barrett 2009 – B30, Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons 2011a - A15, 
CPS 2013 - A15). They were and still are sought after for criminal reactivation; 
hence the earlier comment, by Billy, a Network participant, in relation to the bulk 
of available firearms being converted and reactivated:  
"….the pre ninety five standard is hugely convertible and they are really 
sought after."  
Professor Peter Squires a criminologist at Brighton University also gave 
evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee on Firearms Control in 2010. 
He promoted further restriction on the stock of firearms available for criminal 
use in line with Clarke's (1997) RCT and SCP. The intention being to reduce the 
availability of illicit firearms and increase the risks for the criminal. Professor 
Squires stated that: 
"The market in deactivated and reactivated weapons ... is a glaring gap 
in the system of gun controls in this country". The subsequent report on 
firearms control goes on to state, "The previous government published a 
consultation paper in 2009 which proposed a number of options for 
further control of deactivated firearms, including treating deactivated 
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guns as realistic imitation firearms; making deactivation standards a 
mandatory requirement; requiring pre-1995 deactivations to be modified 
to the 1995 standard; selling deactivated guns only through Registered 
Firearms Dealers; and prohibiting people convicted of serious criminal 
offences from possessing de-activated firearms. No action has since 
been taken. NABIS and ACPO have recommended that consideration be 
given to ensuring that pre-1995 deactivated firearms are aligned with the 
post-1995 standard of deactivation 'in order to prevent exploitation by 
criminally minded individuals'" (Great Britain, Parliament, House of 
Commons 2011a, p46 - A15). 
Bill and Mitchell Greenwood concentrated on trading in pre-1995 deactivated 
firearms. They traded in the live firearms that they had deactivated through a 
RFD and other pre-1995 stock that they purchased. They tended to deal with 
one UK based international firearms dealer who bought up ex-military and ex-
police firearms from around the world and lawfully imported them into the UK for 
deactivation and sale, usually through firearms auctions, to lawful collectors and 
dealers. Bill and Mitchell built up a large and varied collection of deactivated 
firearms that included AK-47 assault rifles, Uzi sub machine guns, Stirling sub-
machine guns, VZ25 sub-machine guns, Mab pistols, Smith and Wesson 
revolvers, Makarov pistols, Browning automatic pistols and Walther pistols; to 
name but a few. They sold the deactivated firearms direct to the public from 
their premises and by way of mail order; advertising in sporting gun magazines 
(Severns 2001 and 2008 - A15, BBC 2004 – B30). 
Shortly after they started trading in deactivated firearms a number of the 
Greenwoods' stock began appearing as  illegally reactivated firearms, used in 
crime. The recovered illegal firearms were traced back to the Greenwoods' 
stock through the record of serial numbers collected by Derbyshire Firearms 
Licensing Officers at the time of the MOD Police/Derbyshire Constabulary joint 
investigation. Initially Bill and Mitchell were questioned as witnesses to see if 
they could identify who had purchased the deactivated firearms that had been 
illegally reactivated. However, they stated they could not and, as the trade in 
deactivated firearms is unlicensed, there was no obligation on their part to 
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record who they had sold deactivated firearms to (Severns 2001 and 2008 - 
A15). 
As well as police suspicions being raised by the number of Greenwood 
deactivated firearms that were turning up reactivated, suspicions were also 
raised by the fact the Greenwoods were advertising barrel blanks and chamber 
reamers together with deactivated firearms. Both barrel blanks and chamber 
reamers could be sold lawfully without a licence however; they are key 
components for reactivating. Therefore, there was a suspicion that the 
Greenwoods had made some rational choices about their business becoming 
criminal. They were encouraging and potentially conspiring in the illegal 
reactivation of deactivated firearms in the belief the rewards were greater than 
the risks (Severns 2001 and 2008 - A15). In addition, by making a rational 
choice to make their business a criminal enterprise the Greenwoods were 
embedding the criminogenic and glocal criminal nature of the firearms industry 
identified by Rothe and Collins (2010) by making legal purchases of deactivated 
firearms (legally purchased and deactivated from a global market in used 
firearms) and facilitating their criminal reactivation. In other words the legal fuels 
the illegal. 
A police test purchase operation was set up by Derbyshire Constabulary and it 
was found that Bill and Mitchell Greenwood were giving verbal instructions, 
backed up with diagrams, on how to reactivate deactivated firearms. They were 
therefore arrested in 1999 and charged with firearms offences based on the 
police test purchase evidence. At the time of their arrest 722 firearms 
deactivated to pre-1995 standards were recovered by Derbyshire Constabulary 
(Severns 2001 and 2008 - A15).  
Bill and Mitchell pleaded not guilty, but as their case was about to go to trial it 
was withdrawn by the CPS because of a European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) decision, in Teixeira de Castro v Portugal (1998) and decisions made in 
the UK case R v Smurthwaite; Gill (1994). The decisions in those cases meant 
that the Greenwoods could not be prosecuted solely on the evidence of police 
test purchase. There had to be evidence of predisposition on their part to carry 
out an unlawful deal. Test purchase rules and regulations have since been 
reviewed to ensure clear evidence of predisposition is gathered. However, in 
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1999, Derbyshire Constabulary were left in the position that, by law, they should 
return the deactivated stock to the Greenwoods knowing that there was a risk 
that the firearms could all be reactivated and used in crime which could lead to 
death or serious injury (Severns 2001 and 2008 - A15). 
Following consultation with George Carman QC, it was decided that further 
investigations would be carried out by the Derbyshire Constabulary to gather 
evidence of predisposition. In addition, evidence was sought to show the danger 
that the stock of deactivated firearms posed to the UK public if they were 
released back to the Greenwoods by the Derbyshire Constabulary. The aim of 
the investigation was to seek lawful destruction of the deactivated stock through 
the civil courts and if sufficient evidence of predisposition was found to seek a 
reinstatement of a criminal case against Bill and Mitchell Greenwood (Severns 
2001 and 2008 - A15). 
As a result of a detailed investigation, evidence of predisposition to illegal 
dealing in firearms by Bill and Mitchell was gathered from a number of criminals 
involved in the illicit UK firearms market. In addition, the instructions given by 
the Greenwoods to one of the police test purchase officers together with the 
barrel blank, reamer and deactivated Mab pistol, purchased by the officer from 
the Greenwoods, were used by a forensic scientist to carry out a successful 
reactivation. The evidence was used in a new criminal case and on 25th January 
2004, following a trial; Bill and Mitchell were convicted at Nottingham Crown 
Court of conspiracy to convert deactivated firearms into live firearms. They were 
sentenced to 7 years imprisonment, which was reduced on appeal to five58 
(Severns 2001 and 2008 - A15, BBC 2004 – B30). 
Not only did the Operation Barker investigation show how the Greenwoods 
became involved and operated in the illicit UK firearms market with the 
reactivation of deactivated firearms, it also showed the type of firearms involved 
and that many originated from outside the UK. They were imported into the 
country legally by someone trading in the international firearms market then 
legally deactivated and sold onto the lawful unlicensed collectors' market before 
                                                          
58 The appeal on sentencing was successful due to a change in sentencing powers within the period of the conspiracy; from a 
maximum of 5 at the beginning of the conspiracy to a maximum of 7 years imprisonment at the end. Bill died whilst in prison and 
Mitchell was released on licence in September 2005 (Severns 2008). 
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being diverted onto the illicit market as illegally reactivated firearms. This is 
clear evidence of a glocal criminal market; a local market in illicit firearms 
fuelled by the availability of firearms on the international market (Hobbs 1998). It 
therefore shows the criminogenic nature of the firearms trade in that the legal 
trade facilitates the illegal trade from the white market through a grey market 
and onto a black market. As a consequence the whole firearms industry from 
the local to the global should be more accountable through 'system criminality' 
(Rothe and Collins 2010, p2). 
In addition, this example demonstrates how the Greenwoods attracted 
likeminded individuals with a keen interest in firearms and a collective contempt 
for the UK firearms laws. This contributed to their criminalisation and attracted 
the attention of those wishing to make use of firearms for criminal activity, 
beyond flaunting the firearms laws. There were two main criminal re-activators 
who purchased stock from and discussed reactivation with the Greenwoods. 
One was an engineer who liked to tinker with firearms in his Manchester based 
workshop. The other was an ex Special Constable from Brighton who had 
travelled the world taking part in police firearms competitions and who cornered 
the criminal market by producing his own illegal Mac 10 sub machine guns.  
The Greenwoods also dealt directly with a number of criminal end users who 
visited them in person, carried out their own reactivations and used their end 
product to commit murder, robbery and enforce or protect drug dealing. The two 
re-activators, who were associates of the Greenwoods, also had similar criminal 
contacts that purchased illegally reactivated firearms from them; including two 
Liverpool drug dealers59 who used illicit firearms stashes to dupe the Home 
Secretary into granting them a pardon from a heavy sentence of imprisonment 
for drug trafficking. In all, the Greenwoods were connected to 96 criminal cases 
involving 700 firearms (The Guardian 1999 – B30, The Independent 1999 – 
B30, Severns 2001 and 2008 - A15, BBC 2004, 2008a,2008b – B30). 
                                                          
59 Hasse and Bennett stashed a large number of firearms then gave false information to customs officers purporting the firearms 
had been stashed by others for terrorist purposes (BBC 2008b – B30). Arthur Shaw gave evidence at the trial of the Greenwoods 
and then later gave evidence against Hasse and Bennet. His evidence in the Greenwood trial was accepted and corroborated. It 
has never been rebuffed and Shaw has never changed his evidence about the Greenwoods, even though he accused Derbyshire 
officers during the Hasse and Bennet trial of exerting pressure on him. It is believed he gave a fabricated story about the exertion 
of pressure  because of fears of reprisals from the criminal underworld. Despite Arthur Shaw changing his evidence enquiries 
confirmed the integrity of the original evidence provided by him to Derbyshire Officers and Hasse and Bennett were convicted. 
They were imprisoned for a total of 42 years (Author’s note). 
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Some of the contacts of the Greenwoods also had terrorist connections, or 
moved reactivated firearms on to terrorists, making the Greenwoods part of an 
OCG/terrorist nexus. As such the terrorists had a need and the Greenwoods 
could meet that need in return for profit (Severns 2012)60. One contact with al-
Qaeda sympathies from Stockport dealt directly with the Greenwoods and has 
since been arrested on suspicion of terrorist activity and dealing in illegal 
firearms in Bangladesh. Others, with connections to Loyalist terrorists in 
Northern Ireland and suspected of collusion with the UK security forces in 
Northern Ireland, were found in possession of reactivated firearms that 
originated from the Greenwoods. However, despite lengthy wider investigations, 
particularly about collusion between terrorists and the security forces, the way 
that the loyalist terrorists actually obtained the firearms from the Greenwoods 
has not been identified. All that exists is a suspicion that members of right wing 
groups that included former soldiers, such as Combat 18, purchased 
deactivated firearms from the Greenwoods, reactivated them and sold them to 
terrorists in Northern Ireland (Severns 2001 and 2008 - A15, Andrew 2009, 
Cobain 2010 – B40, Moorland 2011 - A15).  
As well as conspiring to convert deactivated firearms into live firearms, evidence 
was found of fraudulent activity by the Greenwoods whilst they were RFDs. 
They forged entries in their firearms register, and covered them up with forged 
documentation, to divert live firearms onto the illicit UK market. Many of the live 
firearms that were diverted on to the illicit market were found to be hand guns 
and prohibited firearms that had been converted into smooth bore shotguns with 
24" barrels enabling them to be possessed on less restrictive shotgun licences. 
The purchase of such firearms on a shotgun licence was legal up to 198961 and 
many of those diverted onto the criminal market were found to have had the 
barrel cut back to the hand gun length when used in crime (Severns 2001 and 
2008 - A15, Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons 2010a – A15).  
                                                          
60 The OCG/terrorist nexus appears to have featured on mainland Europe where terrorists involved in a firearms attack in Paris in 
January 2015 appear to have purchased firearms from an OCG (Moftah 2015 – E40). Although the Belgium police denied an OCG 
leader had admitted to the sale (BBC 2015b – B20) interestingly, two days later, they raided a terrorist cell in Brussels, killed two 
suspected terrorists and recovered another stash of firearms. The head of Europol, Rob Wainwright states this is evidence of 
increased sophistication in the acquisition and use of firearms by terrorists across Europe (Sky News 2015 – B20). 
61 Such firearms were eventually banned, first by the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988, which banned semi-automatic and pump 
action rifles, short shotguns with magazines and self-loading rifles following the Hungerford shootings and second by the Firearms 
(Amendment) Act 1997, which banned all handguns following the Dunblane Shootings (Great Britain, Parliament, House of 
Commons 2010a – A15). 
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Operation Barker led to the arrest of 45 other people and the recovery of 435 
illegally held firearms. Some of those arrested were also found to be involved in 
the illicit drugs market, the market in child pornography and the manufacture of 
explosives. They included a man from Wiltshire in illegal possession of 20 
firearms, gunpowder, ammunition and mercury switches. A man from 
Gloucester was in possession of a .22 rifle and 50 cannabis plants. A man from 
Bristol was in possession of a reactivated hand gun as well as other home 
made firearms. Two men from Durham were in illegal possession of 19 
firearms, explosives and chemicals. A man living near Torquay was in 
possession of 301 prohibited firearms and a large quantity of ammunition. Also, 
nine people, including  teachers, engineers and a firefighter with connections to 
an Oldham gun club, were convicted of conspiracy to commit firearms offences. 
They were in possession of 21 prohibited firearms (Darlington and Stockton 
Times 2001 – B30, Askill 2002 – B30, Severns 2008 - A15). 
In 2008, a follow up intelligence operation showed that some of the illicit 
Greenwood weapons and reactivation equipment (i.e. barrel blanks and 
reamers) had been retained by people who had dealt with the Greenwoods. 
Following a domestic violence investigation, a man in the UK Channel Islands, 
was found to be in illegal possession of Greenwood supplied firearms (Severns 
2008 - A15). Also, as late as 2013 Derbyshire Constabulary were still receiving 
enquiries from other police forces following the recovery of suspected 
Greenwood supplied firearms (Thurman 2013 - A10). However, as indicated by 
the participants in the Network, the 2008 and 2013 information suggests that as 
a result of the police action there are not as many illegally held Greenwood 
firearms in the illicit market (Severns 2008 - A15). 
Operation Barker is a clear example of how the UK firearms market operates 
and the threat it poses. It includes evidence of the criminogenic nature of the 
firearms market and the rational choices made by organised criminals which 
could be managed through SCP. However, despite a number of attempts to 
tighten the legislation to prevent reactivation of deactivated firearms and to 
reduce the stock available for reactivation such commodities continue to be a 
threat. That threat and the slow legislative response to it are clearly articulated 
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by the research participants and other OSINT (Great Britain, Parliament, House 
of Commons 2011a  – A15). 
5.4  Middlemen and Competitive Adaptation by the Criminals towards a 
Transnational Threat to the UK from Imported Live Firearms. 
SCP and proactive police action can lead to displacement in the form of 
competitive adaptation in the favour of the organised criminals. Competitive 
adaptation is where criminals and police develop metis, which is the embedded 
organisational learning of new flexible skills alongside established older skills. 
This enables the police and criminal groups to improve their knowledge and 
adapt to try to exploit an advantage over each other (Kenny 2008). The type of 
firearms available in the illicit UK Market and the way they are being supplied is 
changing from the period when Operation Barker was running. According to the 
participants in the Network the market has been displaced "a little bit" and there 
is more emphasis on converted blank firers. In addition and as already alluded 
to in the evidence given to the Home Affairs Select Committee (Great Britain, 
Parliament, House of Commons 2011a), criminals are adapting the market so 
that firearms are being recycled by middlemen, Alex said: 
"…we've identified …middlemen within the criminal market place, people 
who are suppliers of firearms to others….you know facilitators of 
crime; …We have seen, in the past….opposing crime groups shooting 
each other with the same gun."  
The identification of middlemen in the illicit UK firearms market as the key 
facilitators of the criminal use of firearms (supplying the firearm to one group on 
hire then re issuing it to an opposing group), is an example of Cornish and 
Clarke's (2002) criminal actors within crime script analysis. It highlights the 
making of rational choices in line with RCT and identifies options for SCP of 
organised crime by way of market disruption (Clarke 1997, Sutton, Schneider 
and Hetherington 2001,Tierney 2009).  
Cornish and Clarke (2002) explain that crime involves a series of choices where 
decisions need to be made on various aspects of a crime such as preparation 
and commission. Those aspects are then developed further by identifying what 
is required by way of criminal actors, equipment, location and activities which 
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makes up the crime script (Cornish and Clarke 2002). It also identifies where 
the power lies within the nodal network (Shearing and Johnston 2010) which is 
that the illicit UK firearms market supply is controlled by the middlemen. They 
are a key node.  
The importance of middlemen is underlined by the fact that NABIS gave 
evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee in 2010 that a new crime should 
be introduced to ensure the seriousness of the activity of middlemen is captured 
in law. NABIS suggested there should be a new criminal offence of, 'possession 
with intent to supply firearms' that would carry a life sentence. They presented 
their evidence with a view to deterring middlemen and others who traffic 
firearms into and around the UK (Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons 
2011a - A15). Classification of the offence they sought, together with the 
proposed life sentence, was included as part of the UK Government's Serious 
and Organised Crime Strategy (Great Britain, Home Office 2013 - A15)62. It 
increases the risk for the criminal (Clarke 1997); in this case the middlemen and 
firearms traffickers. 
The crime script for the illicit UK firearms market during the period of Operation 
Barker involved criminals supplying the raw materials and instructions to turn 
the legal into the illegal. They worked with the legal and the illegal dealers in 
firearms and distributed goods directly from shop premises or by way of mail 
order. The raw materials and instructions were used by re-activators who 
produced illegal firearms and sold them direct to criminal end users or to 
criminal armourers who would in turn sell or hire out illegal firearms to criminal 
end users. The individual roles sometimes overlapped in a continuum of 
obtaining raw materials, to re-activating, to using a re-activated firearm in the 
commission of a crime. The script developed to include air weapons and blank 
firers that could be imported legally into the UK and then illegally converted into 
live firearms. At the same time, the middlemen or criminal armourers became 
more prominent, within the script, recycling firearms to make up for the lack of 
                                                          
62 It has since been incorporated into law under provisions 108-111 of the Anti Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The 
offence carries life imprisonment under the Act, which also imposes life imprisonment, as the maximum, for improper importation 
of firearms (Great Britain 2014 – A15). 
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availability of good quality firearms on the illicit UK firearms market (Severns 
2001 and 2008 - A15). 
The criminal script (Cornish and Clarke 2002) has now been subjected to 
further competitive adaptation (Kenny 2008) to include transnational criminal 
actors posting or carrying firearms into the UK. The displacement in the market 
has seen some UK criminals turn to US criminals as a source of illicit firearms. 
A number of the participants talk about a transnational operation where firearms 
were purchased by way of a ‘straw purchase’ (Ridgeway et al, p.xiii)63 in the US 
and then transferred to UK criminals. The operation is talked of in glowing terms 
as a joint operation between UK and US law enforcement agencies by Alex: 
"We ran a proactive investigation for about three months, again with 
support of ATF, massive support from the ATF, where we were delivering 
parcels to that crime group from the US to the UK for a period of about 
three months.64"  
The partnership with the ATF will be explored further in chapter 7 and 8. 
However, in relation to the illicit UK firearms market, the US connection is 
further evidence of competitive adaptation (Kenny 2008) on the part of the UK 
criminals making rational choices (Clarke 1997). As a result of UK police activity 
there was a lack of quality firearms on the illicit UK market. Therefore, a small 
group of UK criminals adapted, based on knowledge of the market and the 
police disruption and made a rational choice to go transnational and transfer 
firearms purchased illegally in the US onto the illicit market in the UK. As 
evidenced by Alex: 
                                                          
63 ‘Under current (US) federal law, a straw purchase occurs when the actual buyer of a firearm uses another person, a straw 
purchaser, to execute paperwork necessary to purchase a firearm from a licensed dealer. The straw purchase violates the Gun 
Control Act 1968 (P.L. 90-618) by making a false statement with respect to information required to be kept in the licensed dealer’s 
records (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 2000b, p.1)’ (cited in Ridgeway et al, p.xiii). 
64 In Alex’s enthusiasm for telling the story, it does appear as if the police are taking part in the crime. However, they were not.  
Alex confirms, elsewhere in interview, that correctly authorised controlled deliveries were taking place, where LEAs become aware 
of the delivery of an illicit goods and observe the delivery to recover the goods, gather further evidence and make and arrest of 
suspects in possession of the goods. Alex confirms, “…we did some controlled deliveries arrested some individuals and moved 
along quite nicely to prosecution”. (Please see EMCDDA (2015) for further explanation on controlled delivery legislation). 
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"Operation Lapworth …was a joint West Yorkshire, NABIS and ATF 
investigation into the supply of Glock pistols into the Leeds and Bradford 
area by a group of Asian men using Fast Parcel."  
Mohamed Tariq and Artique Arif were the main UK subjects of Operation 
Lapworth. They were convicted of smuggling 13 firearms in 27 parcels into the 
UK from the US over a 12-month period starting in July 2010. A man based in 
Texas used two women to make illegal straw purchases of the firearms in the 
US. He then broke the firearms down into parts and sent them, in various 
parcels, to different addresses in Bradford (Yorkshire Post 2011- B30, 
Barthorpe 2011 - A15, Public Service 2012 – B30). 
Network participants also talk of another case (briefly referred to in the current 
literature by Harrington 2011 when he talked about operation Newhaven), 
where US firearms were transferred on to the illicit UK market by someone 
assessing the risks and making a rational choice from outside the UK to go 
transnational. Again, Alex evidences the point: 
"A guy called Stephen Greenoe … used to travel across to the UK on a 
regular basis, he had dual nationality, …he could keep as many firearms 
as he wanted in the states. …he was breaking them down and putting 
them in his stored luggage, taking an internal flight in the States first, 
whereby you just go on and you can move firearms around in your stored 
luggage as a matter of fact over there. So he'd fly from you know Newark 
to Boston (for) the connecting flight from Boston to London (and) nobody 
checked the luggage they'd be just moved on."  
Such a scenario appears impossible and the transfer was probably not as 
straight forward as made out by Alex. However, Greenoe did transfer firearms 
from the US to the UK in his luggage. Billy stated the Greenoe case was 
complex and:  
“The Americans … were beside themselves … it was nearly an 
international diplomatic incident.” 
Factual reporting on Greenoe’s arrest and conviction provides some of the 
detail: 
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“… according to papers filed in the US courts, the spotlight fell on 
Greenoe and he was arrested when his cases were searched at Raleigh-
Durham airport, in North Carolina. Officers found 16 pistols broken down 
into parts and 32 magazine clips.  
 
…The documents posted in the US Eastern District Court revealed the 
suspected gun runner was stopped by airport security staff in North 
Carolina last May but still talked his way onto a flight.  
 
He claimed to be an arms salesman returning from a gun show and said 
the broken-down weapons parts were harmless dummy samples.  
 
Investigators have linked him to 10 flights that flew into Manchester via 
Raleigh-Durham International Airport and Atlanta last year.  
 
It is thought he put the guns, broken up into parts, in luggage that was 
checked in at Raleigh-Durham and then whisked through automatically 
for his connecting flight from Atlanta to Manchester” (Rossington 2011 – 
B30) 
According to a US Department of Justice (2014, p49 – E35) summary, Greenoe 
was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment on 10th January 2012 at a court in 
Carolina (US) for the illegal export of firearms from the US to the UK: 
“Greenoe, and at least two other individuals he recruited obtained pistol 
purchase permits, completed the necessary ATF forms and purchased 
firearms. Greenoe then took the firearms apart and concealed them in 
his checked luggage. On nine occasions, from February 22, 2010, to July 
25, 2010, he allegedly concealed a total of 63 pistols in his checked 
luggage and travelled from Raleigh, N.C., to the United Kingdom. In total, 
Greenoe smuggled at least 79 firearms to co-conspirators in the United 
Kingdom. According to court documents in the case, firearms purchased 
by Greenoe in the United States and illegally smuggled to the United 
Kingdom were used in a shooting in Manchester, England, in October 
2010; as well as in the murder of Ian Langford, a father of four children, 
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in Scotland on April 29, 2011; and in an attempted shooting of a cab 
driver near Liverpool. The investigation was conducted by ICE (US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement) and ATF, with assistance from 
the Northwest Regional Organized Crime Unit from Liverpool”. 
Other reports stated that the US and UK were in ‘crisis talks over serious flaws 
in transatlantic aviation security’ exposed by the Greenoe case, because he 
was able to break down the guns among his cases that were checked on to US 
domestic flights then transferred on to a flight to Manchester (OneIndia – B30). 
Greenoe reassembled and sold the firearms on to the illicit UK market. Some 
were used in the course of criminal activity, including an attempted murder in 
Manchester. During the Manchester investigation an Operation Lapworth 
firearm was recovered which indicated illicit UK armourers were obtaining 
firearms from different sources, as there was no direct connection between 
Greenoe and the Lapworth offenders  (Carter 2012 – B30, Public Service 2012 
– B30). 
The Greenoe and Operation Lapworth cases show that the illicit UK Market has 
adapted to make use of transnational connections with the US and, in 
furtherance of competitive adaptation (Kenny 2008) the police have moved to 
close that transnational source. However, UK criminals operating in the illicit 
firearms market will not rest on their laurels. They have already adapted over 
the years to make use of reactivated firearms and then converted firearms, first 
converting air weapons to fire .22 bullets and more recently converting blank 
firing firearms into live firearms. Finally, they made use of transnational parcel 
deliveries and loopholes in luggage transfers between domestic and 
international flights and history shows that they will continue to adapt to meet 
their needs. Indeed, the 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy (which 
was compiled after the 2012 research interviews, with more up to date 
intelligence) suggests criminals have moved on, and although reactivated and 
converted firearms are still common, organised criminals now have ready 
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access to original firearms from the US and Europe (Great Britain, Home Office 
2013 - A15)65.  
Terrorist plots that threaten the UK do not, as yet, include the significant use of 
firearms like the attacks in Mumbai and France. Mumbai involved heavily armed 
terrorists (Police News 2010a – B30) and the attacks in France included an 
armed assault on the offices of Charlie Hebdo in Paris, where three suspected 
terrorists believed to be armed with a rocket launcher and Kalashnikov 
automatic firearms shot dead 10 journalists and 2 police officers (BBC News 
2015 – B30)66. The terrorists arrested for the murder of a soldier at Woolwich 
were in possession of a firearm (Malik and Walker 2013 - B30). However, it was 
a rusty old weapon and it is believed the terrorists were using it as a tool to 
provoke the police into shooting them dead rather than being capable of out 
gunning any opposition (BBC 2013a – B30). One of the terrorists in the 
Woolwich case also had a previous conviction, in 2007, for possession of a 
prohibited weapon (a CS spray) (Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons 
(2014 - A15). In addition, on 13th October 2013 four men were arrested in 
London on suspicion of terrorist offences believed to centre on a plot to use 
firearms for an attack in the UK (Kelly 2013 - B30).  
One Network participant, Jean, commented that:  
"In the past, organised rational terrorists have always sought to achieve 
equal or more fire power than the police or armed forces that they are 
likely to engage during an attack in order to do maximum damage."  
This was also reinforced by Dr Andrew Staniforth a researcher for the Centre of 
Excellence in Terrorism Resilience, Intelligence and Organised Crime Research 
(CENTRIC) who in a recent commentary stated: 
                                                          
65 In addition, there is a recent suggestion of increased internal thefts from UK military and US soldiers smuggling firearms into the 
UK. US soldiers purchase the firearms legally in the US then break them down into parts to bring them into the UK via military 
transport. Once in the UK they sell them to UK criminals (Thurman 2014 – A40). Clear evidence of the importation of live firearms 
from Europe did not become known until August 2015 when the NCA arrested and charged 7 persons in connection with the illegal 
importation of automatic firearms and ammunition, which are believed to have arrived in the UK on a boat from France (NCA 2015 
– A20). 
66 The Charlie Hebdo attack was followed up by the shooting dead of a policewoman in the street and 4 persons at a supermarket 
in Paris and preceded by the shooting of 4 persons at a Jewish School and 3 French Paratroopers in 2012 (Mullin et al 2015 – B20, 
Fox News 2012 – B20). 
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"Armed assaults are predominantly conducted in areas where terrorists 
have ready access to firearms and ammunition which initially exceeds 
the capacity and capability of security forces first responding to the 
incident67." 
In acknowledgement of Clarke's (1997) SCP Dr Staniforth continued: 
"The restriction and regulation of firearms in the UK therefore remains a 
vital deterrent to prevent equipping terrorists to conduct an armed 
assault" (Staniforth 2013 - A30). 
The trial of the two men arrested at Woolwich and any subsequent trial of the 
four arrested in London on 13th October 2013 will add to the intelligence and 
knowledge (Ronn and Hoffding 2012) on how terrorists are adapting in relation 
to the criminal use of firearms and whether they sought to obtain more firepower. 
This is something that the Network participants are aware of. Although reluctant 
to talk in detail about terrorist matters, so as not to breach any confidential 
relationship with the UK intelligence agencies, Alex did feel able to comment:  
"I pick up quite a bit of the CT (Counter Terrorism) stuff and its probably 
something that has become much more relevant since Mumbai."  
The operational response to any such intelligence is also being treated 
seriously. In response to questions about the readiness of police in the UK to 
deal effectively with a terrorist attack, using firearms (similar to Mumbai and a 
2013 attack in Kenya) the ACPO lead for the police use of firearms stated that 
an attack by terrorists armed with assault rifles was unlikely in the UK. However, 
police firearms teams are trained and able to deal with such events and it was 
more likely that the UK police firearms officers would have to deal with 
individuals such as Derrick Bird68 in Cumbria (Caswell 2013 – B30).  
Therefore, in response to the current high impact terrorist and other mass 
shooting threats, the police have adapted their methods to be one step ahead of 
                                                          
67 Clearly evidenced by the shooting of a police officer responding to the Charlie Hebdo attack (Mullin et al 2015 – B20). 
68 Bird was armed with limited firearm capability but still shot and killed 12 people in addition to wounding 11 others (Wainwright 
2011 – B30). 
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the criminals in respect of the force available for use (Kenny 2008). Where the 
threat is not likely to have an immediate impact such as the threat from 
reactivated and converted firearms the police and government take longer to 
adapt. To some extent that is because it was not possible to draw out a full 
intelligence picture on the firearms threat and act on it until NABIS was 
established.  
In recent years the UK Government appear to have reacted with legislation 
when a perceived threat is likely to be more newsworthy. A terrorist attack, like 
Woolwich is instant news and lasts as headlines for days. This spreads the fear 
of crime far and wide, whereas other criminal shootings do not grab the 
headlines and the fear of such crimes appears to be localised. Currently, the UK 
Government are quite rightly examining their policy on steering the counter 
terrorism response in light of the Charlie Hebdo attack. However, some 
members of the Government are using the Charlie Hebdo incident, which has 
received global media attention, to introduce their favoured policy on access to 
communications data. This results in the introduction of policy on the back of a 
media frenzy without taking the longer view and considering other issues; 
particularly about access to firearms for terrorists (BBC 2015a – B30)69. 
5.5  A Summary Discussion on the UK Firearms Threat 
As the operational lead for Operation Barker, I had to re-start the operation in 
1999 by obtaining a full intelligence assessment of where reactivated firearms 
had been used or recovered in criminal cases. I then had to establish how many 
of those firearms originated from the Greenwoods. However, at that time there 
was no formal UK network or central point to go to in order to pull that 
intelligence together, let alone a transnational network or a central database of 
firearm recoveries. 
Gathering the required intelligence for Operation Barker required the formation 
of a nodal network. Every UK Chief Constable was contacted in writing and 
relationships were formed with, among others, the then National Crime Squad 
                                                          
69 Indications are that the firearms used by terrorists in the attacks in France were purchased from an OCG in Brussels who had 
access to ex eastern bloc firearms. This suggests that a nexus between OCGs and terrorists occurred because the terrorists had a 
need and the OCGs sort to make a profit from crime (Papirblat 2015 – E40, Moftah 2015 – E40 and Waterfield 2015 – B30).  
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(NCS), the then National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS70), the customs 
service known at the time as Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise (HMCE71), 
various Crown Courts, the then FSS72, Her Majesty’s Prison Service (HMPS), 
the Royal Armouries, the armed forces and the proof houses73 in London and 
Birmingham. The process was lengthy and delayed disruption of the illicit 
firearms market and bringing offenders to justice. It did however highlight the 
need for the UK police to adapt their processes. Particularly the gathering of 
various types of intelligence on criminal use and supply of firearms, in order to 
understand the problem and establish an articulated policy of ILP (Maguire and 
John 2006) and SCP (Clarke 1997) to be able to adapt to be one step ahead of 
the criminals (Kenny 2008). 
From my experience, in 1999 the UK police did not understand the details of the 
firearm threat or what the illicit firearms market looked like. The findings from 
the research confirm that was the case. The following chapters show that the 
UK police are organised in such a way that they are now one step ahead of the 
criminals in dealing with the firearms threat. They now clearly understand the 
threat and SCP methods for dealing with the threat. They are also proactive in 
seeking out new trends that police activity, SCP and competitive adaptation 
lead to. There is no evidence to indicate that those in the Network are justifying 
their own existence and spreading the notion of securitisation through 
insecurity, which Bigo (2000) evidences in Europe as the ‘Europeanisation of 
(in)security’ (p81) by some transnational police agents and government 
representatives. The evidence in this chapter shows that the firearms threat 
exists and the firearms threat drives the Network. 
By drawing out what the police understand of the firearms threat and how the 
illicit market in firearms operates, this thesis provides a critical analysis of both. 
The threat comes from criminals being able to access a stock of deactivated 
                                                          
70 The NCS and NCIS later merged to become the major part of SOCA. 
71 ‘Creation of HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) - On 17th March 2004 the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the creation of 
a new department to bring together the functions of HM Customs and Excise (HMCE) and the Inland Revenue, and the transfer of 
some policy work to HM Treasury’ (HMRC 2005, p23 – A10). (Some organised crime functions of HMCE were incorporated into 
SOCA.) 
72 The service has now been privatised and a number of private forensic services exist. 
73 Responsible for checking and recording the deactivation of firearms by those authorised, by licence, to do so. 
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and blank firearms, which they are able to reactivate and convert to live firing. 
Currently, it is converted firearms that are the main problem as there is easy, 
cheap access to blank firing firearms that are imported lawfully from other 
nation states and then converted unlawfully by criminals in the UK, who buy 
them lawfully from UK retailers. This makes converted firearms a high risk. 
There is also a smaller, but significant, risk from the illicit supply of brand new 
firearms shipped from other nation states. This is either by way of bypassing 
custom checks, by exploiting a loophole in the system of luggage transfer from 
the US to the UK or by way of illicit smuggling into the UK; usually with other 
illicit commodities74.  
The Network participants were of the opinion that the nature of the illicit market 
in firearms in the UK is, as Jordan put it, “very UK centric”. They put the nature 
of the market down to the fact that the UK has very strict licensing laws and 
strict border controls in place. As a result, the stock of firearms that can be 
criminalised and made available for use in crime is limited. As a consequence, 
competitive adaptation takes place and the market is displaced. The criminal 
metis is developed and they adapt to the restrictions and learn new ways of 
obtaining the firearms they need (Sutton, Schneider and Hetherington 2001, 
Kenny 2008). 
Hypothetically, those involved in the criminal use and supply of firearms quickly 
learn that the strict UK controls limit their access to firearms and that smuggling 
of live firearms is risky and costly. Therefore, they make rational choices 
(Cornish and Clarke 1987, Clarke 1997 and 2002, Tierney 2009). Over the 
years, they discuss their problems with like-minded people and learn that it is 
easy and less of a risk to legitimately purchase deactivated firearms and then 
use someone with basic engineering skills to illegally reactivate the firearm. 
Metis or changing organisational learning of practical and deviant skills is then 
developed further. When it becomes apparent that the police are focusing on 
the reactivation of deactivated firearms criminals move on to conversion of 
                                                          
74 Even though Papirblat (2015 – E40), Moftah (2015 – E40 and Waterfield (2015 – B30) state recent murderous attacks on Charlie 
Hebdo, the police and the Hyper Cacher supermarket in Paris suggest terrorists had a supply to military style firearms via OCGs, 
there is no suggestion that particular market, originating from former Eastern bloc war zones (Moftah 2015 – E40), has 
encroached on the UK.    
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easily accessible blank firers and make a profit first, by selling such unlawful 
conversions and later, by hiring out such firearms. 
The development of such metis by UK criminals using and supplying firearms 
has, as the research findings show, highlighted the criminogenic nature of the 
firearms industry identified by Rothe and Collins (2010). The industry is 
criminogenic because it is a simple process for the criminal to turn the lawful 
firearm into the unlawful. The Greenwoods appeared to make a rational choice 
to move from the lawful to the unlawful. They had committed previous offences 
preventing them carrying out a lawful business as a RFD and they exploited 
weaknesses in the law to minimise the risk of being caught whilst at the same 
time making a profit. At the time of their criminal enterprise there was also 
minimal risk of receiving a lengthy custodial sentence. They assessed the risks 
and made a rational choice to engage in crime.  
There is a need for a whole system approach to dealing with firearms to include 
those involved in policing the issue and the industry themselves. The 
government should carry out a detailed impact assessment on any new 
legislation that they bring in to restrict the availability of firearms. In addition, the 
police should risk assess when someone is brought to justice whether their 
offence is a precursor to them engaging in further crime. RCT and SCP is about 
looking at all the elements of criminal activity and implementing action to 
prevent or minimise further crime (Clarke 1997).  
The whole system approach needs to permeate the trade from the global to the 
local because the criminalisation of the firearms can take part at any point. In 
the case of the threat to the UK, the criminalisation in respect of conversions 
and reactivations has taken place in the UK itself. The firearms being 
criminalised were originally sourced from other nation states, either from 
specific lawful manufacturers in the case of blank firers or from armed forces 
and police forces in other nation states in respect of deactivated firearms sold 
for lawful collection. In the case of the smuggling of firearms from the US the 
criminalisation first took place in the US with the straw purchase of firearms not 
available to the general public in the UK. 
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Examining where the criminalisation took place and the original source of the 
firearms also highlights what Hobbs (1998, p407) would term the ‘glocal’ nature 
of crime where local crime depends on global influences. In the case of firearms 
the trade is global and within that global trade some firearms can be legally 
purchased in one country that cannot be purchased in others. In addition, when 
armed conflicts end or when police and armed forces in different nation states 
acquire new stock, their old stock is traded globally either into new conflict 
zones or onto the criminal market by fraudulent dealing, theft or, as highlighted 
by the Operation Barker Case, by way of a legitimate collectors market 
exploited by criminal reactivators. However it is done, it is a global trade that 
has a local impact. It is criminals from the UK, making rational choices about 
risk, who seek out the product available in the global market to enable their 
criminal enterprise to continue. No one from the global trade is flooding the UK 
market with illicit firearms. 
The research data indicates that the UK police and in particular the Network, 
from the UK standpoint, have increased their knowledge of the firearms threat 
and the illicit UK firearms market that contributes to the threat. That is also now 
articulated in this thesis through theoretical explanation. The illicit market is 
glocal, it is facilitated by the criminogenic global firearms industry and the 
criminals in the market adapt through acquisition of metis. 
The knowledge of the market has been acquired through organised gathering 
and dissemination of intelligence which is underpinned by the introduction of 
new privately developed IT. That is all part of the Network’s metis where the 
police adapt to be one step ahead of the criminals. The police are ahead as 
there is no OSINT to suggest the use or supply of firearms in the UK operates in 
any other way than how the market has been analysed. Although there was an 
indication of the use of 3D printers to produce firearms for criminal use in the 
UK; further investigation showed that to be a false alarm (Fox 2013 – B30). If it 
had not been a false alarm, the fact that information on such potential use of IT 
by criminals is thoroughly examined, by nodes in the Network, indicates the 
Network would correctly assess the intelligence on the subject. It would then 
form the metis to adapt to any such threat from a change in the market 
dynamics. 
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While the illicit UK firearms market is driven by UK criminals and their needs 
and restricted by a UK policy of strict gun control it does rely on transnational 
connections. Those connections are obvious in the case of Greenoe and 
Operation Lapworth as the transnational aspect of the operation involved illegal 
activity. Whereas, in the case of reactivated firearms and converted firearms, 
the transnational connection is not so obvious. All the illegal activity takes place 
in the UK with the reactivation and conversion and the transnational aspect of it 
tends to be the legal acquisition of the firearm in its non-lethal state; either 
imported and deactivated or imported as a blank firer.  
The Network increased its knowledge on the criminogenic transnational threats 
and the following chapters will show how the Network is adapting to respond to 
that threat, beyond the headline hitting responses to the terrorist firearms threat 
(Caswell 2013 – B30). In the meantime, the threat remains and the criminals 
continue to develop their metis and adapt their actions and skills in an attempt 
to be one step ahead of the police (Kenny 2008).  
Criminals adapted to the lack of available firearms for criminal use caused by 
strict UK firearms control and developed skills to first divert firearms from the 
legal market by way of forgery of transfer documents. When documentation was 
tightened, they used their knowledge of firearms and formed allegiances with 
those interested in firearms who had engineering skills to reactivate deactivated 
firearms to be supplied to the illicit UK market. When the police targeted illegal 
reactivation operations the criminal firearms suppliers switched to blank 
firearms as a source for conversion to illegal use. Now that loophole is being 
well policed, criminals are looking to those with knowledge of air transport 
methods and requisition of fully working firearms from other nation states as a 
source. Middlemen or facilitators who store firearms are also adapting to the 
lack of available weapons, caused by police activity, by hiring out firearms to 
different groups and individuals rather than making a straight sale.  
This chapter has shown that glocal competitive adaptation continues apace as 
criminals look evermore to sources outside the UK for firearms. That shift in 
focus will have an impact on crime in the UK. At the same time the police and in 
particular the Network understands the threat. They gather intelligence to 
understand the threat and improve their knowledge in order to adapt. The threat 
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to the UK drives them to adapt and so it drives the Network (Appendix 11.4), 
although in some cases that adaptation takes time.  
The threat and what the illicit firearms market consists of, is clearly articulated 
within the findings; more so than in the existing literature. The Network 
participants demonstrate that they understand the threat and they are using the 
Network to enhance that understanding. The following chapters will show how 
the UK police in the Network adapt to make use of transnational policing in 
order to develop UK nation state policing to gather intelligence to deal with the 
firearms threat more effectively.  
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Chapter 6 - The Key UK Nation State Nodes in the Network 
6.1 Introduction to Key UK Nation State Nodes 
This chapter identifies and analyses the key UK nation state nodes within the 
Network. It is a nodal network analysis of the Network showing where the power 
and the governance lies (Castells 2004, Shearing and Johnston 2010). The 
chapter demonstrates whether politicians are right to perceive that a global 
police state exists (Westmarland 2010). Also, the chapter assesses whether 
policing in and by the UK is determined by nodes outside the nation state or a 
network that criss-crosses and undermines the sovereignty of the UK nation 
state75.  
The current literature touches on the existence of UK policing organisations and 
groups as nodes and makes some links to show the existence of a police 
transnational firearms intelligence network. However, the thesis findings clearly 
articulate the existence of the UK nodes as part of the Network and the fact that 
they moor the UK's participation within the Network, in the nation state. The 
development of the Network is a response to the firearms threat, which is 
glocal.  
Central to the response is the Organised Crime (Firearms) TRB which makes a 
strategic intelligence assessment of the threat and then co-ordinates action by 
way of the Network, which expands out into the wider world (Appendix 11.4). 
The Network is set up to provide an intelligence led response to deal with the 
threat. In dealing with the threat, nodes and lines of communication within the 
Network tend to have dual roles of intelligence and police response at both an 
operational and a strategic level. 
 
 
                                                          
75 As previously defined, a network is an 'arrangement with intersecting lines, a complex system or a group of interconnected 
people or things' (Hawker 1996, p416) and, more specifically to this thesis, it is an interconnected group of people who come 
together to obtain information (Oxford English Dictionary 2003). A node is an individual, group, organisation or state that is part of 
the network (Shearing and Johnston 2010). The nodal network analysis continues in chapter 7 with an analysis of the transnational 
nodes. 
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6.2 The Organised Crime (Firearms) TRB, the Programme 5 Review Board 
and ACPO CUF 
The importance of the Organised Crime (Firearms) TRB was emphasised in 
chapter 5, when Jordan talked about having to reassure the Home Office TRB 
that the firearms threat was being: 
 "….identified and tackled."  
Another participant, Billy, describes how the Organised Crime (Firearms) TRB 
pulls together different partners to assess what the threat is, in order to be able 
to provide a strategic governed response to it: 
"It's part of the Government’s strategy from global to local……the 
Government sees their responsibility around crime in two ways: firstly 
about counter terrorism, secondly about organised crime…...The threat 
reduction board concept was born out of the new Government's current 
strategy and it's a multi-agency group that in essence defines what the 
threat is, so in terms of bringing together the intelligence…(there are) 
representatives there from (the) police service (and) from SOCA, .....(The 
TRB) also work obviously with Scotland and Northern Ireland so it's not 
just about England and Wales …….it's about understanding properly the 
threat so… we have a community representation……..the chair of (the) 
IAG (Independent Advisory Group) (and) the national armouries …..So 
it's a very inclusive group.…..it's about understanding and agreeing the 
threat which is then reflected in the UK threat assessment. It’s setting the 
national intelligence requirement for firearms against that known and 
unknown threat and it's about defining an action plan, that is strategic. It's 
not about saying this is what we're going to do about Fred Bloggs and his 
organised crime group who are involved in say the supply of weaponry  
but it's about understanding, it's about defining what strategically we can 
do which there is a considerable amount."  
Billy's response draws out evidence of other agencies being pluralised into 
taking responsibility for delivering policing strategy and operational activity. 
Such pluralised policing is evidenced in the literature by Bayley and Shearing 
(2001), Jones and Newburn (2006) and Bowling and Sheptycki (2012). 
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However, it is important to note that those who are partners at the TRB table 
are UK public organisations not private.  
When asked about the accountability of the Organised Crime (Firearms) TRB 
and the accountability of the chair (who is an Assistant Chief Constable from a 
provincial force in England and Wales representing ACPO) participants 
evidence how the TRB is currently being grounded in UK policing. Billy stated it 
is a willing partnership rather than a chain of command that is hierarchically 
above Chief Constables: 
"(The Chair) is held accountable by senior officials at the Home Office as 
to …delivery against that action plan to reduce the threat, harm and risk 
that firearms cause and to make sure that we have an improving position. 
So if you like that's sort of the accountability….Colleagues from….ACPO 
forces would perhaps take a slightly different view about accountability 
because as you will be aware (the Chair) does not have any direct 
command and control … it is a partnership and we all know the strengths 
and weaknesses of those. So (the Chair's) compellability even though it 
sits as part of a government strategy….can't direct what any resourcing a 
police force is going to do. At best (they can task their) own but not 
others, that's why that bit about threat and risk is really good. But you'll 
remember for example in those Barker days when we tried to pull people 
together it was about coalitions of the willing, I have to say 
constitutionally we are still in the same place.."  
Therefore, the Organised Crime (Firearms) TRB generates activity to deal with 
the firearms threat. The influence that TRB can have, its Network links and its 
positioning within the Network can be established by, first, examining what it 
has recently replaced within the Network. This is followed by an examination of 
other key UK nation state nodes in the Network and a case study on how they 
worked together to reduce the supply of the BBM which was shown to be a 
threat to the UK. That action was co-ordinated by ACPO CUF under UK Law 
Enforcement Programme 5 reporting to the Programme 5 Review Board76 . The 
Review Board was the forerunner of the Organised Crime (Firearms) TRB, 
                                                          
76 Replicated within SOCA's programme of activity as 'SOCA programme 5' (Author’s note). 
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which sits under the 'Gun Crime, kidnapping, violent crime and gangs' TRB 
category (Great Britain, Home Office 2011d, p10 - A11).  
Alex explains the changing structure of the Programme 5 Review Board and 
ACPO CUF in detail: 
"ACPO CUF and the TRB are in reality one and the same thing…..ACPO 
Criminal use of firearms forms part of the Violence and Public Protection 
portfolio (led by a Chief Constable) and that portfolio includes child 
exploitation, sexual offences, adult sex offences, violence against the 
person etc., domestic violence, all those kinds of things and CUF 
(Criminal use of Firearms) forms part of that…”  
Therefore, the firearms threat is dealt with in the Violence and Public Protection 
portfolio under the National Policing Crime business area (ACPO 2014 – A10). 
The current national lead for the Crime business area is the Chief Constable of 
Merseyside, the Violence and Public Protection portfolio lead is the Chief 
Constable of Cheshire and the national lead for CUF is the Deputy Chief 
Constable of the West Midlands Police (ACPO 2014 – A10, Cheshire 
Constabulary 2014 – A10).These areas of national policing are subject to co-
ordinated activity between various UK LEAs shaped by the threat to the UK, 
including the firearms threat (NCA 2013 – A10). It appears that the police take 
the lead and a steer from government in pluralisation of the policing 
responsibilities in dealing with the threat.  
Alex continues: 
“……there is a level of accountability that (NABIS) have to that 
portfolio…in terms of what activity (NABIS) are doing, how (they) are 
doing it as well as commissioning pieces of work that are of national 
importance …. those commissioning pieces of work often go from ACPO 
CUF to NABIS.”   
Therefore, the ACPO lead for CUF works in partnership with NABIS, who are 
accountable to all UK police forces and other LEAs in the UK who are signed up 
to the NABIS Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The CUF lead also 
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worked in close partnership with SOCA and will do the same with the NCA 
(NABIS 2012 – A10,  ACPO 2014 - A10). 
Alex explains the existence of an ACPO CUF steering group and how its lead 
was also the lead for the LEA programme of activity on firearms known as 
programme 5, which is where SOCA took their programmes of activity from: 
“There has always traditionally been an ACPO CUF steering group. Now 
because (the chair of that group) is also the lead of the programme of 
activity which is the law enforcement programme of activity…. Those 
programmes of activity are replicated in SOCA so where people would 
talk about SOCA programme five i.e. the criminal use of firearms, those 
programmes of activity aren't actually SOCA programmes of activity they 
are UK law enforcement programmes of activity…”  
In terms of accountability Alex explains that the ACPO CUF lead:  
“… is accountable for all activity, be that NABIS, ACPO CUF, UK policing, 
Borders etc.,” and in maintaining and discharging that accountability they 
have, “…. a dual role ... an ACPO lead and … a programme lead as well.” 
As such they run the, “ACPO CUF Steering Group (as the) Programme 
Board .., a strategic board made up of ACCs (Assistant Chief Constables) 
and DCCs (Deputy Chief Constables) from across the country (together 
with representatives of) the top five gun crime forces (and the) UK Border 
Agency .., Crown Prosecution Service…, military and various other 
organisations ...  
That group would meet on a quarterly basis and...discuss the strategic 
issues and national issues at hand that required either: activity, action, 
support, direction etc. Again can't tell a Force what to do but it was 
designed in a way to provide a nexus for communication and discussion 
as well as tasking but in a 'I will go away and do that, we will go away 
and do that' type of situation.  
… what would happen is that things would be discussed in that group 
and ACPO CUF would say right ok we'll take this forward and we will do 
this and we will do that. …(i.e.) ACPO CUF will task NABIS into doing 
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pieces of work…..because it’s an issue that has been raised at this group 
or its come from a different source and we need to be able to take this 
forward….. So that will lead on to other areas of activity and joint 
working….”  
Alex then explains that recently the programmes of activity including the one 
relating to the criminal use of firearms have been replaced by TRBs:  
“……. what's happened in the last kind of five months is that those law 
enforcement programmes of activity have been replaced by the Home 
Office with what are called Threat Reduction Boards (TRBs).  
… Threat Reduction Boards … deal with three elements which are stem, 
strengthen and safeguard. Now the boards operate almost exactly the 
same way….as the Programme Board did. So we fundamentally 
replaced the Programme Board with a Threat Reduction Board, but the 
Threat Reduction Boards have a slightly different terms of reference in 
that the lead of the Threat Reduction Board is required to go to 
something called the Threat Reduction Assurance Forum (TRAF) 
…At that Threat Reduction Assurance Forum the lead has to, as it says 
on the tin, provide assurance. Now in doing that as you can imagine that 
is slightly more into the realms of accountability and tasking, because in 
providing reassurance you are in effect basically saying (for example) 'I 
am confident TRAF that Merseyside are dealing with these offenders' 
because (what) plays into TRAF is …organised crime group mapping 
and … the people who are mapped to your TRB, in effect, are effectively 
being managed and you need to be able to provide reassurance (you are 
managing them).”  
Finally Alex provides a subtle critique of the ACPO CUF/Programme of Activity 
steering group, suggesting the level of accountability and responsibility may be 
more rigorous with the introduction of TRBs. Alex states:  
“Its very similar but its also very different. So I wouldn't previously 
describe the steering group as a talking shop… it was a group of people 
that came together to discuss issues at a strategic level. They were not 
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there to provide some form of accountability and assurance…They were 
in effect doing their job, delivering operations that fitted the key principles 
of stem, strengthen and safeguard or that they were effectively managing 
their organised crime groups. So (accountability and reassurance) is a 
key change that is something we will transition into over the next 12 
months."  
In essence, in replacing the Programme 5 Review Board, the Organised Crime 
(Firearms) TRB, and in particular its ACPO lead, have become more 
accountable. They have partnership links with various organisations, some of 
which are mentioned by Alex. In addition, they have partnership links to all UK 
police forces and may well be a conduit for the tasking of Chief Constables by 
the NCA (Great Britain, Home Office 2011b- A15, Home Affairs 2012 - A15).  
NCA tasking may impinge on the independence of UK Chief Constables as 
alluded to by one of the Network participants but which the Director General 
(DG) of the NCA, (a former ACPO CUF lead), Keith Bristow, insists will only 
take place in 'exceptional circumstances' . He would rather work in partnership 
with police forces and 'help make best use of dwindling resources' (Caswell 
2011 – B30, Home Affairs 2012 - A15). 
The establishment of TRBs and the TRAFs at the Home Office does suggest 
greater control from central government. However, that appears only to be in 
relation to holding the UK police to account and to steer rather than to direct 
operational policing. All the evidence suggests the police still make decisions on 
what the specific problems are and how to deal with them in liaison with the 
public, as well as on intelligence and developed knowledge. The Government 
consults with the police and the public to decide on and steer the general 
priorities for policing. 
6.3 The National Crime Agency 
The impact of the NCA on the TRB process is still developing but it appears that 
they are likely to support the process77. Evidence from the NCA DG supports 
this. The NCA DG is a Chief Constable rather than a former intelligence agency 
                                                          
77 In fact recent enquiries by the author to the Home Office about TRBs have been directed to the NCA (Etarat 2015). 
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professional. He is seeking to legitimise the NCA by entering into Bottoms and 
Tankebe’s (2012) two way conversation with those who are being policed, by 
grounding the NCA in a policing philosophy of bringing offenders to justice 
rather than a philosophy of disruption. He purports to be a crime fighter as well 
as advocating the community policing philosophy (Home Affairs 2012 - A15, 
Bristow 2012 and 2013 - A10). Community policing is what the UK public want 
and like and it persists as the philosophy of UK policing (Baggot 2007). In my 
experience the majority of the general public who like community policing also 
like crime fighting enforcers to solve some of their problems. As such, 
enforcers, as will be argued in the theoretical discussion, do have their place in 
the continuum of transnational policing subcultures identified by the research 
data and Bowling and Sheptyki (2012).   
Prior to the establishment of the NCA one former Network participant, Jean, 
who perceived SOCA not to be effective, stated that we should have a national 
LEA responsible for gathering and taking action on intelligence on the firearms 
threat:  
"National collecting and collating is needed, a kind of FBI (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation), a robust group with a charter, who can look 
within and outside the country. It needs to be structured right  … so that 
people are indoctrinated in a certain way to protect the source whilst at 
the same time have the clout to act on the sanitised version of the 
information …The people involved need to have the right knowledge and 
the organisation should not include any dead wood."  
Jean’s perception that SOCA was not very effective does not take into account 
SOCA management having to prioritise other crimes, based on intelligence, 
competing demands and allocation of finite resources. Jean is talking from the 
point of view of someone who has spent a career dealing with the criminal use 
of firearms and arguing that firearms should be a LEA priority. However, Jean 
does make a valid strategic point about the investigation of the firearms threat 
by a national agency who can influence policing inside and outside the UK. 
Whilst still not solely responsible for firearms, the NCA, described by some as a 
British FBI, began operations on 7th October 2013. The launch of the NCA came 
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amid the usual tug of war between politicians over the best way forward for the 
policing of the threat from organised crime to the UK (BBC 2013 – B30). It was 
launched as a crime fighting agency, (Great Britain, Home Office 2011b - A15, 
Home Affairs 2012 - A15) that would be more overt than its predecessor SOCA 
(BBC 2013 – B30).  
When SOCA was launched in 2006 it claimed to be a different crime fighting 
organisation based along the lines of MI5 (rather than a LEA) and only 
accountable to the SOCA board and the Home Secretary (Harfield 2006). The 
NCA appears to champion the fact it is a LEA. It is still only responsible to the 
Home Secretary but the DG of the NCA (who dislikes the FBI label) states he 
wants to work in partnership with Chief Constables and with similar 
organisations overseas to fight organised crime (Home Affairs 2012 - A15, BBC 
2013 – B30). 
The NCA has absorbed all the functions of SOCA (BBC 2013 – B30). Those 
functions include TRB attendance, the SLN and a responsibility for disrupting 
the use of firearms by OCGs (NCA 2013 – A10). The SLN is a network of 140 
staff (now employed by the NCA) stationed in various countries around the 
world (Europol 2011a - A15). This will be discussed further in the continued 
nodal analysis in chapter 7 as the SLN is a key transnational node in the 
Network. The NCA in itself is a key nation state node and is already part of the 
Network by way of SOCA's existing strong partnership links with the Organised 
Crime (Firearms) TRB, ACPO CUF, the UK Border Agency (UKBA) and NABIS. 
It is accountable to the Home Secretary and its DG is also regularly held to 
account by the cross party Home Affairs Select Committee; as is the Home 
Secretary and various members of her department (Home Affairs 2012 - A15). 
This adds to the NCA’s  legitimacy as a police organisation.  
As stated in the literature by Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) legitimacy should be  
part of a two way conversation between those who police and those who are 
being policed. It should be based on shared beliefs between the police and the 
policed. In this case those who are being policed are represented by the Home 
Affairs Select Committee, although perhaps not as well as they are through the 
tripartite system of governance. This point was emphasised by Harfield (2006) 
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in relation to the governance and accountability of SOCA not being in line with 
the rest of policing. 
The participants believed NABIS would eventually become part of the NCA. 
Although SOCA already worked closely with NABIS, if NABIS became part of 
the NCA they would have more access to NCA operational capabilities. 
However, they too will only be accountable to the Home Secretary and the NCA 
board as opposed to the 43 Forces of England and Wales and the tripartite 
system of governance that holds them to account. That said, the fact that 
NABIS has entered into a MOU with the 43 forces means there will be some 
tripartite influence on them and the NCA. In fact, incorporating NABIS into the 
NCA would, by way of the Network, embed the actions of the NCA into 
mainstream UK policing78.  
The NCA, which is governed by the UK nation state, also helps to secure the 
Network in the nation state. The Network is an ‘informal network’, like those 
identified by Bigo (2000) and Harfield (2006, p757). It is set up by ILOs and has 
no formal accountability to any particular nation state. However, this thesis 
demonstrates that the nodes in the Network can make the Network accountable 
to the nation state and at the same time nodes such as the NCA (as well as the 
Network itself) can be subjected to a constabulary ethic of governance and 
accountability similar to the tri-partite system. Bowling and Sheptycki (2012, 
p136) identify such a constabulary ethic as the way forward in global policing 
governance and accountability.  
Jordan emphasises the current accountability of NABIS and the potential for 
change to be part of the NCA: 
"…..governance (of NABIS) is through ACPO and to the forty three 
forces…. (NABIS) are answerable to them basically but this will change 
                                                          
78Despite it being the belief of Jordan, Billy and others that NABIS would become part of the NCA, that has not happened yet. They 
should, however, as they did with SOCA, continue to work closely with the NCA who should still keep staff embedded with NABIS 
to gather and share intelligence. NABIS could have benefited further from inclusion as part of the NCA in the same way as CEOP. 
CEOP has become part of the NCA and, as stated by the DG: 
"CEOP are in safe hands with the NCA and they have access to the extra resources that the NCA can provide" (Bristow 
2013 - A10). 
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because err undoubtedly (NABIS) will be incorporated within the new 
National Crime Agency and will work within their structures then but at 
the moment its definitely through ACPO CUF."  
Jordan also emphasised how SOCA worked closely with NABIS. However, 
SOCA had more of a focus on transnational issues than NABIS who were more 
UK centric: 
"…. (NABIS) is naturally very UK centric and its looking at ….things like 
reactivated weapons (and) converted weapons …. (NABIS) work closely 
with SOCA programme five team…..which is a huge help because it 
means that you're not having to exchange with another agency you're 
directly interlinked to that agency.”  
Although the DG of the NCA states they are not a British FBI and will be 
different to SOCA, he will continue to direct overseas activities where SOCA left 
off. However, he intends the NCA node to better organise the response to 
serious and organised crime through close liaison with all UK forces and the 
ability to task, where necessary, local Chief Constables in England and Wales 
(Caswell 2011 – B20, Great Britain, Home Office 2011b - A15, Bristow 2012 - 
A15). In talking to a National Detectives Forum in the UK he said:  
“Any talk that we are picking up from SOCA is wrong – this is a new 
agency. We have a challenge and we will make sure we have the best 
people in it… We need the power in extreme circumstances to task 
police forces, but it must also follow that this will work the other way as 
well" (quoted in Caswell 2011 – B20). 
Therefore, the NCA is likely to become a larger more powerful node that will 
have a big impact on the Network. It may even, at some point, (as with SOCA 
and agencies such the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP)) 
take over other national agencies that are part of the Network including all or 
part of the UKBA and NABIS (Great Britain, Home Office 2011b - A15, Bristow 
2012 - A15).  
In addition the debate about the NCA being more involved in CT has not gone 
away and they have recently advertised for a Head of Counter Terrorism and 
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Organised Crime Collaboration (Civil Service 2014 - A10). This is a key role that 
will further fuse high and low policing whether it leads to the NCA being the CT 
lead or not. It will increasingly blur the line between high and low policing as 
indicated by O’Reilly and Ellison (2006). Part of the job role will be: 
"…driving joint work with police and other partners to develop closer 
collaboration and the sharing of capabilities and approaches to improve 
the overall response to national security threats of terrorism and 
organised crime. They will ensure that the NCA plays a full role in 
assisting those reviewing the future of counter terrorism policing in the 
UK, ensuring that the UK has the optimal structures in place to offer the 
best protection for the public and make best use of public resources" 
(Civil Service 2014 - A10). 
The NCA is firmly anchored in the UK nation state. As well as the DG of the 
NCA being able to task Chief Constables, the Home Secretary can direct the 
NCA to assist local forces (Bristow 2012 - A15, NCA 2013a, p12 – A10, Great 
Britain 2013 - A150) and additionally as pointed out by Alex: 
"The Threat Reduction Board will make the NCA more accountable for 
their action."  
According to Billy, some Chief Constables may see the power to direct by the 
NCA DG as a threat to their authority and such tasking of Chief Constables will 
be a challenging issue. Billy stated that:  
"(The) National Crime Agency …will have a power of direction or tasking 
to other police forces …That is still seen in some Forces …as quite 
challenging. I think in reality what that looks and feels like will inevitably 
present some issues that we'll need to work through. I don't find it a 
particular threat because providing the evidence base is there and 
understanding of your local context to your national context in your 
threats, that all seems doable to me. But there are some colleagues that 
will sit there constitutionally and say ‘…I am the Chief Constable of X 
shire and you will not tell me what to do, I have…a divine right about my 
operational control’. …it will be interesting to see how that develops. That 
hasn't been an issue for me …the place where it has been the most 
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difficult to get leverage and to get real traction to do stuff is at the Home 
Office."  
Therefore, the NCA will be the key nation state node in the Network and it will 
be moored there by the Organised Crime TRBs, the Home Secretary and the  
DG. In addition, the NCA DG states the NCA are NIM compliant and as such, 
partner agencies will hold the NCA to account for their actions through the NIM 
process of tasking and co-ordinating. 
PCCs replaced Police Authorities in the tripartite structure of governance in 
2012 and the PCC system has since been analysed as flawed due to serious 
mistakes and bad judgement on the part of individual PCCs (Stevens 2013 - 
A15, Gregg 2014 - A15). However, Mark Burns-Williamson, the PCC for West 
Yorkshire, has stated he will hold to account West Yorkshire Police and other 
LEAs who deal with organised crime impacting on West Yorkshire (Burns-
Williamson 2014 – A10). He also stated the following when questioned recently 
about holding the NCA to account for operations in his area: 
"As a PCC of a lead force in a Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) policing 
collaborative….. I am responsible for holding the North East CTU to 
account. I am not yet in a position to hold SOCA, or any transnational 
police networks, to account for activity in my police area, but I will be 
seeking to do that through national PCC structures" (Burns-Williamson 
2013 - A10). 
There does appear to be agreement between the NCA DG and PCCs that they 
can work together and manage the balance between local and national 
priorities. Following a Police Foundation conference, bringing the police, the 
NCA, PCCs and academia together to debate a way forward in detecting and 
preventing organised crime threats to the UK, the NCA DG stated: 
“One of the challenges that people said that I might face was police and 
crime commissioners. My experience so far is that this has not been a 
problem” (quoted in Caswell 2013a - A10). 
At the same conference Alun Michael a PCC in South Wales stated: 
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"The issue of serious organised crime was an important country wide 
issue" (quoted in Caswell 2013a - A10). 
In addition, his colleague, Tim Passmore, a PCC in Sussex stated: 
"Many police and crime commissioners were committed to engaging with 
national agencies to deal with serious criminals" (quoted in Caswell 
2013a - A10). 
Time will tell whether the NCA will improve the co-ordination of organised crime 
policing (Harfield 2008). However, as evidenced here, those involved in setting 
up the NCA and those who hold them to account believe the NCA is the right 
way forward. They claim it will have a local impact on organised crime by taking 
into account national and transnational threats on that local impact and utilising 
transnational contacts where necessary to mitigate the threat to the UK from 
organised crime. The NCA is being promoted as a glocal policing organisation 
(Great Britain, Home Office 2011, p16 - A15, Bristow 2013 – A10, NCA 2013a – 
A10. 
The DG of the NCA is consistent in making the case to the general public, 
police audiences and the Home Affairs Select Committee that the NCA is a 
glocal crime fighting agency that will provide support to UK Chief Constables 
and make good use of the overseas liaison network. The NCA is the 
embodiment of this thesis that the Network is contributing to an apparent glocal 
reconstruction of policing. It was established to improve the UK policing 
response to organised crime (including the firearms threat) and to complement 
the government steering a local to global approach to crime control (Great 
Britain, Home Office 2011 - A15).  
Even though the NCA remains directly accountable to the Home Secretary it is 
more in tune with the UK policing philosophy than SOCA was and systems are 
in place to make it more accountable to the tripartite system of policing than 
SOCA (Burns-Williamson 2013 and 2014 - A15). In line with Deflem's (2002) 
policeization the NCA is a bureaucracy that is operationally independent from 
the government and able to co-operate and exchange knowledge with similar 
bureaucratic police organisations in other nation states. It is, however, anchored 
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in the UK state by UK laws, policy and procedure and the need to deal with the 
organised crime threat to the UK (Great Britain, Home Office 2011b - A10).  
Like SOCA before, the NCA is a development of policing based on a need to 
manage the risk to society (identified by Ericson and Haggerty 1997 and Beck 
2002). Although the NCA has a UK policing philosophy with closer ties to the 
UK police, it will also, like SOCA work with partners to examine other ways of 
disrupting criminal activity beyond criminal prosecution. Using a strategy similar 
to the UK counter terror strategy, the NCA manages the risk from organised 
crime under four areas of pursue, protect, prevent and prepare. Pursuit of 
criminals is the NCA priority (NCA 2013a – A10), whereas prevention by 
disruption was SOCA’s priority (SOCA 2012d A15).  
The prioritisation of pursuing criminals and bringing them to justice suggests a 
philosophy of crime control on the part of the NCA, but it will also continue to 
communicate knowledge through partnerships (including the Network). This will, 
as argued by Ericson and Haggerty (1997) in relation to policing in general, 
extend its surveillance of the criminal threat. The NCA will use the symbiotic 
relationship with its partners to identify, predict and manage the threat to pursue 
criminals and prevent crime. That symbiotic relationship allows the NCA and 
other nodes in the Network to transcend nation state boundaries to police the 
actual firearms threat and the risk of real harms. However, such policing 
through the Network does not appear as disorganised as Ericson and Haggerty 
(1997, p447) found to be the case in some police knowledge networks. The 
policing through the Network appears to be dealing with a real, rather than a 
perceived threat. As such, the NCA and the wider development of the Network 
is a further adaptation by the police to be one step ahead of the OCGs, which 
Kenny (2008) states the police in general always strive to do. The NCA also 
appears to be a further move towards the organisation of organised crime 
policing, identified in other areas of policing by Harfield (2008). 
The NCA DG describes the overseas network as a valuable asset that the NCA 
has inherited from SOCA (Bristow 2013 – A10). By now, as Billy will later 
discuss, that liaison network should have completed work started by SOCA with 
the SLN and under the control of the TRB, on a firearms threat to various 
European nation states, including the UK. The threat involved a pistol 
Richard John Severns 19035736 The 'Network' 
  
144 
manufactured in another nation state and the solving of the problem involved 
SLN ILOs working in a subculture of diplomacy with the manufacturers and the 
government of the nation state concerned. As well as evidence of Bowling and 
Sheptycki’s (2012) problem solving diplomats such overseas liaison is evidence 
of Deflem’s (2002) police bureaucrats working operationally independent from 
the nation state politicians but not independently from their own UK nation state 
node or other connected policing nodes.   
6.4 The National Ballistics Intelligence Service   
Another key nation state node in the Network is NABIS. It is an ACPO 
sponsored national police unit (NABIS 2012 - A10) and even though the 
research participants expected it to become part of the NCA that has not yet 
happened. The core function of NABIS is the examination of ballistics material 
recovered at crime scenes and linking those results to other firearms 
intelligence (NABIS 2012 - A10). Network participants, particularly Jordan, 
believe it is firmly based within the nation state providing a service to UK police 
forces and, at the time of the research, was working closely with SOCA on the 
firearms threat to the UK:  
"…. (NABIS) is naturally very UK centric and its looking at….things like 
reactivated weapons (and) converted weapons …. (NABIS) work closely 
with SOCA Programme 'five' Team."  
NABIS was set up between 2003 and 2008 as a result of an ACPO Strategic 
Review of Firearms. Chris stated: 
"(It was set up) through the ACPO Criminal Use of Firearms Portfolio and 
the Senior Responsible Officers within ACPO CUF and the National 
Ballistic Intelligence Programme. The ACPO Strategic Review of 
Firearms (included) research in Germany and the US. Other individual 
contacts were established … through the Director of the Police and 
Crime Standard Directorate, Paul Evans, who was a former Police 
Commissioner in Boston (US)."  
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Apart from being described as 'UK Centric' by Jordan, another Network 
participant, Chris, states that there was little influence, in the setting up of 
NABIS, from other nation states, apart from the spreading of best practice:  
"(There was no) direct influence because of the completely different 
levels of crime compared to the UK but much learning came from the US 
and South Africa relating to their use of IBIS (Integrated Ballistics 
Identification System) technology and their forensic and firearms 
intelligence processes. All of this fed into the ACPO CUF Strategic 
Review which in turn led to the development of NABIS."  
Chris also emphasises that NABIS was set up as a nation state node steered by 
the Government:  
"UK Government Policy, Home Office Policy and ACPO Policy all 
influenced the work on gun crime but in turn by working in a government 
department and working closely with ACPO we were able to influence 
those very same policy areas".  
Another participant, Geri, stated: 
"Anything that (NABIS staff) do on a transnational basis has to adhere to 
UK law, policy and procedure."  
NABIS is headed by a Detective Chief Superintendent seconded from one of 
the 43 police forces in England and Wales. The role of the head of NABIS, 
according to Jordan is:  
"To oversee all elements of the service from the initial recovery of items 
from crime scenes, the way they are examined in forensic laboratories, 
the way the intelligence (from forensic examination) is developed, 
through to co-ordinating operational activity through organised co-
ordination and tasking groups ….. It is a strategic overview of 
management of the whole service."  
The management of NABIS is split into three areas. They include Forensics, 
which is responsible for four ballistic laboratories, in London, Birmingham, 
Manchester and Glasgow, who process forensic examinations of firearms and 
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ballistic material from UK crime scenes using IBIS. Intelligence is the second 
area. NABIS staff analyse information and intelligence from forensic 
examination together with other information and intelligence on individuals, 
groups, premises and vehicles. As a result they produce intelligence products 
for operational and strategic action by UK police forces and, at the time of the 
research taking place, for SOCA.  
The third NABIS area is Knowledge and Communications where the knowledge 
gained from NABIS intelligence and practice is turned into best practice guides 
and is used as evidence to drive change in firearms legislation. All three areas 
have links with other nation state nodes and international nodes such as 
Interpol (Interpol 2012a - A15, NABIS 2012 - A15). 
NABIS is an influential node in that it has a core function of dealing with the 
firearms threat and it is an executive arm of the Organised Crime (Firearms) 
TRB, driving action and influencing policy and legislation change in the UK. The 
Home Affairs Select Committee made a point of calling key members of NABIS 
to give evidence on tackling the misuse of firearms, with a view to changing 
policy and implementing new legislation to tighten gun control in the UK even 
further (Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons 2011a - A15). Without 
the existence of NABIS and their close liaison with the Organised Crime 
(firearms) TRB the UK police would not have a strong foot hold in the Network. 
According to Alex and then Chris: 
"ACPO CUF would say right ok we'll take this forward and (NABIS) will 
do that…. ACPO CUF and the TRB are in reality one and the same thing 
because they have a joint lead."  
" (In setting up NABIS) as part of the ACPO Strategic Review of Firearms, 
the on-going work in collaboration with ACPO CUF and the Home Office 
Police and Crime Standards Directorate remit to seek out good practice, 
attention was focused on developing contacts within countries making 
significant use of IBIS technology or other major involvement with gun 
crime issues."  
NABIS is therefore very much UK based, it is responsible for pulling together 
the majority of the firearms intelligence in the UK and, as such, it is the node 
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that flavours the Network from the UK point of view. It was born out of a review 
by ACPO and was put together in its initial stages by staff seconded to the 
Home Office. Those staff had a predominantly, UK policing background. It did 
include a former senior police officer from the US but he was employed under 
contract to the Home Office working on UK problems and developing UK 
policing. He was not part of any outside node influencing UK nation state 
policing. 
6.5 The Home Office 
The Home Office are the link node between the UK Government and LEAs79. 
They steer policing on behalf of the government based on consultation with the 
police and the people they police. Steering takes place through the Home Office 
involvement with the TRB and other Network nodes. It is also communicated 
through policy and strategy documents. The Home Office, through the tri-partite 
system of police governance and the TRAF80, are a key UK nation state node in 
the Network. As well as holding other UK nodes to account they also participate 
in the Network 
Although one Network participant, Billy, refers to them as, "Masters of 
procrastination",81 the Home Office did second staff from the UK police to a 
Home Office Police and Crime Standards Directorate to implement the ACPO 
Strategic Review of Firearms that led to the implementation of NABIS. The 
Home Office have also implemented an up to date Serious and Organised 
Crime Strategy (Great Britain, Home Office 2013 – A15), which refers to 
firearms as a cross cutting organised crime issue. The strategy includes the 
formation of the NCA under the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (Great Britain, 
Parliament, House of Commons 2013).  
                                                          
79 The devolved parliaments in Scotland and Northern Ireland control policing and LEAs in its areas and the Home office deal 
predominantly with England and Welsh LEAs. However, all are linked through the Network. NABIS have agreements and work 
closely with Scottish and Northern Irish LEAs (ACPO 2011 - A15) and so do the NCA (NCA 2014 – A10).  
80 Where the lead officer for each TRB gives reassurance that their particular risk is being managed. 
81 Billy did not evidence the exact nature of the procrastination however, such behaviour by the Home Office is evidenced on other 
occasions, suggesting it is an issue that requires further research. They replied to a research question on TRBs for this thesis by 
writing back to the author, sometime after the request, suggesting they contact the NCA for an answer rather than them (Etarat 
2015 – A10). In addition allegations amounting to procrastination by the Home Office have been made in connection with the 
Rotherham sexual abuse scandal (BBC Radio News 2015 – B30). 
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According to Jordan:  
"(NABIS and UK police forces as a whole) have a lot of interaction with 
the Home Office because at the end of the day clearly one of the things 
they have to provide ….through the Threat Reduction Board 
is ….reassurance ….They rely on NABIS intelligence to do the UK threat 
assessment. The section on firearms is (based, in the main,) on what 
NABIS tell them. On the flip side of the coin NABIS rely on them …. 
pushing quite hard to change the law in certain areas that type of stuff so 
(there is) a fair degree of interaction with the Home Office and they … 
are represented at all levels really."  
To progress the implementation of NABIS the Home Office deployed seconded 
police staff to other nation states to harvest best practice on gathering and 
disseminating firearms intelligence. This was then circulated to all UK police 
forces. Chris stated: 
"Knowledge and good practice was disseminated through ACPO CUF 
and publications such as the Home Office/ACPO CUF Gun Crime 
Investigative Guidance. 
From 2003 until 2008 …I had contact with the Bundeskriminalamt, FBI, 
ATF, Boston Police and New York Police. In 2006/2007 I participated in a 
European Union Project relating to Firearms Class Classification and 
recording of information by Firearms Examiners."  
As well as spreading best practice through the UK part of the Network, the 
Home Office also link into other networks that have a relevance to the Network 
and the firearms threat. In particular, they operate the Home Office Strategic 
Centres for Organised Crime and Counter Terrorism (Great Britain, Home 
Office 2009 - A15), as evidenced by Alex: 
"Information and intelligence on any organised crime terrorism nexus 
relating to firearms in the UK should be picked up by the Home Office 
Strategic Centre for Organised Crime (OC) and Counter Terrorism (CT) 
who have overlap meetings."  
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The 'procrastination' on firearms issues raised by Billy could be a symptom of 
two bureaucracies coming together as part of a network. The Home Office 
adhering to bureaucratic rules and implementing long-term government policies 
and the police exerting dynamic operational independence, which Deflem 
(2002) states is part of policeization. This could also be seen as good 
governance and holding the police to account for operational implementation. 
They are working at different paces, which will inevitably bring challenges, but it 
does emphasise that steering exists on the part of the government and 
operational independent rowing is undertaken by the police as identified by 
Osborne (1993) and Bayley and Shearing (2001).  
It is left to Police and other LEAs within the Network (Deflem's (2002) police 
bureaucrats and Bowling and Sheptycki's (2012) policing sub cultures) to 
ensure strategy and operational plans are delivered on time. However, there is 
a suggestion that those who steer and the operationally independent police 
bureaucrats will start to work closer to understand each other's needs. This 
should be positive provided the police do not try to become politicians and 
Home Office ministers do not try to become operational police officers82. 
According to Billy: 
"The place where it has been the most difficult to get leverage and to get 
real traction to do stuff is at the Home Office….. Certainly in terms of 
speed and accountability. Where you have got a coalition of the willing, 
that's all well and fine but when it gets tricky and …really slow (which) is 
hugely frustrating and its an ability to task not just law enforcement but 
the Home Office. …it will be (a different person) that goes in the autumn 
(2012) as the (Firearms) lead to …a meeting chaired by the Home 
Secretary … to say this is what's going well this is what's going badly."  
Therefore, the police firearms bureaucrats in the UK nodes in the Network will 
have direct access to the UK Government via the Home Office without any 
filters. That access in a democratic state like the UK, where the police have 
operational independence, has always been there (Deflem 2002 and 2010). 
                                                          
82 Former Met Commander Andy Hayman alleged in his book the Terrorist Hunters that police officers and politicians forgot what 
their role was when attending COBRA meetings. Police officers politicized and politicians gave operational orders to senior police 
officers (Davenport 2009 - B30). 
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However, it appears that the degree of access and subsequent action can vary. 
Billy makes the point above that there is a challenge in dealing with the Home 
Office and persuading them to operate in a dynamic fashion that corresponds 
with the speed of operational policing rather than at a pace that suits a political 
agenda. Whatever the case, the Home Office is a key node in the Network that 
facilitates change and the mooring of transnational policing in the UK nation 
state by way of governance and accountability through the TRB. 
6.6 The Other UK Nation State Nodes in the Network 
In addition to the Organised Crime (Firearms) TRB, the NCA, NABIS and the 
Home Office83, the Network is comprised of other UK nation state nodes that 
secure the UK's involvement in the Network within the UK nation state. Some 
have already been mentioned due to their close links with TRBs, the NCA, 
NABIS and the Home Office. They include ACPO and its various business area 
nodes such as Crime and its sub areas such as Violence and Public Protection, 
CUF and Firearms and Explosives Licensing Working Group (FELWG). They 
also include the UK police84, the CPS, IAG, the Royal Armouries, HMRC, HM 
Armed Forces and the UKBA, which is currently under a Home Office review 
that has led to the formation of the UK Border Force and the establishment of 
the Border Policing Command within the NCA (Great Britain, Home Office 
2013a). 
The UK part of the Network also includes HM Government, the FCO, MI5, the 
DTI and the Home Affairs Select Committee. All the nodes have varying 
degrees of influence on the Network. Some nodes facilitate the existence of 
other nodes which can be treated as separate entities as they comprise 
representatives from a number of other nodes coming together for a specific 
purpose. An example of such a node is the Organised Crime (Firearms) TRB 
which was set up by the Home Office to manage firearms crime. It was merged 
with ACPO CUF, replaced the Programme Five Review Board and comprised 
representatives from a number of different organisations (Appendix 11.4). 
                                                          
83 Which facilitates other nodes such as the Home Office Strategic Organised Crime Group, the Home Office Strategic Counter 
Terrorism Group, College of Policing (CoP) and the Home Office TRAF. 
84 The 43 police forces of England and Wales,  the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), the Police Service of Scotland and 
other police forces (such as the BTP). 
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Nodes such as the CPS, the Royal Armouries, HMRC, HM Armed Forces, the 
FCO, MI5, the DTI and the cross party Home Affairs Select Committee are all 
part of the pluralisation of policing across all UK public and government 
organisations identified by Jones and Newburn (2006). The addition of the IAG 
and the Home Affairs Select Committee adds legitimacy to the pluralisation as 
they represent the UK public and facilitate Bottoms and Tankebe's (2012) two-
way conversation between the police and the policed. The other nodes listed 
also have their own separate connections with the UK public. One example of 
this is UK Government ministers who are elected and lead nodes such as the 
DTI and the FCO which, as will be shown, have their own bureaucracies that 
take on responsibility for some aspects of policing the firearms threat. 
Some of the nodes become involved in policing action on their own initiative or 
with others. An obvious example is the military police of HM Armed Forces who 
work with the Ministry of Defence (MOD) police to target firearms being 
smuggled into the UK by individual soldiers from war zones (Thurman 2014 – 
A30). The FCO also act on their own initiative to contribute to the policing of the 
illicit supply of firearms. The FCO will be discussed further in chapter 7. 
However, any pluralised policing action by or across the UK public nodes is 
usually led by the UK public police. The best way to explain how the different 
UK nodes contribute to the Network is to examine what part some of them 
played in dealing with the firearms threat posed by the BBM.  
The BBM was a blank firing gun manufactured in Italy and imported into the UK 
for sale, mainly to athletics clubs for starting races. The manufacturing, 
importation and sale was legal. However, in 2009 the Metropolitan Police, a 
node in the Network (one of the 43 police forces in England and Wales), 
identified through intelligence that, "the illegal conversion and criminal use of 
the Olympic .380 BBM blank firer (BBM)", was a problem. It posed a particular 
threat to communities in London (NABIS 2010, p1 - A15) . 
The intelligence on the BBM threat was taken by the Metropolitan Police 
Specialist Firearms Command (CO19) to a meeting of ACPO CUF. As a result, 
NABIS were tasked with producing a problem profile on the BBM based on 
information and intelligence gathered from UK police forces. The profile showed 
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that the problem was not just confined to London and the surrounding area. The 
BBM was a national problem (NABIS 2010 - A15)85. 
Following the identification of the BBM as a national problem, two BBMs were 
submitted for examination to the then FSS86 for independent classification. The 
opinion of the FSS was the BBMs were readily convertible under section 1(6) of 
the 1982 Firearms Act. Legal advice was sought from the CPS and the Home 
Office Legal Advisory Branch (HOLAB) which showed that the BBM could be 
classed as a prohibited firearm under section 5 of the 1968 Firearms Act. 
Therefore, it was illegal for anyone to be in possession of a BBM without the 
appropriate authority (NABIS 2010 - A15). 
Based on the NABIS problem profile, the FSS examination and the resulting 
legal advice, ACPO CUF in consultation with the Home Office, developed a plan 
of action to remove the BBM from the UK firearms market. It was another 
example of the criminogenic nature of the firearms trade (Rothe and Collins 
2010) in that the BBM was traded as an imported legal blank firearm, however, 
it was easily converted into an illegal firearm by criminals in the UK. It could be 
purchased legally in its original state for around £80 and sold illegally converted 
to fire live ammunition for up to £750 (NABIS 2010 - A15). So, the BBM was 
criminalised, even though it was never intended by the manufacturers and UK 
suppliers to be used illegally or even to be subject to UK licensing laws. 
A Joint Management Group (JMG), comprised of a partnership of a number of 
agencies forming individual nodes in the Network, was established under the 
strategic leadership of ACPO CUF. Their aim was to stop the supply and 
circulation of the BBM by ending its importation, removing it from sale in the UK 
and setting up an amnesty to recover all those that had already been sold. In 
the meantime, CO19 continued with proactive operations targeting illegal 
conversion operations and arresting those involved.  
                                                          
85 ‘There were 179 recoveries of converted Olympic .380 BBM revolvers in 13 police forces in England and Wales, between January 
2007 – March 2010. Olympic .380 BBM revolvers were used in crimes such as Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH) with intent, attempted 
murder and resisting arrest.’ (Unknown 2010 - E40). 
86 The FSS has since closed and their work is being picked up by private providers. NABIS have picked up the majority of forensic 
examination relating to ballistic materials (Rincon 2013 – B30, NABIS 2012 - A15). The removal of the FSS in favour of private 
providers has led to wider forensic discipline dangers of bias, fragmentation, unbalanced assessments, reduced defence checks, 
loss of expertise, reduction in research and development and a lack of archived results (Gallop and Wilson 2014). 
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Prior to presenting the problem to the ACPO CUF meeting, CO19 had also 
sought early consultation with NABIS, SOCA and HMRC to gather intelligence. 
In addition, they met with the Director of the UK Gun Trade Association (GTA) 
and travelled to meet with the manufacturers of the BBM to build intelligence on 
the numbers of BBMs imported and sold into the UK. The lawful manufacturers 
of the BBM were an Italian Company, Bruni, and they met with CO19 at a gun 
trade fair in Nuremburg, Germany (NABIS 2010 - A15). 
The JMG consisted of representatives from NABIS, the Home Office, SOCA, 
UKBA, CPS, the Metropolitan Police, FELWG and ACPO (Violence and Public 
Protection and the Press Office). They liaised closely with the IAG, for 
independent advice on implementing their programme of action, and set up a 
close joint working partnership with the GTA, the British Shooting Sporting 
Council (BSSC) and the British Association of Shooting and Conservation 
(BASC) (all non-profit making organisations funded by member subscriptions 
(Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons 2010b – A10)). Therefore, whilst 
the threat had a transnational element to it and there was some liaison with 
representatives from another nation state, the gathering of intelligence and 
policing of the problem by the Network was firmly in the hands of UK nation 
state based nodes (NABIS 2010 - A15). 
The JMG tasked SOCA to use their SLN and one of their representatives, in 
consultation with the DTI, met with the management of Bruni in Italy. They 
explained the problem that the BBM was causing in the UK and Bruni agreed to 
stop exporting the firearm to the UK. The GTA identified that the sole importer 
of the BBM into the UK was one of their members. After consultation with the 
GTA who were supported by the BSSC and BASC and who had been briefed 
by the JMG, the importer agreed to stop importation and they recalled all BBMs 
still for sale at a number of outlets in the UK. Some outlets did not respond so 
NABIS tasked local UK police forces to make direct enquiries to identify if they 
still held any stock of  BBMs. These enquiries confirmed that they had sold out 
of stock (NABIS 2010 - A15). 
Intensive discussions took place between the Home Office, the IAG and ACPO 
regarding Home Office concerns that the firearms amnesty should not take part 
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during ‘purdah’87 which restricts government ministers and senior civil servant 
decision making and communication before and during a general election 
(NABIS 2010 – A15, p12). However, an operational decision was made by 
ACPO, which highlighted their operational independence from the nation state 
whilst at the same time dealing with a threat to the nation state. After reviewing 
the JMG process ACPO decided that the amnesty should take place. It was 
necessary, legal and ethical that the amnesty should not be delayed. Due to 
different firearms licensing procedures in Northern Ireland and there only being 
minimal impact of the BBM problem in Scotland, the amnesty was focused on 
England and Wales and legitimate purchasers were targeted for publicity to 
avoid them being criminalised (NABIS 2010 - A15). 
The amnesty involved NABIS Knowledge and Communications working with the 
ACPO press officer to deliver the message about the amnesty. They produced 
information and media packs for all police forces involved to enable safe 
recovery of BBMs handed in during the amnesty. The amnesty was launched 
on 16th April 2010 with a joint ACPO/GTA/BSSC/BASC press statement. It ran 
until 28th May 2010 and resulted in the recovery of 799 BBMs and a number of 
other blank firing firearms (NABIS 2010 -A15)88. 
The policing of the BBM problem did not run smoothly, due to different partners 
having differing priorities. However, it is clear evidence of how the key UK 
nodes within the Network operate as a network to deal with the firearms threat. 
It also shows how the Network is a conduit for both intelligence and police 
action and that any action taken by individual nodes is subject to UK law, policy 
                                                          
87 ‘Purdah is a political convention which restricts government ministers and civil servants in central government engaging in 
communications activity, making decisions or policy announcements which are significant and may be politically contentious, from 
when a general election is announced until after the election is held’ (NABIS – A15, p12).  
88 "• 799 Olympic .380 BBM revolvers were surrendered to police forces during the amnesty period. 
• 98 other blank firing firearms were also handed in during the amnesty. 
• 476 blank cartridges were handed into police during the amnesty period. • 
• At present police are in possession of 1322 Olympic .380 BBM revolvers. This includes the 799 as well as others already recovered, 
declared or in police possession." (Unknown 2010 - E40). 
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and procedure and is governed by independent groups within the UK.  The 
operation is summarised by one of the Network participants, Billy: 
"…we are also working to cut off supply which is exactly what we did with 
the Olympic BBM….. Which, if you like, that's a… really good model of 
how we operated, that was a firearm that was, as I am sure you are 
aware, was designed and manufactured solely for the UK market. It just 
happened to be the manufacturer was abroad…..so we worked with 
international partners to resolve that in terms of supply. But also the 
distribution network here and …lawful owners of the firearm, because it 
was used (by) law abiding communities for sports …But equally what it 
identifies is that you get bad people seeing this as an opportunity to 
exploit and going to a gun shop and buying eighty or ninety of these 
things or ordering them a hundred at a time, hullo?!"  
Whilst the UK nodes keep the Network secured in the UK nation state, the use 
of the SLN is an example of a transnational/glocal node in the Network that 
develops UK nation state policing. In addition, as the BBM profile showed, with 
a visit to Italy, there is a tendency for the Network to carry out policing in 
another nation state in a diplomatic way. Such diplomatic policing is identified 
by Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) as the way forward for global policing, 
however, they do not identify how such policing is governed by the nation state 
by way of a network.  
There is clear evidence that the policing action that took place, including the 
visit to Italy, was driven by an identified threat to the UK. Whilst the 
transnational policing that took place was pluralised, it was led by the UK public 
police and involved public organisations based in the UK, all legitimately 
representing the people of the UK.  
The policing of the BBM is transnational in that it involves diplomacy in Italy by 
police from the UK. That transnational policing deals with a transnational 
criminogenic firearms problem where a product sold legally in Italy becomes 
criminalised in the UK. The transnational criminogenic firearms problem can 
also be seen as a glocal issue as the BBM was part of a wider global trade in 
firearms that was having a local impact in the UK. In addition, the transnational 
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policing action is part of a glocal policing process called for by Heeres (2012). 
The UK public police and the Network make use of policing services and 
products from around the world (or, in this case, services that have a global 
reach) to deal with a UK policing problem. The SLN was used as they have 
links to 140 staff in countries around the world. The SLN are now part of the 
NCA; directed from a UK base but with access to police around the globe to 
assist with UK policing problems.  
6.7 Summary Discussion on the Key UK Nation State Nodes in the 
Network 
Before summarising how the UK part of the Network has developed, how it 
operates and the metis that has been acquired, it is important to emphasise that 
the Network is intelligence led. The threat that has been identified by the 
intelligence drives the operation of the Network. This is highlighted by Jordan 
when he states that reassurance has to be provided to the Home Office that the 
firearms threat has been identified and addressed. That is a clear aim, which is 
evidenced by the Network participants and an obvious driver amongst those 
who provided evidence for the research.  
The firearms threat also prompted me to highlight Operation Barker to the UK 
knowledge network, that existed at the time, to bring about national action to 
deal with the threat from reactivated firearms. The only way to understand the 
firearms threat is to gather information from all sources to produce intelligence, 
which is what the Network does. It then acts on that intelligence, as has been 
evidenced by Operation Lapworth and the operation to deal with the threat from 
the BBM. Therefore, the Network is clearly intelligence led and any threat that is 
identified drives the Network. 
In assessing the intelligence, and the eventual knowledge that results from it, it 
is necessary to mention the importance of the use of Cornish and Clarke’s 
(2002) crime script analysis, which breaks down who the criminal actors are, 
what their modus operendi is, which tools and raw materials they use and how 
they develop criminal relationships with other actors to form their own nodes 
and networks. This then enables the police and others to identify opportunities 
to intervene and prevent crime. Without such analysis the Network could not 
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adapt to deal with the illicit firearms market which is clearly networked rather 
than being a hierarchical organisation.  
Therefore, the UK police and the Network develop metis based on action taken 
previously to disrupt firearms and what they have learnt about the metis of the 
criminals by way of crime script analysis. As a result, they compete with the 
criminals responsible for the firearms threat and adapt to be one step ahead of 
them, similar to the competitive adaptation that took place between Kenny's 
(2008) narcs and narcos.  
Operation Barker used crime script and network analysis to gather evidence on 
the Greenwoods89 and identify suspects beyond the Greenwoods, as well as 
potential witnesses. It is the basis of proactive detective work. By forming 
policing networks Operation Barker staff were able work beyond the confines of 
Derbyshire to bring the Greenwoods and other offenders to justice. In addition, 
we were in a position to suggest more strategic action to police the illicit 
firearms market network. Other UK police operations at the time, such as 
Operation Trident run by the Metropolitan Police, were developing similar 
networks to deal with firearms crime. Such operations helped to identify the 
need for a central national node, like NABIS, to pull together the work of those 
different operations, to form a clear national picture of the firearms threat and 
co-ordinate a wider response. 
Overall, the UK part of the Network has developed through competitive 
adaptation. (This will be further evidenced in chapter 7 by an explanation of the 
nodes that work on a transnational basis and how they link with nodes outside 
the UK nation state.) ACPO realised that there was a need to adapt and 
centralise the gathering and dissemination of intelligence to enable co-ordinated 
action to deal with the threat to the UK from the criminal use and supply of 
firearms. Therefore, under the governance of ACPO CUF, NABIS was officially 
launched in 2008 following research and gathering of knowledge from various 
                                                          
89 My experience from dealing with the Greenwoods and their associates is that they make rational decisions (Clarke 1997, Tierney 
2007), making it possible to draw up their crime script and analyse their criminal operation (Cornish and Clarke 2002). The 
Greenwoods as with other criminal nodes did, however, keep themselves to themselves as a family node and only formed 
relationships with others to make a criminal profit for themselves. Those they formed relationships with also operated in close knit 
nodes or alone to do what they needed to do to make their own criminal profit. Therefore whilst one node might be more active 
or more powerful in criminal terms than another node they did not control each other through any sort of hierarchy; they 
networked (Appendix 11.8) (Author’s note). 
Richard John Severns 19035736 The 'Network' 
  
158 
UK nation state and transnational sources under the National Ballistics 
Intelligence Programme (NABIP).  
ACPO CUF was the key node in governing the introduction of NABIS and 
directing its priorities and how it should operate. The importance in nodal terms 
within the network of ACPO CUF has been succeeded by the Organised Crime 
(Firearms) TRB. This was confirmed by Jordan who stated that the TRB had to 
be reassured that the threat to the UK from the criminal use and supply of 
firearms was being “…identified and tackled”. Also, Alex who confirmed that 
ACPO CUF and the Programme 5 (Firearms) Review Board had in fact become 
the Organised Crime (Firearms) TRB under the Violence and Public Protection 
portfolio of the ACPO National Policing Crime Business area.  
The TRB lead, in turn, also attends a TRAF at the Home Office to provide 
assurance that the police in the UK are dealing with the threat from firearms. 
Therefore, whilst the TRB governs strategic policing activity in the UK and holds 
other policing nodes to account for the work they are doing, its lead is held to 
account by the Home Office who are part of the tripartite system of police 
governance that is well established in the UK.  
Harfield (2006) described and critically analysed the new form of oversight for 
SOCA, which was only accountable to the Home Secretary. This differed from 
the tripartite system of governance and accountability for UK police forces. 
However, through the nodal network that exists and links to the TRB, the 
tripartite system may in fact be taking hold of all areas of UK policing, including 
the work of SOCA and their Programme 5 activity which has now been taken 
over by the NCA. The TRB system includes Chief Constables who are also part 
of the tripartite system. Whilst the third part of the tripartite, the PCCs, are not 
part of the TRB, they are pushing to have a role in transnational policing. 
Therefore, the inclusion of one or more PCCs on the TRB could be a step 
towards enhancing the tripartite system at a national and transnational level.  
The legitimacy of policing that Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) identify as 
necessary, exists within the plural Network with the involvement of the IAG and 
the Home Affairs Select Committee. These public organisations or nodes are 
pluralised into policing through the Network and add to the two way 
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conversation between the public and the police to enable legitimisation of the 
police and the Network.  
There is no involvement of any private policing in the pluralisation and the risk 
of privatisation through the multilateralization process identified by Garland 
(2000), Bailey and Shearing (2001) and Jones and Newburn (2006) is minimal. 
Even the privatisation risks identified by Gallop and Wilson (2014) with the 
breakup of the government sponsored FSS in favour of free market forensic 
providers are minimised, as firearms forensic examination is run by NABIS. 
Although there is nothing to stop UK police forces taking their firearms 
submissions to other providers, they would miss out on the enhanced 
capabilities of NABIS. 
TRBs, according to Network participants, are becoming grounded in UK 
policing. A TRB is a key node that pulls together a number of UK policing nodes 
to work together in a pluralised partnership towards achieving the aims of the 
UK Government, global to local strategy, for dealing with crime and the priority 
crime areas, which are currently organised crime and terrorism. As such, in 
respect of the firearms threat, the Organised Crime (firearms) TRB sits firmly 
within the UK working to UK law, policy and procedure to consider the local 
impact of crime with an eye on the global influences. Thus, TRBs are the nation 
state anchor node of transnational policing. They have been set up to operate 
within a glocal philosophy. It is the glocal policing that Heeres (2012) is calling 
for and which Network participants such as Billy are embracing as part of a 
proactive intelligence led process: 
“The vast majority I think of weapons are converted in this country or are 
stolen or are diverted from the lawful sort of supply chain. So I think the 
bulk of our focus should and needs to be therefore here and about how 
guns, when they arrive are here. But actually there's that upstream stuff 
about how we work. And because we now understand what that firearms 
picture looks like here, the strategic work is increasingly up and out and 
that's the work that the Threat Reduction Board, Forces and other Law 
Enforcement Agencies deal with; what's happening on the street and 
within their Organised Crime Networks.  
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The work of the Threat Reduction Board actually looks up and out so all 
our strategic pieces of work are around 'How do we make in many ways 
our borders or our capability to import unlawfully firearms, make that 
much harder make us much more resilient and make weapons that are in 
this country or being brought into this country, much harder from getting 
into the criminal chain. I think that is the purpose of the Threat Reduction 
Board.”  
Heeres (2012) published the call to move towards glocal policing whilst the 
research evidence for this thesis was being analysed. Billy’s words capture the 
essence of glocal policing in action with the TRB and support the grounded 
theoretical reconstruction towards glocal policing being articulated and accepted 
in everyday policing in the UK. It is certainly a philosophy that is present 
amongst the UK participants within the Network and hypothetically, if the TRBs 
for other crime threats to the UK are operating in the same way then that glocal 
policing philosophy is present throughout all areas of UK policing. The structure 
and organisation of TRBs suggest the glocal policing philosophy is generalised, 
however, further comparative research with the Network would enhance the 
grounded theory that a glocal reconstruction of policing is taking place in the UK. 
What has emerged from the nodal analysis of the key UK nation state nodes in 
the Network is that the Network contributes to a development of nation state 
policing. The Network includes local UK police forces who are dealing with the 
local impact of a real firearms threat. UK police forces, working within a 
community policing philosophy, are strongly represented on a number of the UK 
nodes by frontline police officers and staff. In addition, those UK nodes comply 
with NIM, which contributes towards the prioritisation of resources between all 
levels of UK policing from the local and the regional to the national and 
transnational. As such, the UK nodes contribute to the development of policing 
through an emerging pattern of legitimate pluralised transnational policing by 
way of contact between UK ILOs and nodes outside the UK (which are explored 
further in the next chapter). This forms a network, which does not stand outside 
UK policing. The Network is an integral a part of UK policing.  
In summary, UK transnational policing through the Network is based on an 
articulated actual threat rather than, as in some networks analysed by Ericson 
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and Haggerty (1997), a perceived risk, which justifies the existence of networks 
and Bigo’s (2000) ILOs, who sit apart from the nation state and justify their 
existence by promoting insecurity. This articulation of the firearms threat and 
identification of actual risk from the local to the global, including the 
transnational, is part of a glocal policing process adopted by the UK public 
police and UK public organisations, who are involved in a networked pluralistic 
partnership based in the UK. The Network is driven by the threat from the 
criminal use and supply of firearms and whilst multilateralization towards 
privatisation of some aspects of policing within the Network cannot be ruled out, 
no evidence of its existence has been found. The existing literature identifies 
the existence of the UK nodes. However, this presentation of the findings on the 
UK nodes is more detailed and clearly articulates their existence, their influence 
on the Network and the fact that they anchor the UK's participation within the 
Network, in the UK.  
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Chapter 7 - Transnational Nodes in the Network that Develop Nation State 
Policing 
7.1 An Introduction to the Transnational Nodes 
There are some key UK nation state nodes that work on a transnational and 
glocal basis in their own right. Those and other nodes also connect with nodes 
in other nation states. As a result, the Network is transnational and part of a 
glocal policing process. This chapter explains how those nodes become 
transnational, how they make the Network transnational and what nodes they 
connect with to make the Network transnational. It shows that the nodes do not 
become part of a supranational police force, a global police state or a network 
where the power lies outside the nation state, dictating to the nation state (in 
this case the UK) how it should police.  
The nodes in the Network that do operate on a transnational basis, and by so 
doing develop nation state policing towards a glocal reconstruction, are the 
NCA (which incorporates the organisation formally known as SOCA), the FCO, 
the Home Office, NABIS and MI5 (Appendix 11.4). The NCA, via the former 
SLN which is now part of the NCA Border Policing Command, and the FCO 
have staff permanently based in other nation states. The Home Office and 
NABIS have staff regularly travelling to other nation states and MI5 have some 
staff based in other nation states and work closely with MI6 who have staff 
permanently based in other nation states (Great Britain, Home Office 2013b – 
A10, Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2014 – A10, MI5 2014 – 
A10, NCA 2014 – A10). 
The nodes that are then connected to form the Network are EFE, EU, Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF), EU Law Enforcement Working Group (LEWP), EU 
Committee on Operational Co-operation in Internal Security (COSI), Europol, 
Forensic Technology Incorporated (FTI), Strategic Alliance Group (SAG), US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), ATF, FBI, Interpol, UN and  the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (Great Britain, Home 
Office 2011 – A15, Great Britain, Parliament, House of Lords 2011 – A15, 
Cyprus Police 2012 – A10, Europol 2014 – A10, FTI 2014 – A10, Interpol 2014 
– A10, Levi and Gilmore 2012, NCA 2014 – A10). 
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7.2 UK Nation State Nodes in the Network that are Transnational or Glocal 
in Themselves 
As stated in chapter 3, the UK participants in the Network are small in number 
and it has not been possible to gain access to them all. The majority of the UK 
participants in the Network operate within the sphere of the UK nation state 
nodes that have an organisational remit to engage on a transnational or glocal 
basis. This transnational section includes a detailed examination of the UK 
nodes that operate transnationally, as the Network is being examined from the 
UK point of view. Such nodes turn the national into the transnational as part of 
the glocal process called for by Heeres (2012). 
The NCA is firmly secured within the UK dealing with the national security threat 
of organised crime. It also works on a transnational and glocal basis with some 
staff based overseas covering 150 countries. It operates in partnership with 
police forces in the UK and is held to account through the TRB mechanism and 
Home Affairs Select Committee, as well as being responsible to the Home 
Secretary. It is a LEA that develops UK nation state policing rather than one that 
operates independently of the UK or as part of a global police state. The 
overseas liaison network that the NCA has inherited from SOCA (the SLN) 
operates in the same way. The SLN access to various countries around the 
world can bring services from a global policing market to impact on local 
policing in the UK. The SLN has and will continue, as part of a glocal process, 
to deliver both glocal and transnational policing for the UK as part of the 
Network or to deal with other types of organised crime in the UK. 
The NCA DG, Keith Bristow, confirms organised crime as a local to global threat 
and speaks glowingly of the SLN. He states:  
"Having a whole government approach, about people crossing borders, 
how all of that works is absolutely key. So hopefully what you can see is 
there is an international, right through to the local issue and there is a 
breadth of government, breadth of law enforcement, frankly a breadth of 
responsibility for citizens for how we tackle organised crime that brings a 
great deal of complexity for all of us.  
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So, what will be different about the NCA? First of all I have to say some 
of what we have inherited from agencies that went before us is excellent. 
I'll give you an example; the overseas network that we're inheriting from 
SOCA, I think is outstanding. A hundred and thirty or so officers 
supported by locally engaged staff reaching to a hundred and fifty 
countries. All of the countries that I have been to talk about what SOCA 
are doing tell me what a fantastic effect they have. The effect they have 
had in Columbia, in Afghanistan and elsewhere is absolutely outstanding. 
So we are going to build on that" (Bristow 2013 – A10). 
The SLN was used to good effect to help deal with the BBM threat to the UK 
and as such develop nation state policing. As part of the strategy to deal with 
the problem, the SLN officer based in Italy was tasked, by the JMG, to visit the 
Italian exporters, to explain the problem and ask them to stop exporting the 
BBM to the UK. The UK officer deployed outside the UK and developed the 
capability of the UK nation state police to deal with a UK problem by persuading 
citizens of another nation state to take action. As a result of diplomatic policing 
(Bowling and Sheptycki 2012) the Italian company  stopped exporting the BBM 
to the UK.  
Billy added to the evidence and generalisation about using the SLN to develop 
nation state policing when talking about a more up to date threat:  
"So for example this pistol I have got in mind we know where it’s 
manufactured …we know that it’s also an issue in other parts of Europe, 
on a relatively small scale, but it’s there and so we are working with 
SOCA and the country of origin to work with the manufacturers and the 
government in that country of origin …….to cut off supply, which is 
exactly what we did with the Olympic BBM."  
Billy provides clear evidence that based on a threat to the UK, UK police will 
deploy in other nation states. With the other nation state’s agreement they use 
diplomatic negotiating skills to persuade citizens of that other state to take part 
in an action that they would not otherwise take part in. Therefore, the police are 
diplomatic bureaucrats working on behalf of the nation state. They are using 
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their policing skills, rather than any executive powers, in a practical bilateral way 
(Deflem 2002, Bowling and Sheptycki 2012).  
However, Billy did make the point that it was not easy to obtain the services of 
SOCA and the SLN to deal with firearm supply threats:  
"It was about saying this is the biggest threat ……..what do we know 
about it? what don't we know? … it was a bit of a bringing together all the 
intelligence then developing a plan  …one of the challenges was buying 
in our partner agencies and SOCA were our problem child at that point, 
for that particular issue.  
There's always a problem child, …I'm … saying right I think this is a 
really important piece of work, the threat risk and harm around it is huge 
but …it was a problem getting it through SOCA's tasking process. 
Sometimes that's about language… knowing how other organisations 
work, (to SOCA) drugs is far more exciting, and they have a bigger target 
than they do around gun crime.  
Its understanding the organisational psychology and systems and I have 
to say I learnt through that because we made a bit of a false start, hence 
with the Bruni, the Olympic BBM we knew exactly which way to go at that 
point so some of that's about organisational learning but sometimes 
some organisations don't necessarily make it easy, I think I would say."  
From Billy’s point of view, it was difficult at first to engage with SOCA on 
developing nation state policing of firearms through the Network, due to SOCA 
priorities not being compatible with others. As with Jean’s earlier perception of 
SOCA not being very efficient, SOCA management’s prioritisation against other 
crimes, based on intelligence and the allocation of resources, has to be taken 
into account. Information on making the judgement as to whether SOCA 
management’s priorities were correct was not available for this thesis. However, 
NIM is in place to attempt to organise such prioritisation within and between 
different policing nodes and both SOCA and ACOPO CUF (as they were at the 
time) were part of the NIM process. This does not discount each nodes’ 
management team exaggerating priorities for their own means leading to a 
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reliance on Ericson and Haggerty’s (1997) perceived rather than real risks; but 
the NIM process should lead to a proper evaluation of risk.  
There are also other nodes in the Network who appear difficult to engage with 
because of their remit. The FCO are one such node. They are focused on the 
UK’s overseas interests rather than home affairs which are the remit of the 
Home Office (Gov.UK 2014 - A10). Chris states they never had any contact with 
the FCO while Billy admits that the relationship with the FCO is not clear but 
believes and hopes that is unintentional. 
The FCO do have firearms as a priority and they are an example of Jones and 
Newburn’s (2006) pluralisation of policing across UK Government agencies. 
That pluralisation is steered by the UK Government who direct what the FCO's 
wider organised crime policing responsibilities are. The FCO's organised crime 
priority is underpinned by UK Government strategy which states:  
"The government will improve its strategic oversight of the UK’s 
international efforts against organised crime. Experience suggests that in 
some circumstances it may be more cost effective, as well as tactically 
advantageous, for enforcement activity to take place outside the UK. The 
UK deploys significant resources overseas through FCO, SOCA, HM 
Revenue & Customs (HMRC), UK Border Agency (UKBA) and the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS)"  (Great Britain, Home Office 2011 - A15). 
FCO policy on firearms is also driven by the UN PoA on SALW and it is 
committed to report on work that the UK has undertaken towards the actions 
within the plan. The FCO SPOC for the PoA stated:  
"We provide the information requested by the UN PoA reporting 
document"  (Severns 2012a - A10).  
A FCO reporting document on the UN PoA on SALW details action taken by the 
UK. However, whilst it acknowledges the existence of national organisations 
such as NABIS, HMRC and UKBA, there is little evidence there or elsewhere of 
contact with agencies within the nation state (Apart from Geri noting that UK 
nation state agencies do answer occasional questions posed by the FCO). 
Instead, the FCO does focus on action taken on the illegal supply of firearms to 
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other countries involving UK nationals and the illegal passage of firearms 
through UK territory, rather than on UK law enforcement activity on illegal 
supply of firearms into the UK. This does suggest it is part of the Network that 
operates on a transnational basis targeting transnational and glocal criminals. 
For example one extract from the document states:  
"In October 2010, Andrew Faulkner was found guilty of attempting to 
smuggle 100 military grade sniper scopes from the UK to Iran."  
Another:  
"In February 2010 Gideon Sarig and Howard Freckleton were found 
guilty of trafficking and brokering offences relating to the movement of 
high explosive bombs, 30mm armour piercing ammunition and high 
explosive rounds to Sri Lanka and Israel" (Gore 2012 - A15). 
Overall, whilst the FCO is part of the Network it could improve its connections to 
other nation state nodes; especially in relation to UN action on SALW. The lack 
of connectivity is further evidence of Golding and McClory's (2008) assertion 
that the UK commitment to the UN SALW PoA is too foreign office biased. Any 
action taken in line with the PoA does suggest that some UK policing is being 
influenced from outside the UK nation state at the direction of the UN. However, 
it is a UN protocol that the UK has signed up to. The protocol was developed 
from the nation state by public (not private) NGOs and the self-initiated action 
reported has been taken by UK nation state nodes who take an active part in 
the Network. In effect, all the FCO is doing (and would be enhancing by 
improved connectivity), is reporting to the UN that all the UK LEAs already do 
what the PoA is requesting. As such, the UK nation state policing of firearms 
could be spread as best practice via the UN. 
The Home Office are clearly engaged as a node within the Network, they are  
part of the governance process that keeps the Network secured within the UK 
nation state. As well as hosting the TRBs that generate transnational action as 
part of a glocal process, the Home Office tend to work more on a transnational 
and glocal basis when setting up new organisations, which have become nodes 
within the Network. As stated by Chris:  
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"The Police and Crime Standards Directorate (PCSD) (a department 
within the Home Office) were responsible for the National Ballistics 
Intelligence Programme (NABIP) to improve UK law enforcement 
capability in tackling gun crime."  
NABIP led to the establishment of NABIS. As part of the programme, officers 
travelled to other nation states to gather knowledge on best practice on tackling 
gun crime. According to Chris the PCSD staff were comprised of police officers 
seconded from UK police forces and other staff, recruited for specialist skills, 
such as Paul Evans the former Commissioner of Police in Boston, US. They 
travelled to many countries and made contact with several overseas LEAs, 
transnational policing groups and private commercial companies. These 
companies could supply the technology required to assist in forensic 
examination, matching of ballistic material and linking forensic intelligence to 
other intelligence such as human intelligence (HUMINT).  
The PCSD staff explored a global market of policing services to make an impact 
on policing in the UK and they chose the product based on the nature of the 
threat. PCSD staff were developing Heeres (2012) glocal policing. Chris states 
the LEAs and groups included:  
"Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), FBI, ATF, Boston Police Dept, New York 
Police Dept and a European Union Project relating to the Classification 
and recording of firearms information by Firearms Examiners across the 
EU."  
The private company Chris talked about was Forensic Technology Incorporated 
Montreal (FTI). They supply IBIS technology and promote themselves as:  
"Pioneering automated ballistics identification and analysis over 20 years 
(and continuing) to be a leader in forensic ballistics and firearms 
identification technologies that promote a safer society."  
FTI publicise close working relationships with a number of LEAs, forensic 
groups and transnational policing organisations around the world, including 
Interpol (FTI 2014 - A10).  
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FTI are also mentioned by Alex when talking about spreading knowledge 
around the Network on best practice: 
"Some of that gets done ……. because FTI who make the IBIS kit … 
Integrated Ballistics Identification System kit, that's the stuff that does the 
linking of  ... cartridge cases and … bullets, they are a Canadian 
company and they cite NABIS around the world as basically how to do 
this."  
Therefore, FTI are a key private commercial node within the Network. They 
identify and share best practice by sponsoring and organising transnational 
policing events and promoting their own product. However, even though FTI 
have commercial priorities which could influence policing, FTI do not take over 
any actual policing function. They do not reconstruct policing towards 
privatisation, which is what Bayley and Shearing (2001) suggest was happening 
to contemporary policing, however, in line with Shearing and Johnston’s (2010) 
later thinking FTI could influence policing through a nodal network, dependant 
on where the power lies within such a network. The IPC see commercial 
privatisation as a risk to UK policing (Stevens 2013 - A15), especially when the 
police are the governance mechanism for private police. It is a situation that 
could lead to a conflict of interest (Rowe 2014).  
FTI do facilitate transnational policing and knowledge transfer by using it as an 
opportunity to sell their product. However, Alex explains the process and makes 
the distinction between what FTI do and what the police role and function is: 
"They sell hard ware. What they don't sell is the bit that goes with it, how 
to use what you understand by these two cartridge cases…. methods of 
detection, methods of prevention etc. …In their endless quest to sell kit 
all around the world at enormous sums of money they use that lifestyle 
picture that says if you use this system in the way that NABIS uses the 
system you can work with other countries you can understand gun 
crime….  
They run an international conference every year where they bring other 
countries together and last year they ran it at Interpol….. They have all 
the countries from around the world presenting at these things and 
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NABIS actually won the Interpol President's award for best programme of 
activity…and was talked about glowingly across all Interpol member 
states as the bench mark of how to do business. So they do a lot of 
promotion for NABIS around the world."  
Alex does warn of a downside to FTI promoting NABIS as an example of best 
practice. Alex says it brings a number of requests for help by other nation states, 
which takes up time that could be spent on policing priorities in the UK. 
However, at the same time, Alex sees an opportunity for closer working with FTI. 
It helps with resources to put on nation state events. Whilst this does not deal 
with the potential conflict of interest of working closely with a private company it 
does evidence a perceived need by UK nation state LEAs to engage with the 
private sector to identify and use alternative resources. However, in FTI’s case, 
not to the extent that private industry takes over or provides policing, either 
directly or through the process of nodal networking identified by Shearing and 
Johnston (2010): 
"Sometimes (there) is a bit of mutual back scratching. (At a) seminar on 
the first of March (NABIS will be) delivering an operational case study to 
all forty three forces in England and Wales…explaining …an operational 
case to practitioners (using) surveillance footage, audio conversation. 
All …very interactive, but through it feeding in key learning points along 
the way that says right actually (NABIS) could do this by using the 
relationship with ATF….. by using firearms tracing …. by working with 
Interpol etc. etc…. FTI have been quite helpful and they've given (NABIS) 
some sponsorship to put that on and in return (NABIS) have given them 
some spaces so that they can bring some of their potential customers."  
Whilst FTI are obvious facilitators who champion organisations that are nodes 
within the Network other organisations that are transnational nodes in the 
Network are more discrete. The research participants were reluctant to talk  
about MI5's involvement in the Network as, for security reasons; they did not 
wish to disclose any operational tactics that MI5 currently deploy. However, they 
did allude to MI5’s participation in transnational operations. Jordan mentioned 
MI5 when discussing the dissemination of transnational intelligence:  
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"It would depend on the type of intelligence …SOCA…. are the … UK 
portal for that type of stuff coming in, apart from the Security Services 
(MI5) who obviously differ. If it’s to do with serious and organised crime it 
would come through SOCA."  
Alex states that there is a regular joint meeting of the Home Office Strategic 
Centre for Organised Crime and the Home Office Strategic Centre for Counter 
Terrorism. MI5, being the lead agency for CT (Andrew 2009) must contribute to 
the meeting and as such contribute any intelligence they hold on firearms to the 
Network. Chris also mentioned MI5 being present at some ACPO CUF 
meetings and Jean talks about MI5 as:  
"A basis of a national police force forming an overall assessment of the 
firearms threat to the UK. But who have to turn to the police to take any 
executive action on any information they receive from inside or outside 
the UK."  
MI5 also disclose on their website that they map transnational terrorism and 
have been involved in joint police operations resulting in offenders being 
convicted of firearms offences. In addition, they confirm that they work in 
partnership with UK police forces, the NCA, HMRC and MI6. MI5 task MI6 
through the JIC to gather intelligence from overseas on specific threats within 
the UK. Through MI6 and their own direct contacts they have links with 100 
other intelligence services worldwide, meaning they are discrete but key 
contributors to the transnational workings of the Network (MI5 2014 - A10).  
As with all the nodes in the Network the key element of the intelligence 
agencies’ transnational strategy is to deal with the threat to the UK and as such 
MI5 and MI6 are pluralised into policing (Andrew 2009). Even though some 
might say that the end of the cold war led to the police being securitised into 
higher policing, by a blurring of the lines between defence of nation states from 
foreign attack and policing of the nation state to prevent crime (Bigo 2000, p82), 
the pluralisation evidence exists in the UK.  
Whilst MI5 management actively sort to take over the policing of organised 
crime at the end of the cold war, the threat from international terrorism took 
priority and MI5 resources were used alongside police resources (Andrew 2009). 
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That pluralised partnership is clearly evidenced in a speech given by Andrew 
Parker (the current MI5 DG) on 8th January 2015. He mentions joint working 
between the police and intelligence services throughout the speech and 
evidences how MI5’s work is governed and held to account  by a legal 
framework (Parker 2015 – A20)90.  
7.3 Nodes, Outside the UK Nation State, making up the Network 
As a result of the transnational links formed by the NCA, NABIS, the FCO, the 
Home Office and MI5, the Network extends into other nation states. However, 
because those key agencies that form the links with nodes in other nation states 
are firmly anchored in the UK (by the threat to the UK and a series of 
governance mechanisms91) the power within the Network is in favour of the UK 
(Appendix 11.4). 
There are a number of organisations and groups that the NCA, NABIS, the 
FCO, the Home Office and MI5 link with and as such those organisations and 
groups become nodes within the Network. FTI is one such node (previously 
discussed) who have close links with Interpol (FTI 2014 - A10). Interpol oversee 
their own general policing network in which they are a key node in facilitating 
the exchange of information and communication between 190 member 
countries (SOCA 2012b - A10, Interpol 2014 - A10). 
In 2009, FTI and Interpol launched a public-private partnership allowing Interpol 
members to share information on ballistic data through Interpol as the central 
hub (FTI 2014 - A10). Jordan explains how NABIS utilise Interpol as a hub: 
"In Lyon, Interpol have got an international server for the ballistic 
equipment … the IBIS server, which allows (NABIS) to do cross-national 
checks on an intelligence led basis with other countries…. A number of 
                                                          
90 “The range and severity of threats the UK has faced over the years has meant that we have needed to build substantial security 
and intelligence capabilities. MI5, with our close partners in GCHQ, SIS (MI6) and the police, together embody an intelligence and 
security effort of a quality that is the envy of many partner nations. It is focused on those who threaten harm, not on the private 
lives of the population at large. All of it is set within a robust legal framework that governs, properly constrains and, through 
oversight, holds us to account. Having that framework is vital to the legitimacy and public consent that we need to do our work. 
And it is intrinsic to the sort of country we are protecting” (Parker 2015 – A20). 
91 Such as the Tri-Partite system of police governance, Ministerial accountability and oversight, Parliamentary oversight, judicial 
oversight, Organisational policy, Organisational hierarchies and UK Law. 
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countries signed up to this; Holland, Ireland, I think there is about 7 or 8. 
(They) have agreed that on an intelligence led basis (to) submit items to 
that server, which allows checks at a central server rather than having to 
send them to different countries. Saves countries running things through 
individual servers so there is a technological advance which Interpol are 
driving."  
In other words, UK nodes within the Network, especially those, like NABIS, 
whose core function is policing the firearms threat, are supporters of the public-
private partnership between FTI and Interpol. However, as pointed out by 
Jordan and in the Interpol guidelines on access to IBIS, use of the international 
server must be intelligence led. In other words, the use of the server must be 
based on reliable intelligence. In addition, access to the server must conform to 
nation state laws (Interpol 2014a – A10). It is further evidence of the Network 
policing activity being anchored by governance within the nation state; even 
though the Interpol-FTI, public-private partnership, has made it easier for nation 
states to have access to each other’s data without reference to the originating 
country. The nation state emphasis is further evidenced by Alex, who stated 
that any resulting Interpol identifications have to be formally evidenced through 
the SLN ( and this will continue with the NCA). In addition, this is an example of 
the glocal nature of policing that is promoted by Heeres (2012) where a product 
that is offered globally is used locally. 
Other evidence of the involvement of NABIS in the establishment of the 
international IBIS server, resulting from the Interpol-FTI partnership, is the fact 
that NABIS were involved in a European working group that built the system. 
Members of NABIS were part of a validation group that met in Spain in 2011 to 
evaluate a forensic evidential process. The group was made up of forensic 
science experts from different nation states and they produced:  
"Best practices and guidelines for double-casting techniques for use in 
the Interpol Ballistic Information Network (IBIN)" (Interpol 2012a - A15).  
The fact that IBIN is in place with all its safeguards does not mean that it is 
identifying firearms links between the UK and other nation states. Alex says:  
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"Scandinavian countries they've had their IBIS system interlinked for 
years, they've never had a single crossover. (The UK) has run the IBIS 
system through Interpol for the last eighteen months, they've got five 
countries on there so far and (there has) never (been) a single crossover. 
So gun crime arguably tends to be quite localised."  
Alex suggests, the fact that there have been no crossovers between 
Scandinavian countries or between the UK and any other countries with access 
to IBIS, indicates that firearms crime tends to be local. That might be the case 
with the end use of the firearm, however, other OSINT and interview evidence 
analysed for this thesis suggests the source country of the firearm is not always 
where it is used in crime. Examples include the BBM sourced in Italy (NABIS 
2010 - A15) and the  firearms used in the attacks in Paris in January 2015, 
which are believed to have been sourced in Belgium (Moftah 2015 – E40). 
Billy also acknowledges the important link between the UK nodes and Interpol 
as well as other nodes in the Network, such as Europol. However, those links 
are developing from the UK side rather than Interpol, Europol or any other node 
from outside the nation state controlling UK policing from the outside. When 
asked specifically if Interpol, Europol, US or any other foreign LEAs or networks 
had any influence on Billy's involvement in policing inside the UK nation state, 
Billy replied: 
"No (laugh). I don't mean that in a sort of negative way I'm just...Yes they 
do in that when there is useful intelligence that helps us to build that 
picture of threat to this country… so the answer actually is yes 
sometimes rather than my original no. Because there is an overseas link 
with gun crime, whether that is sort of mail order or personal post from 
the States. Whether that's bringing in on Lithuanian lorries in kits, with 
silencers, sound moderators and ammunition all beautifully wrapped and 
things. The vast majority … are converted in this country or are stolen or 
are diverted from the lawful sort of supply chain. So … the bulk of our 
focus … needs to be …here. ... but actually there's that upstream stuff 
about how we work. And because we now understand what that firearms 
picture looks like here, the strategic work is increasingly up and out … 
that's the work that the Threat Reduction Board, Forces and other Law 
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Enforcement Agencies deal with. What's happening on the street and 
within their Organised Crime Networks.  
The work of the Threat Reduction Board actually looks up and out so all 
our strategic pieces of work are around, 'How do we make ….our borders 
(and the) capability to import unlawfully firearms…much harder …and 
make weapons that are in this country or being brought into this country, 
much harder from getting into the criminal chain. I think that is the 
purpose of the Threat Reduction Board … and I think increasingly as we 
get better connected … Interpol and Europol add more value … the more 
we give them the more we get back, the more so its a sort of a virtuous 
(conforming to moral and ethical principles) relationship."  
Billy qualifies an original "no" to the answer by relating how the link with nodes 
outside the nation state can impact on policing in the UK, but it is subject to the 
firearms threat and is about gathering information and intelligence on that threat 
and any emerging trends. Billy also places the responsibility for decision making, 
on what intelligence to act on, with the TRB. Again, the control is with UK 
policing nodes within the Network. They decide on how much influence the 
nodes in other nation states have, dependent on what they can do to prevent 
and detect firearms supply and use and its impacts on the UK.  
UK decisions are based on proven intelligence outcomes. The current 
knowledge is that the biggest threat to the UK is illegal conversion and 
reactivation. This takes place inside the nation state using materials lawfully 
sourced inside and outside the UK, rather than the main source of supply being 
live illicit firearms from the outside. Even if the balance of the threat were the 
other way, the way the Network is constructed with a firm anchor in the UK 
points to nodes, such as the TRB, still having control on the influence of other 
nation state nodes on the Network. The Network is clearly intelligence led which, 
as identified by Maguire and John (2006), is increasingly present at all levels of 
policing. In addition, that intelligence gathering and any subsequent action from 
it, is governed by UK legislation such as RIPA (Harfield 2009a). 
The UK police are in an age of glocal network policing and from the UK point of 
view, when it comes to firearms, the balance of power within that network is with 
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the UK. The UK decides on how much influence the global has on the local. 
Billy and the other participants within the Network have demonstrated that any 
action they take is based on a thorough assessment of the available intelligence 
and it is taken in the interests of dealing with the threat to the UK. This again 
answers the call for more glocal policing to take place (Heeres 2012) and is in 
line with the Government’s ideological views of the NCA, that they should take 
the lead in glocal policing. As a key node in the Network the NCA are in a good 
position to enhance glocal policing. Billy's response also develops Commander 
Yates answer to the Commons Select Committee about how much the UK use 
Europol for terrorism investigations (BBC 2009a – B10).  
Commander Yates' appeared dismissive and sceptical of what Europol could 
offer saying the police working anti-terrorist operations prefer their own bilateral 
contacts with other nation states. This suggests their decision on who to form 
policing relationships with is based on historical trusts, the nature of the threat 
to the UK, or the direction of the investigation, rather than it being a case of 
allowing organisations from outside the nation state to colour the investigation 
just because they are part of a network and available. Whether or not that is the 
case or whether it is a generalisation that can be drawn about UK policing 
beyond the Network, could be the subject of comparative research between the 
Network and the police transnational terrorism intelligence network.  
As indicated by the current literature, Europol produce intelligence products as 
part of the ECIM that member states, including the UK, are expected to act on. 
That is the function of Europol and that is what they should focus on doing 
(Brady 2008). They are not a supranational police force and are prevented from 
becoming a supranational police force because people in different member 
states cannot agree on technical, legal or policy issues (de Buck 2007, Yates 
2011)92. Billy, provides evidence of the fact that Europol do not influence the 
policing of the firearms threat. However, if the intelligence they supply suggests 
an increased threat to the UK it might impact on the policing response by the 
UK, but the response would still be controlled by the UK police. 
                                                          
92 Hence Europol’s mandate is only, ‘to support and strengthen action by the competent authorities of the Member States and 
their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating organised crime, terrorism and other forms of serious crime affecting two or 
more Member States’ (EU Council Decision 2009). 
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Alex also refers to Europol supplying intelligence via the SLN on firearms, but 
states it tends to be informative rather than actionable as there is limited illicit 
movement of firearms into the UK from the rest of Europe. Chris stated there 
was no influence from Europol, particularly in respect of the setting up of 
specific UK firearms nodes such as NABIS. Jordan also mentions intelligence 
coming from Europol into the UK via the SLN but does not mention it having any 
impact on policing the firearms threat. Jean does not mention Europol as having 
any influence due to evidencing the main threat to be inside the UK from a 
diminishing illicit stock of firearms that are already in circulation. Jean further 
supports an organisation such as the NCA being the gate keeper to the rest of 
the world, stating the focus should be on dealing with that threat through an 
enhanced national policing unit that should have an eye on what is happening 
outside the UK:  
"A kind of FBI, a robust group with a charter who can look within and 
outside the country."  
Geri provides evidence that whilst Europol does not directly influence policing in 
the UK, the intelligence Europol produces is strategic and does influence EU 
wide policy for member states. Geri also makes the point that Europol do not 
have firearms as a priority and although they produce some strategic 
intelligence on the illicit firearms market in the wider EU, it is EFE that gather 
information and provide the majority of intelligence for EU LEAs. The UK is 
represented on EFE by staff from NABIS and, at the time the data for this thesis 
was gathered, by staff from SOCA93. The UK is a key partner in EFE. 
EFE were tasked in 2011, by LEWP, with producing a European firearms threat 
assessment and asked NABIS to gather information for the threat assessment 
from EU member countries. NABIS and SOCA staff then produced an 
intelligence report which formed the 2011 European firearms threat assessment 
(NABIS 2012a - A15). 
The threat assessment was disseminated via EFE members to EU LEAs and 
other European organisations such as Europol. Therefore, rather than Europol 
                                                          
93 SOCA since absorbed into the NCA. 
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being the instigator of the threat assessment, taking a top down dissemination 
of intelligence approach to influence the policing of its members, the intelligence 
was produced from the bottom up by EFE, a group outside of Europol. As such, 
Europol and other European organisations were influenced by its members and 
the UK played a major part  by producing the report.  
It is clear then from the Network participants' point of view UK nation state 
policing of the illicit firearms market is not driven in any way by Europol or any 
other European organisation.  Europol intelligence gathering on the illicit 
firearms market is driven by other transnational nodes such as LEWP and EFE, 
which represent the interests of nation state policing, and the UK play an active 
part in those nodes.  
Some of the participants were more eager to discuss EFE than Europol. Jordan 
talks in terms of NABIS being commissioned by EFE to write the European 
threat assessment. Alex talks of EFE being an example of good practice and 
the way forward for transnational policing of the illicit firearms market. Billy 
states that European partners understand the firearms threat much better, 
through EFE, saying:  
"European partners can recognise actually something that might affect us 
when before they wouldn't have noticed."  
EFE is made up of a variety of firearms experts working for LEAs in Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, Sweden, the 
Netherlands and the UK. They first met together, in a formal way, in Brussels in 
2004 and drew up an action plan94 around assessing the threat, exchanging 
                                                          
94  
 Threat assessment regarding firearms crime in the European Union with a variety of offences ranging from illegal 
spreading and trading in weapons to the criminal use of firearms, 
 Information exchange between police services in the European Union to track down the route of a given firearm used for 
criminal purposes. Experiences would be then used to establish a handbook to tackle the firearms crime, 
 Determination of an accurate picture of firearms crime with particular attention to heavy weapons that can be used for 
criminal purposes. A lot of aspects should be considered in order to achieve it, i.e. types of offenders engaged in criminal 
activity, types of weapons available in the market, as well as sources of firearms trafficking, 
 Enhancing of co-operation between EU law enforcement authorities to combat crime groups involved in illicit trading in 
heavy weapons, 
 Targeting illegal sources of heavy weapons trafficking, as well as establishing policies to prevent a theft of firearms. 
(Komeda Glowna Policji 2012 – B30). 
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information, building knowledge and co-operation and taking action (Komeda 
Glowna Policji 2012 – B30). 
EFE was proposed by the Netherlands and established by a meeting of 
European Police Chiefs in 2004. It supports LEWP and it is a working example 
of Deflem’s (2002) policeization (European Commission 2013 - A15, EU 2013 - 
A10, NABIS 2013a - A15, Unknown 2014 - E40). Geri confirms that EFE was 
set up as a useful practical organisation between democratic countries. The 
group and intelligence products they produce are recognised as part of UK and 
EU policy and practice.  
Geri states that:  
"EFE has various representatives from all other EU member states who 
come from a variety of firearms units; not all are police officers. EFE is 
non-operational; it examines trends and law based on intelligence. The 
EFE was formed in 2004 during the Dutch Presidency and originally 
consisted of a small number of countries including, Austria, Finland, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK) with the aim of improving co-
operation between EU Member States in relation to firearms trafficking.  
Each member of EFE is subject to law policy and procedures within their 
own country but report to the Law Enforcement Working Party (LEWP) 
who in turn report to the Committee on Operational Co-operation on 
Internal Security (COSI) at the EU. LEWP requested EFE to produce the 
latest European firearms threat assessment. Officers from NABIS 
(supported by SOCA staff) have written the threat assessment after 
gathering information from EFE members and have presented it to 
LEWP.  
The threat assessment shows trends and makes recommendations to 
EU Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) in respect of tackling the trends, 
which include criminals in Europe making more use of converted 
firearms. LEWP have requested Europol to do the next threat 
assessment themselves."  
When the EFE European firearms threat assessment was presented at a LEWP 
meeting on 16th December 2011, LEWP asked Europol to produce the next 
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European firearms threat assessment themselves. A Europol representative 
was present and asked EFE to share intelligence with Europol as they were 
shortly to appoint a dedicated firearms expert:  
"…to address such issues" (EU 2012a - A15).  
It is not clear, from publicly available information, whether Europol appointed an 
expert to produce a firearms threat assessment following that EFE report. 
However, Europol do state that they "host and support" networks such as 
LEWP and EFE (CEPOL 2013 - A10) and they did produce an organised crime 
threat assessment in March 2013 which includes a short section on weapons 
trafficking. The report makes mention of the trend towards the use of converted 
firearms pointed out by Geri. Therefore EFE through LEWP do guide Europol 
intelligence assessments (Europol 2013 - A15).  
Europol does not consider firearms as a priority but they see it as a cross 
cutting issue that supports other criminal activity such as organised crime 
(CEPOL 2013 - A10). However, there is obviously a push for Europol to make 
the illicit firearms market a priority. That push comes from nation states and it is 
being picked up at the EU policy level by the European Commission (EC), 
where a report has been submitted proposing: 
"An integrated policy for addressing this threat, through legislation, 
operational action, training and EU funding" (European Commission 
2013, p6 - A15). 
The EC (2013 - A15) uses a number of sources including, a nation state 
consultation, EFE and the UN PoA SALW to support the need for new 
proportionate EU legislation by 2015 and co-ordinated operational action. They 
put EFE expertise on CUF together with Europol expertise in knowledge on 
serious and organised crime, to show that the EU is taking operational action. 
They also confirm that, despite Europol's assertion that firearms crime is a cross 
cutting issue rather than a priority in itself, that the illicit firearms market will be a 
priority for the EU: 
"On an operational level the EU has established the European Firearms 
Expert group (EFE) to promote information exchange and co-operation 
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and in 2010 adopted an action plan to facilitate tracing and co-operation 
against firearms trafficking. Member States and the Commission, on the 
basis of Europol's 2013 EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment, have made the disruption of illicit manufacturing and 
trafficking in firearms one of the EU's nine law enforcement priorities for 
2014-17" (European Commission 2013, p9 - A15). 
Prior to the production of the 2013 European Commission policy report, the 
Council of the EU had also established the importance of EFE at a meeting of 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council in December 2010 to confirm the adoption 
of the action plan mentioned in the 2013 report: 
"The work and expertise of the informal European Firearms Experts 
group (EFE), created under the former Police Chiefs Task Force, should 
be taken into account. It includes: 
- a European Union Firearms Threat Assessment concerning firearms-
related crime, ranging from international firearms trafficking and 
distribution within Member States to the criminal use of firearms and the 
law enforcement response to firearms crime across the EU…." 
(European Justice and Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons 
2010, p2 - A15). 
Information from Geri in 2015 confirms that, as a result of the EC (2013) report, 
Europol have taken a lead on improving co-operation on tackling illicit firearms 
trafficking in Europe. This is now a priority for Europol rather than a cross 
cutting issue95. Therefore, in terms of the Network extending into Europe, EFE 
is a major cog in driving the transnational element of the Network and the UK 
has played a key part in the work of EFE, subject to the threat to the UK and UK 
                                                          
95 During feedback conversations in 2015 Geri stated that Europol are now taking a lead on firearms but not taking over from EFE 
or the nation states involved. As a result, Europol have a closer working relationship with EFE. Geri also stated that there is an 
improved two way flow of intelligence between nation states and Europol.  
On reflection, Geri is optimistic for the future of Europol and its working relationship with EU nation states that have to take some 
of the responsibility for not engaging more with Europol to exchange and enhance intelligence. Overall, Geri agrees that EFE is a 
major cog in driving the transnational element of the Network. EFE has played its part in bringing everybody together and, by so 
doing; it has contributed to driving transnational policing, from the nation state outwards, and made Europol more inclusive in the 
process. The UK police still, however, have control over what they do transnationally; they are not told what to do by Europol. 
Time and further research will tell whether Europol do move beyond being a facilitator of communication (Author’s note). 
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law and policy. This evidences the need to consider the workings of nodal 
groups such as EFE and LEWP and how nation states contribute to their work, 
when analysing transnational policing, which this thesis has done; rather than 
just considering the work of organisations such as Europol and Interpol, which 
the current literature tends to do.  
Further afield the Network extends to the US by means of the SLN and in 
addition by means of a partnership between NABIS and the ATF. As confirmed 
by Jordan: 
"(NABIS have) got a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with 
the ATF to share their Intelligence database. …If we get a trace on a 
firearm that appears to come from America we can check it here (through 
NABIS) and immediately find the origin of the weapon, if it has come 
from America."  
The MOU between NABIS and the ATF was signed by members of both 
organisations after an ATF officer delivered a presentation on e-trace at a 
meeting in Europe attended by EFE members, NABIS and SOCA, as 
mentioned by Geri:  
"The ATF attaché presented to European members and offered access 
to the US firearms database known as e-trace, subject to compliance 
with individual country's law and policy and audit by US authorities on 
justification of use of e-trace by other countries. NABIS took up the offer 
and, together with ATF, drew up a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
around compliance with law, policy and the justification audit to allow UK 
access to e-trace via NABIS."  
The NABIS/ATF MOU and its subsequent use in an investigation is further 
evidence of transnational policing around the firearms threat being part of a 
wider glocal reconstruction of policing. Policing services offered globally to more 
than one nation state are used to make a local impact on local and transnational 
crime. In addition those services are subject to nation state law, policy and 
governance; particularly around justification of use of a database belonging to 
another nation state. Therefore, even though the MOU opens up speedy access 
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to a useful investigation tool that aids transnational policing, there are conditions 
that govern its use.  
The MOU was put to effective use during Operation Lapworth, which is 
championed by the Network participants as a good example of transnational 
policing of the supply of firearms. Alex provides evidence of visits by UK police 
personnel to the US to gain an understanding of e-trace. He states the ATF are 
key partners for UK LEAs and in reference to Operation Lapworth investigations 
he says:  
"…because of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that we have 
and because of the understanding of tracing that we've got from visits, 
we knew what questions to ask."  
Alex confirms the MOU was signed prior to police personnel visiting Washington 
to familiarise themselves about the ATF and e-trace and to publicise the work of 
UK LEAs on policing the firearms threat. Alex states that both the signing and 
the visit were done to form transnational relations should there be a need to 
carry out a joint investigation between the US and the UK. When the MOU was 
signed and the visit was made there was no indication of any transnational 
criminal activity around the supply of firearms between the US and the UK. The 
signing of the MOU and the visit to Washington could have been seen as ILOs 
spreading insecurity (Bigo 2000) to justify their existence based on perceived 
risk (Ericson and Haggerty 1997). However, shortly after the visit, information 
was received that led to Operation Lapworth. Alex elucidates how the 
transnational relationship between the US and the UK developed through 
Operation Lapworth, which dealt with a firearms threat: 
"Operation Lapworth was a joint West Yorkshire, NABIS and ATF 
investigation into the supply of Glock pistols into…Leeds and 
Bradford….using Fast Parcel.…. It was a reactive investigation around 
an intercept (of a parcel) at East Midlands Airport… (It involved) a huge 
amount of work with ATF ….around firearms tracing and firearms tracing 
was a critical part of that investigation because it helped…understand the 
network of supply from the Americans into us. (As a result of earlier visits 
to the US to gain an understanding of e-trace it was possible) to feed 
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back into the UK the knowledge of what is called a straw purchase 
network96.  
…NABIS really becomes a hub in that Borders (UKBA) come straight to 
(NABIS)… (NABIS) do the trace, because (they had) the serial numbers 
(and) the e-trace system …that ties …straight into the ATF. (NABIS) staff 
had been to the ATF tracing centre in Maryland and were able to say (to 
the SIO) look this is what's going to happen, this is what we're going to 
get back, …this is the person who bought your gun, what's a straw 
purchase network how does this work etc. So (NABIS) brought fantastic 
knowledge to that investigation, really early doors.  
The contacts...enabled …that operation (to continue) with fantastic 
support from ATF. We'd got (ATF) agents crossing the Atlantic moving 
stuff …bringing pieces back and forth. (As a result the accused) were 
remanded in custody…all the evidence (was obtained) and (NABIS) 
helped bridge all those gaps that existed because of the contacts and 
knowledge that (they) had in that field …The job got done; it was home 
for tea and medals basically.  
What happened then was that job then became a complete proactive 
investigation because the Judge released them on bail just before 
Christmas and they went straight out and within six minutes of 
purchasing a new phone they got straight back onto the individual that 
they had bought guns from in the first place. So (the job became) a 
proactive investigation for about three months, again with support of ATF, 
massive support from ATF, …delivering parcels to that crime group from 
the US to the UK for a period of about three months. So fantastic support, 
fantastic support from the field agents and arguably a level of support 
that wouldn't exist if it wasn't for the Memorandum of Understanding 
                                                          
96 "…In the States because of the regulations on gun control the problem that they suffer with quite a lot, and it was something that 
(was) recognised as soon as …the first firearms traced back, is that you will have somebody that will be the lead of a criminal group 
who will recruit vulnerable people in order to purchase firearms, so you end up with a straw purchase (that looks clean)… So you 
often end up with young females with babies who are buying individual or small numbers of firearms for a third party in exchange 
for money, baby formulae, nappies, whatever they need basically to support their children… The first trace back…came back as a 
young Hispanic female who purchased the weapon two days before it ended up at East Midlands Airport. (It was therefore possible 
for NABIS to) demonstrate that straw purchase network very quickly… to the SIO…within about forty eight hours of…tracing the 
firearms" (Further explanation by Alex).  
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(MOU) …with the ATF. The contacts …with ATF and actually the thing 
that comes from putting the time in that says you know these people 
really well.  
The ATF liaison officer would come here quite often then we would see 
him. Then when we were in The Hague we would go over and see him 
as well and meet at the Embassy and various other places …There's 
great credit in keeping those lines of communication open, maintaining 
them and ensuring that they are available as and when they are 
presented, rather than a case of its a pick up put down type of situation. 
Speaking to the new liaison officer that's taken over from the old one on 
Friday, 'how are you, are you ok just ringing to say hi, just want to do this 
can you do this - yes yes that's fine of course we'll sort that out for you'. 
So there's a huge amount on that front and ATF are probably one of, if 
not the, biggest key partner in kind of international law enforcement."  
Alex emphasises the importance of the Network link to the ATF and the 
importance of personal contact. This demonstrates that Deflem’s (2002) 
policeization and Bowling and Sheptyki's (2012) subculture of police officers 
and police staff working across nation state boundaries exists. However, Alex 
provides some rich evidence of how that subculture and policeization actually 
operates in a culture of Heeres' (2012, p120) ‘willing and able’ participants.  
Of particular importance to how the subculture and policeization works is the 
people and how they interact with each other. This is a positive aspect of police 
culture where UK participants in the Network work together as part of a team 
with other people in the Network who have a similar goal to them, in this case 
the gathering of evidence to bring offenders to justice. That teamwork, 
underpinned by regular contact led to the efficient exchange of knowledge 
which adds to Glomseth, Gottschalk and Soli-Saether (2007) hypothesis that, 
"The extent of knowledge sharing is positively related to the extent of team 
culture found in police investigation...” and vice versa (p105). 
Before embarking on a critical discussion of the transnational nodes as a whole, 
it is important to identify all those nodes outside the UK nation state that make 
up the Network. In addition to the nodes that have already been discussed there 
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are liaison links with other nodes that could be exploited further by the Network 
as and when required, without the nation state mooring of the Network being 
compromised. They include occasional bilateral agreements, such as those 
between NABIS and Italy to deal with the BBM problem, and further access to 
other nation states through the SLN and the MI5 link to the MI6 overseas 
network; as well as the strategic liaisons that the FCO has with other nation 
states. In addition, there are links with the FATF, SAG, ICE, the FBI, UNODC 
and the UN itself (Appendix 11.4) (Great Britain, Home Office 2011 – A15, 
Great Britain, Parliament, House of Lords 2011 – A15, Cyprus Police 2012 – 
A10, Europol 2014 – A10, FTI 2014 – A10, Interpol 2014 – A10, Levi and 
Gilmore 2012, NCA 2014 – A10). 
The link to the UN is by way of the FCO who are the UK point of contact for the 
UN PoA SALW. As previously evidenced the UN PoA SALW is too FCO biased 
and should be incorporated more into the work of the other UK nodes in the 
Network (Golding and McClory's 2008). The European Commission emphasise 
the importance of the UN PoA SALW alongside EFE intelligence in their 
proposal for changes in European legislation and policy (European Commission 
2013 - A15) and it is a tool that should be embraced more by the UK nodes.  
As stated by Billy the fact that the UN PoA SALW is not embraced more is 
because different UK nodes are not yet fully sighted on all the wider global and 
transnational strategic action to reduce the supply of firearms. Billy is striving to 
gain that wider understanding to incorporate more knowledge within the 
Network in order to deal with the threat to the UK from the illicit firearms market. 
This enthusiasm to expand the work of the Network is further evidence of 
Bowling and Sheptycki's (2012) subculture of police officers and police staff 
working across nation state boundaries, but it is evidence that they are doing it 
for the sake of the nation state through glocal policing. They are the ‘willing and 
able’ (Heeres 2012, p120). They are not doing it to construct a global police 
state or for their own ends. It is therefore important to understand more of the 
subculture of the Network by drawing out more evidence of how the people 
work together and how they use the tools from late modernity to facilitate the 
Network and its nodes. This will be discussed in chapter 8. 
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7.4 Summary Discussion on Transnational Nodes in the Network 
The strength of the TRB as a UK nation state anchor node suggests that 
Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) claim that ‘transnational policing is no longer 
anchored by national sovereignty’ (p129) is not the case with the Network. 
Through its links to other nodes in the Network, the TRB co-ordinates and 
governs UK transnational activity. The policing of the BBM was a good example 
of glocal policing of a glocal problem using transnational policing that was 
governed and co-ordinated from a UK base by the forerunner of the TRB.  
A SLN officer (part of SOCA’s global resource) together with the DTI 
representative, operating with the approval of the local Italian police on the BBM 
problem, proved to be evidence of Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) policing 
diplomats using problem solving methods. They also represent Deflem’s (2002) 
policeization bureaucrats. They engaged in transnational policing activity at the 
direction of one nation state policing node with the approval of the police in 
another nation state. The SLN did not take it on their own initiative to control the 
activities of people in another nation state. UK nation state policing was 
developed on a co-operative transnational basis and it involved the pluralisation 
of the DTI into transnational policing. 
SLN officers are ILOs and in relation to the Network they operate in the best 
interests of the UK nation state to police the firearms threat based on reliable 
intelligence and resulting knowledge, which identifies a real risk. They are not 
contributing to Bigo’s (2000, p81) ‘(in)security’ as part of securitisation and 
neither are they, or other ILOs in the Network, creating work and elevating the 
risk to justify their existence (Ericson and Haggerty 1997, Bigo 2000). It is 
evidence of the police using a symbiotic relationship with other nodes in the 
Network to transcend national boundaries, but they are doing that to police a 
real firearms threat rather than a perceived risk of a firearms threat.  
The NCA DG describes the overseas network as a valuable asset that the NCA 
has inherited from SOCA. As alluded to by Billy, that liaison network should 
have completed work started by SOCA with the SLN and under the control of 
the TRB, on a firearms threat to various European nation states, including the 
UK. The solving of the problem once again involved ILOs working diplomatically 
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with the manufacturers and the government of the nation state concerned. As 
well as further evidence of Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) problem solving 
diplomats and Deflem’s (2002) police bureaucrats those ILOs also appear to be 
part of a ‘willing and able’ culture necessary for good glocal policing practice 
(Heeres 2012, p120). That culture will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8. 
Clearly though, the ILOs are working operationally independent of nation state 
politicians but not independently of their UK policing node. 
All the UK nation state nodes in the Network that have a transnational function 
are secured within the nation state by their own policies and by other nodes in 
the Network. The NCA is one such node, as discussed in chapter 6, the NCA 
DG makes a strong case to the public, police audiences and government 
representatives that the NCA is a glocal crime fighting agency, which will 
provide support to UK Chief Constables and make good use of the overseas 
liaison network.  
Another UK based transnational node in the Network is the FCO. Although the 
FCO is part of the civil service bureaucracy it does have some policing functions. 
Like the DTI, the FCO is part of what is a more pluralistic element of the 
Network and transnational policing in general. That pluralistic form of 
transnational policing involves nodes that do not have policing as a core 
function. They are public rather than private. They do not employ many, if any 
sworn police officers, other than as advisors or security experts, but such nodes 
are involved in some form of social control in direct partnership with the public 
police or through nodal links with them. According to the findings the FCO do 
not fully engage in the Network. As previously evidenced by Golding and 
McClory (2008) the evidence gathered for this thesis shows the FCO appear to 
want to keep control of responses to the requirements of the UN PoA SALW 
without engaging more widely with UK police.  
The UN PoA SALW does not have the same influence as other UN protocols, 
such as the one to deal with conflict diamonds (Jojarth 2009). Nevertheless, 
there are member states within the UN, including the UK, who are willing to 
engage with the UN PoA SALW and all have similar objectives to those in the 
PoA. Therefore, there is a need for all nodes in the Network, including the FCO, 
to feedback to the UN all work that is taking place towards achieving the PoA.  
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Such feedback is requested by the UN who task actions through the PoA. This 
appears to be contrary to the thesis that policing is anchored within the nation 
state. However, it must be remembered that the UN PoA SALW was drawn up 
by a network of member states and NGOs in the first place (Jojarth 2009) and 
the PoA is regularly reviewed by nation states. In fact, according to Alex, UK 
Network participants, other than FCO participants, have recently been invited to 
take part in that review process. The UN do not undermine the UK nation state, 
they can highlight the contribution made by the nation state to the development 
and implementation of the UN PoA SALW. 
As already shown, the Home Office are a key node within the Network. 
Although they appear to liaise with the FCO on some aspects of the firearms 
threat, they naturally have more influence than the FCO because one of the 
Home Office core functions is the support of policing in the UK. More liaison 
between the Home Office and the FCO on the response to the firearms threat 
would enhance the contribution made by UK police and the Network towards 
the implementation of the UN PoA SALW. 
The Home Office seek out best practice on policing and use current and former 
police officers to work alongside civil servants to do that. The research of best 
practice is based on need and the findings show that the Home Office set up 
NABIP based on an identified need by ACPO. There was a need to adapt to be 
one step ahead of the criminals (Kenny 2008) by centralising the gathering and 
dissemination of intelligence to enable co-ordinated action to deal with the 
firearms threat. As previously stated, in my experience, in 1999 the UK police 
did not understand the details of the firearm threat or what the illicit firearms 
market looked like. Now, UK police are organised in such a way that they are 
one step ahead of the criminals in dealing with the firearms threat. They clearly 
understand the threat and SCP methods for dealing with the threat. They are 
also proactive in seeking out new trends that police activity, SCP and 
competitive adaptation lead to. They do this as standalone nodes and through 
the Network. 
NABIP led to the formation of NABIS based on research in other nation states. 
That research led to the introduction of the IBIS technology into the UK and to 
FTI becoming an active node within the Network. FTI involvement suggests a 
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reconstruction of policing towards a plural mix of public and private providers 
identified by Bayley and Shearing (2001). This time, the pluralisation and 
potential reconstruction is at the transnational level. However, the findings show 
that FTI facilitate policing rather than provide it. Even when they formed an 
official partnership with Interpol, it was to provide IBIS at a transnational level 
for the benefit of member nation states who were also involved in the 
governance of the project. It is the public police that choose to use FTI products 
and they have gained access to the product through globalisation. Therefore, 
what is in fact taking place with the involvement of FTI is evidence of another 
aspect of glocal policing. The public police in the nation state identified a local 
problem and went out into the global market to obtain a product that helped 
them deal with the problem locally. 
The pluralisation in transnational policing evidenced within the Network tends to 
be amongst public organisations that form the nodes in the Network. FTI is the 
only private provider node within the Network. Whilst individual nodes might 
engage with the private commercial sector to provide some policing services 
locally, there is no evidence in the findings to suggest that pluralisation with the 
private sector has extended transnationally to shape the Network. Rather, the 
Network acts as a conduit for the local to the global and generally facilitates the 
glocal reconstruction through transnational policing developed from the nation 
state. That transnational policing includes some pluralisation of policing with 
other UK Government organisations rather than private ones. There is no 
transnational or glocal multilateralization through the Network contrary to Bayley 
and Shearing’s (2001) prediction that multilateralization was leading to 
privatisation at all levels of policing. 
The facilitation of the glocal reconstruction by way of transnational policing 
developed from the nation state is further enhanced by the nodes that exist in 
the Network that are outside the nation state. Even though such nodes are 
outside the nation state they are still secured within the nation state because 
each member of the node will only agree action if it conforms to the law, policy 
and procedure in their own nation state. Such nodes are generally missed by 
the literature but they are influential. They tend to drive the work of regional 
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nodes from the bottom up. Therefore, regional nodes such as Europol are 
driven by nation states.  
EFE is one such node that influences the work of Europol and it has been 
missed by the literature. Through the EFE, nation states, including the UK, co-
operate and agree action to deal with common nation state threats from the 
criminal use and supply of firearms. The EFE is a node with members working 
on a day to day basis in their own nation state but travelling to other nation 
states to discuss and solve common problems. It is further evidence of Deflem’s 
(2002) policeization and ILOs working on reliable intelligence to develop nation 
state policing to deal with a real firearms threat. 
The EC consider the threat from firearms to be a priority in line with the UN PoA 
SALW and they also highlight the importance of EFE. The EU consider EFE as 
the operational experts on facilitating action on the threat from firearms across 
EU member states. In addition, they have relied on EFE’s intelligence gathering 
expertise to make firearms one of nine EU policing priorities for 2014 to 2017. 
Those priorities should be adopted in full by Europol and recent information 
from Geri suggests that they have; in particular the criminal use and supply of 
firearms is a priority in itself, for Europol, rather than a cross cutting issue.  
Existing nodes from other nation states have also been brought into the 
Network through Deflem’s (2002) policeization. As with EFE, it involves 
democratic nation states with police who have operational independence from 
the government. It is also part of a glocal philosophy of the police in the UK 
nation state taking advantage of what is being offered transnationally, if not 
globally, to deal with a local problem. The involvement of ATF within the 
Network started with an ILO presenting at a European conference attended by 
EFE members. UK nation state police officers working as ILOs were proactive 
in bringing the ATF node into the Network. This could have been ILOs justifying 
their existence but it led to another glocal problem being dealt with by 
transnational reactive, then proactive, investigation. 
As well as showing that the Network has developed at the transnational level by 
way of further competitive adaptation, this chapter shows that, even at the 
transnational level, the Network remains anchored in the UK nation state. The 
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different transnational investigations, together with the intelligence and 
knowledge gathering, enhancement and sharing, through the Network, are part 
of a wider glocal process where the police consider the global when dealing 
with the local impact. They do that by the way they examine the threat, by 
studying the impact that the global has on local firearms crime. This then drives 
the police to consider what policing services and products are available from a 
global market that can have an impact on the glocal crime.  
There is also an emerging trend of willing and able policing bureaucrats 
operating at the transnational level that will be examined in more detail in 
chapter 8. As with the key UK nation state nodes in the Network, the 
transnational nodes are not clearly articulated in the existing literature. However, 
the findings from the nodal analysis presented in this chapter explains them in 
detail, from the key UK nation state Network nodes fostering transnational 
relationships to the Network nodes from outside the UK nation state. Those 
nodes develop UK nation state policing. They do not control it from the outside.  
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Chapter 8 - The People and 'The Tools of Late Modernity' that facilitate the 
Network 
8.1 Introducing the Late Modern Cops and the Tools They Use 
The tools developed during late modernity facilitate globalisation97 and they 
facilitate the driving of the Network together with a generation of late modern 
police officers and staff. Such ‘late modern cops’ make best use of those tools 
to deal with the firearms threat. They are motivated by positive aspects of police 
culture, a culture which is not always seen as positive (Paoline et al 2006, 
Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). However, Glosmeth, Gottschalk and Soli-Saether 
(2007) identify a teamwork culture that impacts positively on the investigation of 
crime and that teamwork is evident within the Network. The participants are 
focused on the aim of dealing with the firearms threat whilst at the same time 
wanting to be the best and do their best for victims.  
Not only does the teamwork culture deliver good glocal policing (Heeres 2012), 
it also contributes to the UK nation state Network participants being convinced, 
and indeed convincing those in the UK community, that they police by consent 
and there is a moral justification for their actions. Therefore, it is legitimate 
policing (Bottoms and Tankebe 2012) and by extension, the Network is 
legitimate. 
I (and other participants in the research) were late modern cops who grew up 
with the fast developing tools from late modernity, including easier and faster 
travel between nation states, the use of computers and other technological 
advances (Levi 2007). I joined the police force in 1979, at the beginning of late 
modernity, when Margret Thatcher and Ronald Regan's neo-liberalist individual 
responsibility contributed to a reorganisation of the workplace into a more 
flexible entity98.  
As stated in chapter 3.3, my standpoint epistemology is that I have been 'part of 
the scene' (Sugden and Tomlinson 1999, p390) as a police officer and I can 
                                                          
97 'The tools of late modernity’ (Levi 2007, p775) include the internet, air travel and global financial services (Levi 2007). Such tools 
facilitate increased connectivity between nation states, which is known as globalisation (Held and McGrew 2003). 
98 That entity embraced global consumerism through faster travel and instant access to technology to create a society managed 
through an emphasis on risk (Hudson 2003).   
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relate my own experiences of the Network and empathise with the professional 
ethics and integrity of those taking part in it. I did not carry out any academic 
research whilst I was on the inside. However, I retired as a Detective Inspector 
in 2009 to become an academic researcher and can still recall my experiences. 
Even though the most honest witness can be mistaken in their recollections 
(BBC 2015 – A10), all incidents I have dealt with are recorded in pocket note 
books, case notes, policy books and court files. My experiences are used, to a 
greater extent, as data in this chapter, alongside the interview data and OSINT 
data, to draw out positive aspects of police culture among the late modern cops 
in the Network. 
When I joined the police, computers were not in general use but, as late 
modernity developed, I first used computers for police work in 1984 when 
HOLMES 1 was implemented by Derbyshire Constabulary. Today, computers, 
the internet and other IT are in everyday general use by the police, using hand 
held portable wireless computers to access and upload information and 
intelligence (Heaton and Garicano 2007). Long distance travel by police officers 
was also rare in 1979. RCS Officers had the best available cars and radios and 
travelled across UK force borders to investigate criminal activity, but rarely flew 
to the other side of the world to conduct investigations.  
The RCS have become the NCA with ILOs permanently stationed in most parts 
of the world (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). Other Network participants also 
regularly fly to different parts of the world to access computer databases and 
develop links with police staff in other nation states, in order to gather, 
disseminate and action intelligence on the firearms threat. They also build and 
have access to computer systems from different nation states that give instant 
results on firearms intelligence locally at police stations in the UK. As Jordan 
said:  
"Interpol have got an international server for the ballistic equipment we use, 
the IBIS Server … (it) allows us to do cross-national checks on an 
intelligence led basis with other countries…Saves countries running things 
through individual servers so there is a technological advance which Interpol 
are driving."  
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This chapter will show that late modern cops in the Network make the best use 
of the tools available to them. Their aim is to manage the firearms threat using 
the best available resources. That clear aim formulates a positive team culture 
underpinned by a motivation to do their best for victims of firearms crime and to 
be the best at what they do in order to prevent others becoming victims.  
8.2  Late Modern Cops 
Many of the Network participants are late modern police officers or  staff, who 
have worked in policing since the late 1970s – early 1980s and are either 
warranted officers or they are employed by a LEA to support public police 
functions. They have all embraced the use of late modern tools to develop the 
Network. They are motivated by a positive aspect of police culture to seek out 
best practice to deal with the firearms threat and that motivation has led to them 
embracing  tools and technology to enable this. Therefore, as alluded to by 
Kelly (2008) with her network boundary agents and Block (2008, p185) with his 
‘fixers’ and conceptualised with Deflem’s (2002) policeization, it is people who 
facilitate the Network. As Chris said:  
"…part of the ACPO Strategic Review of Firearms, the on-going work in 
collaboration with ACPO CUF and the Home Office Police and Crime 
Standards Directorate remit (was) to seek out good practice. Attention 
was focused on developing contacts within countries making significant 
use of IBIS technology or other major involvement with gun crime 
issues."  
UK police officers and staff were therefore motivated individually and by other 
officers and staff to seek out the best technology from their own and other 
nation states to deal with the firearms threat. They set up NABIS, using IBIS 
technology, which they bought from a private commercial company in another 
nation state (Canada’s FTI) after seeing it work effectively in yet another nation 
state (the US). Other Network participants confirm the same motivation to 
search for best practice to bring technology to the UK or to use technology 
available in other nation states operated by those nation states or by nodes 
within the Network.  
Jordan states:  
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"I suppose the other element about European working that we do engage 
(is in) Lyon. Interpol have an international server for the ballistic 
equipment. (NABIS) use the IBIS Server which allows us to do cross-
national checks on an intelligence led basis with other countries."  
Alex talks about officers visiting Washington, after the MOU was agreed with 
the ATF liaison officer, to improve best practice in firearms tracing; although 
interestingly, Alex states the US system of tracing is not as technologically 
advanced as would be expected in the late modern age99:  
"(From) that visit to Washington we learnt a huge amount. Straw 
purchase networks were completely new to us and it is a problem they 
have a massive issue with…The other thing that we learnt …there is no 
central database for firearms tracing in the US, it is constitutionally 
unlawful. So all records in relation to firearms purchases are held in 
paper format at the registered firearms dealer that you buy the weapon 
from...the only bit that you are able to electronically understand is, where 
the weapon was made and where it was first shipped. "  
As discussed in the nodal analysis, Geri talks about the MOU to gain access to 
the US e-trace firearms tracing system used by the ATF. An ATF ILO offered 
access to the e-trace system to improve best practice in firearms tracing. 
Enabling other nation states to have direct access to US systems to trace illicit 
firearms suspected to have originated from the US.  
Geri states that NABIS staff:  
"Took the ATF attaché up on the offer and drew up an MOU meaning 
that NABIS (on behalf of UK LEA's) had direct access to e-trace. The UK 
was the only country to take up the offer. Direct access was arranged for 
intelligence purposes only and the MOU is only a policy document 
governing access rather than a legally binding document. But any hits 
                                                          
99 Foley (2013 – E30) confirms that, although it works, e-trace is mostly a manual system. He quotes the ATF’s Chief Investigating 
Officer in suggesting e-trace should be updated with a ‘modern imaging system’ to make it more efficient. 
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resulting from the direct access can be put on a legal footing by sending 
a request via SOCA to lawfully gather evidence100."  
Jean emphasises that it is people who make changes, individually and 
collectively; in particular nodal leaders. Jean's assessment is that:  
"There is a network of interested parties in the UK firearms trade and the 
policing of the legal and illegal aspects of it. They include law 
enforcement, research and development, business and intelligence. 
Many are not empowered to order action nationally but they have a 
strong influence. This includes ACPO …when ten Chief Constables get 
together in a room and agree a course of action nationally it tends to 
happen even though we do not have a national police force. Therefore, 
organisations such as ACPO CUF drive the gathering of intelligence to 
obtain a national picture of what is happening. MI5 build a picture and 
form the basis of a national police force, however; they do not have 
executive powers so they have to go to the police to enforce the law. MI6 
are off shore but there tends to be some organisational confusion when 
overseas activity crosses over to activity within the UK and vice versa. 
They are all gradually coming together to drive intelligence gathering at 
home and abroad. They are much more able to do this through advances 
in technology."  
Billy also emphasises the 'we' in reference to people making up nodes in the 
Network and improving the way the Network operates101. Therefore, as shown 
                                                          
100 Evidence gathered from overseas is by way of mutual legal assistance (MLA) (Great Britain, Home Office (2014). Such legal 
documents are beyond the scope of this thesis and the participants are silent on the subject which tends to suggest that, as I did 
as an SIO, they rely on the legal expertise of others. Although if they are anything like me and other SIOs such reliance was 
accompanied by close questioning of the experts to confirm their action was correct . MLAs are also there to protect nation state 
interests as well as aiding transnational investigation (Author’s note). 
101 Billy states, "…I think the bulk of our focus should and needs to be …here ..but actually there's that upstream stuff about how we 
work and because we now understand what that firearms picture looks like here. The strategic work is increasingly up and out and 
that's the work of the Threat Reduction Board. Forces and other Law Enforcement Agencies deal with what's happening on the 
street and within their Organised Crime Networks. …The Threat Reduction Board actually looks up and out so all our strategic 
pieces of work are around 'How do we make …the capability to import unlawful firearms…that much harder, make us much more 
resilient and make weapons that are in this country or being brought into this country, much harder from getting into the criminal 
chain?' 
(Their) terms of reference will say something slightly different than that but I think actually that's probably what it does and I think 
increasingly as we get better connected and I think Interpol and Europol add more value as we get better connected. So I think I 
have seen that picture shift and change so it influences but equally we drive some of what they do as well, its very much a two way 
thing, the more we give them the more we get back, the more so its a sort of a virtuous (conforming to moral and ethical 
principles) relationship in that way because if we say we don't get anything out of them its because we don't put anything in and 
we don't ask."  
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by Deflem (2002), the Network participants from the UK evidence that they are 
bureaucrats, anchored in the nation state, operating independently from the 
government but under the direction of other UK nodes. Those nodes include UK 
nation state government participants providing a form of government steering 
identified by Bayley and Shearing (2001). Such steering is quite influential in 
respect of the Home Office participating and hosting the TRB. Hence, the police 
actors do not distance themselves from the government actors other than in 
relation to their operational independence. When delivering operational policing 
through the Network either strategically or at street level the police actors 
evidence professional team working cultures of the willing and able, promoted 
by Heeres (2012), rather than limited aspirations. Such limited aspirations were 
found by Lipsky (1983) in some street level bureaucrats when emphasising that 
those in public service interpret bureaucratic objectives in their own way. 
The UK Network participants work practically on a transnational basis to deal 
with a threat to the nation state (Deflem 2002). They embrace the tools from 
late modernity in the same way that Levi's (2007) transnational organised 
criminals do. The late modern cops of the Network also work as Bowling and 
Sheptycki's (2012) ILOs, in the form of technicians, diplomats, entrepreneurs, 
public relations experts and field operatives solving problems for their own 
nation state rather than being told what to do by their political masters, by a 
global police state or police bureaucrats from a different nation state. UK police 
officers and staff in the Network are not influenced from the outside, unless it is 
a case of using practical intelligence obtained by outsiders that helps them deal 
with a threat to the UK nation state. 
Bowling and Sheptyki’s (2012) subcultures also exist within the Network in the 
form of a ‘transnational subculture of policing’ (p84). Generally, police culture is 
viewed as negative in that it can lead to ‘disastrous and costly’ consequences 
such as the failed investigation into the murder of Stephen Lawrence 
(Heidesohn 2008, p645). However, there is a clear sense of mission (Reiner 
2010, Bowling and Sheptycki 2012) within the Network. It is a positive sense of 
mission that is part of an overall positive aspect of the culture of late modern 
cops wanting to get the job done in an ethical way in order to deal with a threat 
to UK citizens. There is also evidence within the Network of how and why that is 
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done. It is more than just the mission game and moral justification of good 
versus evil (Reiner 2010, Bowling and Sheptyki 2012). It is about understanding 
the impact on the victim and understanding the need to bring offenders to 
justice by undertaking comprehensive ethical investigations to ensure the 
victims receive the justice they deserve.  In doing that, the investigation still has 
to be impartial and the approach to the victim has to be balanced so that 
impartiality is not compromised. The human rights of suspects and accused are 
just as important as those of the victim and they must be preserved to prevent 
any miscarriages of justice (Kennedy 2004).  
Late modern cops have moved on from having the feeling of being the 'elite 
pariah class' identified by Rumbaut and Bittner (1979, p254) as a coping 
mechanism for the police. Instead, there is, in my experience from supervising 
and observing police officers in the course of my career, a sense that they want 
to work in partnership with the victim and their communities to bring offenders to 
justice. That philosophy was there with the staff working on Operation Barker 
(see chapter 5.3) and with staff working on other gun crime operations, such as 
Operation Trident. I supervised Operation Barker staff and briefed Operation 
Trident staff and police in other forces on intelligence originating from Operation 
Barker. In most cases, the police officers I briefed showed a willingness to act 
on reliable, well-sourced intelligence and the results they produced showed they 
were also able, in line with Heeres (2012, p120) ‘willing and able’ culture. 
Knowing the impact that gun crime has on victims, their families and the wider 
community the police officers I briefed brought offenders to justice and reduced 
the supply of illicit firearms.  
There are examples of where the determination to bring offenders to justice can 
lead to miscarriages of justice and, as already stated, investigations must be 
impartial (Kennedy 2004). There are also some police officers who still appear 
to be sceptical and, as evidenced by Billy (p134 herein), some are still more 
willing than others: 
“… when we tried to pull people together (for Operation Barker) it was 
about coalitions of the willing, I have to say constitutionally we are still in 
the same place.."  
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However, in the main late modern cops who I have worked with on Operation 
Barker and in other serious crime investigations are a willing group. Also, as 
previously evidenced in respect of Billy’s and Jean’s frustrations about the 
priorities of other nodes (p139 and p168 herein), the unwillingness of others to 
act can be down to them having other more pressing priorities, which they do 
not always articulate. Therefore, whilst the existence of a willing and able 
culture requires further research, late modern cops working in the Network do 
appear, in the main, to be part of such a culture, which, as stated by Heeres 
(2012), is necessary to improve policing. 
Ethical investigations come with the adherence to UK law, policy and procedure 
by individuals operating in the Network, which therefore moors what they do on 
a transnational basis to the UK nation state. The drive to get the job done is the 
firearms threat and behind that is a culture of determination to want to do the 
best for the victims; to do a good job without taking short cuts. I have, on more 
than one occasion, witnessed the impact of the use of a firearm, including a 
man apparently picked at random by two criminals and shot twice in the back of 
the head. Also, a woman shot dead, at point blank range in the face, on her 
doorstep, by her boyfriend who then killed himself by shooting himself in the 
head.  
Having spoken to the victims’ families and witnessed the terrible injuries caused 
by the firearms I was determined to bring any offenders to justice on behalf of 
the victims and their families. That means bringing to justice, not only those who 
use the firearms but those who supply them unlawfully. I have also seen cases 
fail at court because they have not been investigated ethically and thoroughly, 
resulting in further anxiety for victims. This made me all the more determined to 
do the job properly and maintain the integrity of any investigation. 
There is a wide belief among police officers that they are there to provide a 
good service in all areas and levels of policing, not just in the investigation of 
firearms. This is reflected in aims and objectives in various police documents 
such as the quote given below from the objectives of one Metropolitan Police 
borough: 
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“To provide the best possible service to all members of our community 
who require our services, whether that be as a victim of crime, because 
of an accident or personal crisis or simply for advice. Our aim is to 
provide you with the same level of service, as we would expect for 
ourselves.” (Met Police 2015 – A10).  
And, whilst not all UK police officers believe the police service as a whole 
provide a good service, a recent survey of Metropolitan Police officers found 
that the majority want to provide a good service. In relation to their local team, 
eight out of ten police officers stated that they ‘take pride in delivering a quality 
service’ and six out of ten stated they were ‘clear about their priorities’ (Dodd 
2015 – B30, Met Police 2015a – A31).   
Serving police officers and police staff still regularly complain about a lack of 
resources, general poor moral and potential cuts due to austerity measures. 
This is reflected in staff surveys, for example one by the Metropolitan Police 
with results that indicated 51% overall satisfaction with the force and only 42% 
feeling motivated to work (Met Police 2015a – A31). This is balanced, in the 
survey, against the positives of taking pride in delivering a quality service and 
my own experience of officers and police staff, connected with firearms 
investigations, appreciating bringing an investigation to a successful conclusion. 
Such findings show that there is a need for more qualitative research interviews 
and observation of police officers and police staff to understand the current 
cultures, how and where they exist and how positive aspects of police culture 
can be harnessed to improve policing.  
The Chair of Hampshire Police Federation, representing rank and file officers102, 
answered questions on the fact that academia dwells on the negative police 
cultures by saying: 
"We ought to focus just as much on the positive as the negative. We 
joined the police to provide a good service for those we police" (Apter 
2014 - A10). 
                                                          
102 Officers of Constable, Sergeant and Inspector rank. 
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Network participants also have a philosophy of wanting to do the best for 
firearms victims. Whilst still a police officer, I witnessed a presentation by Alex 
on the need to improve firearms investigation. Alex put the victim first and 
showed pictures of all those killed by the use of firearms in the UK in recent 
years. Alex emphasised the need to be effective in managing the firearms threat 
on behalf of those victims and their families and to prevent more people 
becoming victims. 
The determination to seek justice for victims and reduce victims, by way of 
thorough ethical investigation, is not a universal motivation among police 
officers and that is evidenced by the literature on police culture (Chan 1996). 
Other nodes within the Network, including MI5, are also striving to promote an 
ethical culture and align it with the investigation of terrorists who are brutal to 
their victims103. They are doing that against a backdrop of allegations that some 
MI5 officers were involved in a culture that utilised intelligence obtained by way 
of torture (Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons 2007 – A25, Great 
Britain, Parliament, Houses of Lords and Commons 2009 – A25). Elsewhere in 
the Network there is a clear willingness to make things happen with nodes 
coming together to drive initiatives, as with EFE.  
However, the evidence from the literature cannot be ignored. Although there are 
differences of opinion on police culture, negative police culture does exist and it 
leads to negative outcomes such as poor investigations (Westmarland 2008). 
Even though there is a call to focus on the positives and a general willingness to 
work for the victim, the hard lessons learnt from failed domestic abuse and 
murder investigations still need to be embedded into the police metis. Police 
need to understand all aspects of domestic abuse. Policies, procedures and 
training need to be in place for the police to respond more effectively to 
victims104 (Hill 2011 – B30). Grieve (2008) states the lessons from the inquiries 
                                                          
103 “ I won’t dignify the group with its self-adopted propaganda label ‘Islamic State’. Scholars have rightly pointed out that it is 
neither ‘Islamic’, nor is it a state. Its true nature is visible to all from its visceral brutality – including the murder of hostages – and 
its indulgence of the very worst imaginable forms of treatment of other human beings…MI5 is made up of men and women who 
only joined to do the organisation’s work in a proper and ethical way and who only stay because that is the sort of organisation we 
are committed to remaining” (Parker 2015 - A10). 
104 IPCC Commissioner, Amerdeep Somal is quoted as saying of Nottinghamshire Police, “In (the case of Casey Brittle who was 
murdered after suffering continual domestic violence),  it is clear that a number of officers failed to perform to the level expected 
of them and basic actions that may have helped others see the full picture of (Brittle’s) suffering were not completed. However, it is 
clear that beside the failings of individual officers, Casey was significantly let down by systemic failures within Nottinghamshire 
Police” (Hill 2011). 
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into the murder of Stephen Lawrence and others still need to be high on the 
police training agenda and a report commissioned ten years after the original 
Macpherson Report on the murder confirms this. Many of Macpherson’s original 
recommendations have been acted on. However, the report concluded that in 
order to prevent a negative impact on community relations more needs to be 
done to reduce the imbalance of black and ethnic minorities subjected to stop 
and search by the police. Also, more needs to be done to recruit and retain 
black and ethnic minority police officers (Great Britain, Parliament, House of 
Commons 2009 – A25). 
The report by the Home Affairs Select Committee ten years after the original 
Macpherson Report also comments on some positive improvements in police 
culture. The report concludes that: 
“Police leaders have shown a clear commitment to increasing awareness 
of race as an issue throughout the service” (Great Britain, Parliament, 
House of Commons 2009 – A25, p7). 
In addition, the report highlights the use of appropriately trained family liaison 
officers for critical incidents: 
“Police witnesses cited this as key to improving homicide detection rates, 
which currently stand at 90%, the highest of any large city in the world” 
(Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons 2009 – A25, p3). 
The evidence of the positive aspects of police culture are shown, in this thesis, 
to exist within investigatory teams, particularly those that deal with serious and 
organised crime (Glomseth, Gottschalk and Soli-Saether 2007). This is probably 
because such teams have been singled out for being responsible for high profile 
miscarriages of justice and failed investigations. Therefore, investigatory teams 
needed to be the first to change.  
Whilst much is known about the culture of general police work, including the 
investigation of homicide, little is known about specialist investigation teams 
(Manning 2007). This thesis has examined specialists in firearms crime who use 
and disseminate intelligence to support the investigation of the firearms threat. 
As a result, it has been found that people from individual nation states come 
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together as a team to facilitate the workings of the Network and they and other 
specialists they work alongside have a positive outlook. It also appears that, 
contrary to much of the literature on police culture which leaves a negative 
imprint (Campeau 2015), there are positive aspects of police culture that can be 
found in general policing. This confirms Chan’s (1996) assertion that police 
culture is diverse and differs throughout policing. The study of the Network 
demonstrates the culture is not always negative but further research is required 
to show how widespread the positive aspects of police culture are.    
Overall, the people, their cultures and the culture in which they work impact on 
how the Network operates. A positive police culture leads to the sharing of 
knowledge and results in offences being detected, offenders being brought to 
justice and victims being supported (Glomseth, Gottschalk and Solli-Saether 
2007). The people in the Network are late modern in character and as such 
have adapted to globalisation to be willing to embrace change so far as it 
assists in dealing with the problem of the firearms threat. Some police appear to 
be more willing than others, but there is no evidence of a negative police culture 
in the Network, which could be ‘disastrous and costly’ to the police organisation 
(Heidenshon 2008, p645). In fact, there is clear evidence of positive aspects of 
police culture such as the team culture and if that culture is understood and 
enhanced it can be used to bring about positive changes in policing (Heeres 
2012).  
8.3 ‘Tools of Late Modernity’ that facilitate the Network 
There is a need for fast time intelligence to police the firearms threat. This leads 
people in the Network to search for best practice and embrace late modern 
tools. In particular they embrace technology, which in turn facilitates the 
operation of the Network. Jordan stresses the importance of fast time 
intelligence to NABIS and states that it is:  
"a core driver of NABIS".  
Jordan then moves on to describe some key IT that is used to gather, analyse 
and disseminate intelligence. Geri also talks of ballistic intelligence being linked 
with other intelligence using the NABIS database. In addition Chris explains that 
ACPO undertook a: 
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"Strategic Review of Firearms, (as part of) on going work in collaboration 
with ACPO CUF and the Home Office Police and Crime Standards 
Directorate remit to seek out good practice. (In doing so) attention was 
focused on developing contacts within countries making significant use of 
IBIS technology. "  
IBIS105 is operated alongside the NABIS database, which is used to log and 
manage the recovery, movement and forensic examination of ballistic items and 
firearms recovered by police forces, other LEAs in the UK and the UK military. 
The NABIS database can also be used to log information from crime scenes 
and about people, objects, other locations and events (ACPO 2011 - A15). 
NABIS intelligence staff and forensic scientists also have access to the Interpol 
server based in Lyon, France. The Interpol server is known as IBIN and it is a 
platform for logging and comparing ballistics information from recoveries by 
member countries. UK scientists helped to build the server and contribute to 
best practice on sharing ballistic data via IBIN (Interpol 2012 - A10, Interpol 
2012a - A15). 
Although UK police and LEAs contribute to IBIN via NABIS and the contribution 
helps facilitate the Network, no links have yet been established between the UK 
and ballistics or firearms recoveries in other nation states. As stated by Alex: 
"NABIS staff can research the Interpol server without reference to the 
originating countries and any hits have to be fully evidenced in 
accordance with the laws and procedures of the countries involved. This 
has to be done via the SLN……Scandinavian countries have had their 
IBIS systems linked for years but have never had a single crossover and 
(the UK) have run the IBIS system through Interpol for the last 18 
months. They've got five (member) countries on there so far and we've 
never had a single crossover."  
                                                          
105 IBIS technology was developed in Canada (FTI 2014 - A10) and is a 3D system, which automatically links bullets and cartridge 
cases to crime scenes and recovered firearms (ACPO 2011 - A15). It is used by several police forces and LEAs around the world (FTI 
2014 - A10) and in the UK it is operated by forensic scientists working for NABIS out of four forensic science hubs located in 
Birmingham, Manchester, London and Glasgow. The work of the forensic scientists at the NABIS hubs is also backed up by the use 
of up to date optical microscopes, forensic workshops and ranges for the test firing of recovered firearms. Those scientists also 
have access to firearms reference collections and other forensic techniques such as fingerprint enhancement and DNA profiling 
(ACPO 2011 - A15). 
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The evidence provided by Alex shows that the Interpol server adds to the 
knowledge that the criminal use and supply of firearms in itself is more nation 
state orientated than transnational at the point of delivery106. The transnational 
aspects of it tend to be orientated towards the legal side of the trade where 
criminals exploit the legal movement of firearms across nation state borders to 
divert them on to the illegal market and sale to end users for criminal use within 
nation states. Again this is evidence of the criminogenic nature of the firearms 
trade (Rothe and Collins 2010).  
Alex also evidences the continued importance of UK nation "state laws and 
procedure" and the need to "fully evidence" any intelligence gained from IBIS 
through the correct SLN channels. This means that the system is governed by 
UK nation state law and policy and any evidence obtained from IBIS will be 
tested in the UK courts. Rules of disclosure ensure that all intelligence that 
leads to the gathering of evidence is subject to testing in court before the Judge 
sitting alone or with a Jury. Therefore, all information and intelligence gathered, 
disseminated and analysed by the Network using IT, which leads to the 
gathering of evidence to bring anyone to trial in the UK is governed by UK law, 
policy and procedure.  
Even where the information or intelligence does not lead to the gathering of 
evidence to put individuals before the court; the gathering, dissemination, 
analysis and storage of that information and intelligence is governed by UK law 
such as RIPA and it is monitored by UK Surveillance Commissioners (Great 
Britain 2000 – A10). Therefore, MacVean’s (2008) assertion that accountability 
for intelligence and its governance is somewhat obscure is not quite the case. 
There is, however, room for further improvement of accountability and 
governance and with the proposed professionalisation of police intelligence 
gathering along the lines of professionalisation of police investigation (Paterson 
2014 – A10) there is scope for the establishment of further governance. 
By embracing IT, the Network aims to be one step ahead of those involved in 
the criminal use and supply of firearms. However, the fact that the use of the IT 
and the subsequent intelligence from it is closely governed by the UK nation 
                                                          
106 Although recent transnational activity between Belgium and France tends to suggest this is not the case in some mainland 
nation states in Europe (Papirblat 2015 – E40, Moftah 2015 – E40 and Waterfield 2015 – B30).   
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state means that the police and other LEAs are not at liberty to use IT as they 
wish. Unlike the criminals, who are not restricted in the use and acquisition of 
IT. They can obtain the best equipment and use it as they want to gain 
advantage over the police (Kenny 2008).  
There are however, some useful outcomes from the use of late modern tools 
which help build a better understanding of the firearms threat. For example, the 
use of forensic examination of ballistic material supported by IT such as IBIS 
can lead scientists and intelligence officers to infer the existence of firearms that 
have not been recovered from offenders. Alex uses the example of inferred 
firearms107 to show that the US is not always the place to go to find best 
practice and sometimes they are interested in UK techniques:  
"What I'd say is its great to sit down with people like ATF and talk…or get 
out of the meeting room and have a few beers and talk about these 
things and you really get a real sense of what goes on that yes straw 
purchase networks are a big deal for them. The idea that guns keep 
getting moved around and used when they have been used in a 
homicide is completely alien (to them). The idea that a firearm could be 
rented is completely alien, the process of creating inferred firearms is 
completely alien. … sometimes (it is suggested  that going) to America 
(to) learn how they do it (is best) where actually its a little bit of the other 
way round. Come to the UK and see how we do it, because (ATF) were 
fascinated by the idea of inferred firearms and tracking a firearm. Even 
though you don't physically have possession of it; its out there."  
Therefore, it does not always follow that policy transfer to the UK from the US 
based on presumed best practice by the US, takes place as it did with policy 
such as 'zero tolerance' (Garland 2000). Sometimes, the best practice and as 
such the best policy is developed by the UK nation state with the support of IT 
systems first developed in other nation states. That is not to say that policy 
transfer does not take place. Alex also talks about the introduction of a policy 
first implemented in Canada, where the fact that either partner in a report of 
                                                          
107 ‘An inferred firearm is created on the NABIS Database to illustrate the presence of a weapon that has been identified from 
recovered ballistic material however the firearm has yet to be recovered. This information is sent to forces where the inferred 
firearm has been identified, to enable them to know what firearms are being used in their force area’ (NABIS 2015 – A15). 
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domestic violence who has a firearm certificate is flagged for immediate review 
to make sure the firearm(s) held are not likely to be used to commit more 
serious domestic violence or even murder. Although not necessarily a 
transnational issue, domestic violence is nevertheless a problem in the UK and 
the policy is being examined through the Network by the FELWG (Great Britain, 
Parliament, House of Commons 2011 – A15). In addition, Chris talks about the 
involvement of the former head of a US police force being involved in the 
NABIP, which suggests some level of policy transfer from the US to the UK; 
particularly around the use of IBIS. 
Late modern cops do embrace the use of late modern tools that are spread to 
different nation states, with ease, by globalisation. However, the late modern 
cops in the UK make best use of  those tools in a way that deals with the threat 
to the UK nation state. They control what products they choose to use to deal 
with the threat. Those products are not forced on the late modern cops of the 
UK. There is a global market of policing products and services ranging from 
policy to IT and the independent UK late modern cops make careful choices on 
which product or service to use based on the firearms threat. Therefore, they 
operate glocally. 
As argued by Deflem (2002) in relation to democratic police forces, late modern 
UK cops in the Network have the benefit of independence from the political 
centre. As explained in chapters 6 and 7 the Network includes connections to 
the UK political centre, but that centre steers rather than controls policing and 
operational police work remains independent. Those late modern cops also 
have a firm bureaucratic IT infrastructure that allows them to work with the best 
tools, but obviously that does not follow in every nation state. I had the privilege 
of supervising a student who is a judicial investigator for the Kurdish region in 
Iraq. He was researching the possibility of setting up the NABIS system in Iraq 
and found it was a non-starter because of the lack of an established 
bureaucratic IT infrastructure in Iraq (Khleed 2012). Therefore, when making 
higher order comparisons and transferring criminal justice policy that is 
successful in the UK, the diversity of other nation states must be taken into 
account together with the power that each nation state wields in promoting the 
importance and success of their systems (Nelken 2012). 
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8.4 Summary Discussion on The People and 'The Tools of Late 
Modernity' that facilitate the Network 
None of the threat awareness, intelligence gathering, evidence gathering or 
nodal linking to form the Network, as a conduit from the local to the glocal and a 
facilitator of a glocal policing reconstruction, would take place without people 
and the tools that they have access to. People also facilitate the anchorage of 
the Network in the nation state. Those people have been identified in this thesis 
as late modern cops and they use late modern tools (Levi 2007) to facilitate the 
Network.  
As well as being driven by the firearms threat, late modern cops are motivated 
to facilitate the Network by wanting to support and prevent victims of gun crime 
and to be the best at preventing and detecting firearms crime. There is therefore, 
evidence of some positive aspects of police culture throughout the Network that 
makes for an overall investigative team work culture, which impacts positively 
on the investigation of crime, as identified by Glosmeth, Gottschalk and Soli-
Saether (2007) in other areas of crime investigation. 
Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) talk about transnational police actors (as they 
refer to them) having a 'sense of mission' (p82) to achieve results. In achieving 
their mission those actors can be divided into subcultures labelled as 
technicians, diplomats, entrepreneurs, public relation experts, legal experts, 
spies, field operators and enforcers. Whilst the sense of mission is productive, 
Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) warn that negative police cultures can exist in the 
way that transnational police actors achieve their mission just as much as they 
can with groups of police officers acting locally. They cite cultures based on 
racism and masculinity and are clear in their assessment that there is a lack of 
governance of transnational police actors because they exist beyond the nation 
state. They are adamant that it is no longer possible to rely on the law of the 
land to govern those working transnationally as sovereignty has become ‘fluid’ 
(p97). However, they ignore how and why police have a sense of mission and 
that the sense of mission can lead to self-governance and positive action based 
on their collective learning and understanding of how things get done or as 
Kenny (2008) puts it, their metis.  
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There is evidence of negative cultures amongst police officers in general (Chan 
1996), which will need careful management and strong leadership. However, 
police officers still like to work as part of a team to bring about positive results 
and in my experience, the metis of UK late modern cops has developed to 
include an understanding that if they are to adapt to be ahead of the criminals 
they need to carryout ethical investigations following correct policy and 
procedures based on the law of the land. They cannot take short cuts or the 
investigation will fall down and the criminals who escape conviction will then be 
ahead.  
The UK police metis has therefore developed a strong sense of ethics and it is 
evidenced by the Network participants whose work is transparent. Network 
activity is based on moral, justifiable, proportionate and relevant decision 
making and, as argued by MacVean and Neyroud (2012, p2), that decision 
making is based on a subjective judgement of what is right, what is wrong, what 
is reasonable and what is unreasonable. As evidenced in this chapter, Network 
participants and police officers do have moral principles. The UK police in 
general are now more transparent and that is evidenced in this thesis with the 
amount of OSINT that is available on the police, produced by the police. There 
have been some notable exceptions where police are accused of not being 
transparent enough (Stevens 2013 – A15), however, generally the UK police 
are only secretive when it is necessary to protect sources and operational 
tactics, when the same moral decision making takes place with respect for 
people, which Kleinig (1990, p3) identifies as necessary in ethical decision 
making. That includes all people involved in whatever activity takes place, 
whether it is the victim, the suspect, the police officer or any other person on 
who the activity impacts. Network activity and the decisions made, whether 
covert or overt, is governed by different nodes in the Network and by the law, 
judicial process and other processes, such as the Surveillance Commissioners 
(Great Britain 2000 – A10).  
Contrary to Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) assertion about the end of 
sovereign control of transnational policing, Network participants exercise self-
discipline and do not act beyond their own or other nation states law, policy and 
procedure. Late modern cops have what Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) identify 
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as 'self-belief in their legitimacy' (p152). Whilst that does not alone guarantee 
that what they are undertaking is legitimate policing (which includes a two way 
conversation with those who are policed as well as adherence to a recognised 
rule of law), it does contribute to the overall legitimacy of the Network and a 
positive aspect of police culture in that it promotes Glosmeth, Gottschalk and 
Soli-Saether’s (2007) team work culture. 
The Network participants are also governed by other UK nodes in the Network, 
who set parameters and priorities. Such governance from other nodes, together 
with self-discipline, continues to develop the metis of the late modern cops in 
the Network. That metis has developed in such a way that the evidence from 
the Network is that the predominant subculture that exists transnationally is the 
problem solving diplomat. This challenges Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) who 
promote the diplomat as their favoured subculture but see the enforcer as the 
current dominant subculture.  
The diplomatic SLN, and other ILOs identified by the research for this thesis, is 
supported by ILOs who are technicians, entrepreneurs and public relations 
experts all working in a positive sense. They are willing and able to adopt glocal 
policing as the way forward (Heeres 2012) rather than be part of a global police 
state (Westmarland 2010). Diplomacy has been used to negotiate MOUs with 
the ATF and to request firearms manufacturers to refrain from exporting their 
particular product to the UK. There is no evidence of enforcers taking the lead 
at the transnational level as Bowling and Sheptyki (2012) suggest. In my 
experience, and as evidenced by Network participants and OSINT, enforcement 
takes place at the local nation state level as a result of the gathering and 
disseminating of intelligence transnationally and locally. 
The findings from the Network show that the mission discussed by Bowling and 
Sheptycki (2012) exists, but it exists in such a way that it is a positive aspect of 
police culture. The mission is to police the firearms threat. As the illicit market 
which forms part of the threat is, as Hobbs (1998) terms it, glocal, there is a 
need to engage on a transnational basis as part of a wider glocal policing 
process to find practical solutions from the global to deal with the local threat. 
Such engagement is evidence of Deflem’s (2002) policeization.  
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Therefore, the mission to police the firearms threat drives the facilitation of the 
Network by late modern cops who in my experience are increasingly ethical108.  
Those late modern cops are motivated to undertake the mission by a 
determination to want to do their best for the victims. That determination is 
again the result of collective learning or metis which is drawn from years of 
experience of dealing with victims and their families and passing on that 
experience to others. It is also a positive aspect of police culture in itself which 
leads to other positive outcomes such as seeking out best practice and wanting 
to be the best at preventing and detecting the criminal use and supply of 
firearms. 
The research for this thesis has not identified any obvious evidence of a 
negative police culture in the Network. There is potential for parochialism, which 
can arise out of wanting to be the best and making the sovereign state the be all 
and end all leading to a lack of transnational development. Such parochialism 
can have the effect of keeping the Network secured within the nation state, 
which would, according to Westmarland (2011), be seen as a positive step by 
some politicians. However, the stifling of transnational policing would, as 
evidenced, by Network participants, reduce policing opportunities for dealing 
with the firearms threat. It would also make policing clearly nation state based 
and less likely to achieve the glocal reconstruction, which this thesis supports. 
In facilitating the Network, the late modern cops make the best use of IT. As a 
consequence IT also helps to facilitate the Network by satisfying its nodal needs 
for such products as fast time intelligence. IT has been developed by the private 
sector nodes (FTI) working for themselves and together with Network 
participants to secure, among others, the installation of an information sharing 
server at Interpol. The Network participants who use the IT, such as the Interpol 
server IBIN, emphasise the need for the governance of the use of such 
                                                          
108 It is difficult to measure an increase in ethical values. However, when discussing ethics, MacVean and Neyroud (2012, p3) argue 
that police are ‘increasingly being asked to account not just for the decisions they make, but also for the way they have made 
them’. Therefore, there is a need for the police to be increasingly ethical in their decision making. In my experience, in the last 30 
years, the UK police have changed the way they think about their decisions and how they record the process. When I first joined 
the police, my colleagues and I recorded our action in pocket books and detective diaries and SIOs recorded some policy decisions. 
The record made, tended to be what the action or decision was, rather than how and why a particular decision had been made or 
a particular action taken, based on what MacVean and Neyroud (2012, p2) argue is a judgement about what is morally right or 
wrong and what is reasonable or unreasonable. Now police officers, in particular detectives, keep detailed day books and policy 
books recording more detail about how and why they make particular decisions and those books are regularly examined during 
cross examination in court. My policy decisions around the use of previous offenders as witnesses were subjected to close 
examination by the defence team representing the Greenwoods in the Operation Barker case. 
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technology. Also, where appropriate, that any intelligence obtained via the use 
of IT, which is turned into evidence for court, is evidenced correctly through the 
correct SLN channels. Such intelligence is governed by clear law and policy in 
the UK derived from the laws on disclosure and legislation such as RIPA (Great 
Britain 2000). 
The late modern cops and the late modern tools that they use confirm further 
that the threat drives the Network. Policing the threat is the mission, which is 
underpinned by positive aspects of police culture. A team culture exists where 
the willing and able are motivated to take part in policeization and achieve their 
mission by a determination to do the best for the victims of gun crime and be 
the best at policing the firearms threat. As such, the team participate in 
transnational policing, using the best available tools, as part of a wider glocal 
policing process. They facilitate the Network and glocaliastion of policing to 
develop nation state policing. The literature overlooks how networks are 
developed and tends to demonstrate that policing is slowed down by a negative 
police culture. However, the presentation of the findings in this chapter 
evidences the existence of positive aspects of police culture within the Network, 
which embrace change and facilitate the development of policing.   
This chapter is the last of four, which present the research findings. Overall, the 
findings identify the existence of more nodes than can be found in the existing 
literature and show that the Network is a facilitator of the glocal reconstruction 
of policing. That reconstruction will now be fully explained in part III of this 
thesis. The explanation will be by way of a comparison of the findings with the 
current literature. This results in an enhancement, as well as a challenge, to the 
literature and the theory of global policing suggested by Bowling and Sheptycki 
(2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard John Severns 19035736 The 'Network' 
  
214 
PART III - THE 
RECONSTRUCTION 
Chapter 9 - New Evidence to Challenge Existing Literature and Theory 
9.1 Introducing the Challenge 
This critical discussion does not make generalisations about transnational 
policing in itself. Instead, it proposes some generalisations in relation to the 
transnational policing of one area of crime by UK police and how that impacts 
on the reconstruction of policing in the UK. Those proposals are made from a 
UK standpoint. The detailed examination of how the Network operates offers a 
blue print for comparison with other nodal networks and the potential to 
generalise the glocal nature of NCA policing in all areas of organised crime. 
The findings in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 support the thesis that the Network leads 
to a glocal reconstruction of policing, which includes pluralistic transnational 
policing. The Network is more than a conduit for the gathering and 
dissemination of intelligence. It is also a network for the exchange of knowledge, 
policy transfer, police disruption of the illicit firearms market and gathering of 
evidence for court.  
The Network is however, intelligence led and the gathering and dissemination of 
intelligence is driven by the firearms threat. The threat is glocal and that is 
clearly understood by the UK participants in the Network. This understanding 
causes Network participants to seek out other nation state police, with a similar 
understanding, to develop the Network on a transnational basis in order to deal 
with the glocal problem by way of glocal policing. The development of the 
Network is facilitated by people and the tools from late modernity. The people 
(who are ‘late modern cops') make use of the tools to achieve their mission of 
policing the firearms threat. They are motivated by wanting to do their best for 
victims of gun crime and to be the best at what they do. 
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Overall, the Network, from a UK point of view, is anchored within the nation 
state. It is a development of nation state policing within a glocal policing 
philosophy, rather than a reconstruction that leads to a global police state or a 
reconstruction dominated by private policing. The current literature identifies 
some understanding of the Network and wider transnational policing but it 
suggests that policing is moving away from the nation state towards a global 
police state. 
The latest literature to emphasise the move towards the global is Bowling and 
Sheptycki's (2012) 'Global Policing’. Bowling and Sheptyki (2012) summarise 
the evidence available in the literature and put forward a theory of global 
policing. That global policing theory is closely aligned with the grounded theory 
findings that support this thesis, but there are differences. Therefore, it will be 
the focus of the main critique discussed in this chapter. 
Global policing theory and the majority of the current literature emphasises a 
move towards a global police state. However, it tends towards broad brush 
assumptions about direct connections between the nodes of nation state 
policing and policing nodes such as the regional Europol node and Interpol, 
which is often referred to as supranational in the literature but only in terms of 
its independence, rather than as a supranational police force with executive 
powers (see Finjaut 2012). The literature does not examine the nodes that exist 
between nation state nodes, regional nodes and supranational nodes, which put 
a different viewpoint on where the power lies in transnational policing. Shearing 
and Johnstone (2010) promote detailed nodal network analysis to analyse 
global governance at all levels. Such analysis of the Network shows the power 
is still in the favour of nation state police who are developing transnational 
policing in a glocal way to deal with glocal problems in their own nation state.  
Therefore, this thesis suggests an alternative global policing theory to Bowling 
and Sheptyki’s (2012) and draws out an understanding of the firearms threat. 
The research findings indicate that policing is not fully global but it appears to 
be glocal. Even though the evidence in this thesis only focuses on the view from 
the UK nation state and the policing of one crime type, it is a detailed analysis of 
the crime and the policing of it. The research did not set out with any 
preconceived ideas about global policing theory. Bowling and Sheptyki's (2012) 
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theory was published during the analysis phase for this thesis. By then, the 
grounded evidence that was emerging indicated that transnational policing of 
the firearms threat was a development of nation state policing that remained 
anchored within the UK as part of a glocal process.  
In addition, the crime type and the UK nation state was chosen because of my 
location and experience. Therefore, what are the odds of picking one nation 
state and one crime area out all those available and coming up with the only 
one where the evidence points to the power still being with the nation state. It 
suggests that further detailed grounded research with other nation states and 
various crime types will draw out similar evidence. 
That said, Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) have pulled together evidence from 
various nation states where they examine various levels and spheres of policing 
together with a brief examination of the crimes being policed. They indicate that 
the architecture of global policing should be examined through high and low 
policing across the spheres of global, regional, national and glocal policing, all 
of which can be found within the Network. They also talk about an influential 
subculture of police who shape policing towards the global in a dimension 
outside the nation state.  
Evidence of the subcultures can be found within the Network, but this thesis 
shows that they are a part of a willing team, which Heeres (2012) states is 
necessary to develop glocal policing. The Network team is driven by threats to 
their own nation state and motivated by wanting to do their best for victims and 
to be the best at what they do. This puts them one step ahead of the criminals 
in terms of Kenny’s (2008) competitive adaptation. They also remain 
accountable to their own nation state and that, together with the threat, is what 
shapes transnational policing.  
This thesis has drawn out evidence that transnational policing of the firearms 
threat is a development of nation state policing. The roots of transnational 
policing remain within the nation state and confirm Bowling and Sheptycki’s 
(2012) assertion (when referring to Edwards and Gill 2002) that policing 
remains ‘local at all points’ (p22). Therefore, transnational policing in terms of 
the Network is the way in which glocal policing delivers the global to the local. 
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Local police use the transnational links to seek products from a global policing 
market to deal with the local impact of a glocal criminal threat. In dealing with 
the local impact of the threat, further transnational policing takes place where 
UK police travel to another nation state to seek their assistance in dealing with 
the local threat. Transnational policing through the Network involves links with 
international nodes such as Interpol as well as the local nation state high and 
low policing nodes. There is no evidence of supranational policing which, 
according to Finjaut (2012), is where co-operation between police from different 
nation states leads to the creation of supranational police forces that have 
executive powers in various nation states.  
As identified by Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) the links between the different 
nodes make up the global policing network, but from the point of view of the 
Network the policing that takes place is moulded in a glocal philosophy of 
dealing with a glocal crime by way of a glocal response. The emphasis is on the 
glocal being delivered by an organised subculture of police, anchored in the 
nation state, dominated by diplomatic policing methods, rather than, as argued 
by Bowling and Sheptycki (2012), global policing delivered by a subculture of 
police dominated by enforcers, who spread global insecurity through a global 
network and undermine nation state policing.  
The alternative glocal concept of policing proposed by this thesis can be 
explained in more detail by comparing the research findings with the original 
literature and with Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) global policing theory. That 
comparison follows. It challenges and enhances the literature, starting with a 
comparison of the thesis with Bayley and Shearing’s (2001) research agenda. 
9.2 Challenging Bayley and Shearing (2001), The Findings v The 
Reconstruction Research Agenda 
Policing has been under scrutiny since the formation of the modern police in 
1829. This gathered pace in the 1960s because of a crisis of legitimacy 
(Rumbaut and Bittner 1979). Bayley and Shearing (2001) called for continued 
scrutiny and research on the reconstruction of policing. They set out a potential 
research agenda based on their own findings. They claimed that the auspices 
and provision of policing are no longer the sole responsibility of nation state 
Richard John Severns 19035736 The 'Network' 
  
218 
governments. Governments tend to steer policing and the auspices and 
providers of policing are a mix of public and private. The emphasis of the mix is 
on the private which takes the control of policing away from the nation state.  
This thesis analyses one aspect of transnational policing (the Network) to see if 
the reconstruction of policing identified by Bayley and Shearing (2001) exists 
within transnational and global policing. The suggestion from the thesis findings 
is that the reconstruction of policing is not towards a global police state or to 
private auspices and providers. The reconstruction is towards the glocal, where 
the nation state public police retain control of policing from the local to the 
global. They take part in pluralistic transnational policing together with other UK 
public organisations as part of the glocal process. The UK public police identify 
the services and products they need to use from a global policing arena, in 
order to respond to the firearms threat. This is evidenced by the use of the SLN 
and also the purchase of IBIS from FTI. 
Bayley and Shearing (2001) state that any developments in the policing 
structure should be subject to constant monitoring to ensure it is effective. 
Monitoring has and should continue within a framework of legitimacy and from a 
number of angles. This has been reinforced recently with closer working 
between academics and the police on the future of UK policing (Bottoms 2014 - 
A15, Gregg 2014 - A15). This thesis has shown the police are effective in 
adapting to deal with the threat. It has also analysed the legitimacy of policing 
through the Network, what the Network consists of, how the Network is 
constructed, how it operates and the impact it has on the reconstruction of 
policing. The analysis has taken place within the wider framework of a theory of 
global policing put forward by Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) and, the research 
findings suggest that, from a UK police standpoint, the Network is legitimate. A 
self-belief in legitimacy exists on the part of the people in the Network, they act 
in line with UK law and policy, making ethical decisions and the Network 
includes nodes that enable a two way conversation between the police and 
those they police. In addition, nodes in the Network hold the police to account 
and govern their actions and decisions.  
Bayley and Shearing (2001) do not look to change the theory of social control 
which underpins the definitions of policing, instead they examine the physical 
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protection that policing provides, "…because that is what people want most 
from the police" (p3). That is the case in the UK where community policing by 
the public police in a pluralistic partnership with other UK Government agencies 
is predominant because that is what the people of the UK want as their 
protection (Baggott 2007). This thesis has found that the Network places the 
physical firearms threat as a priority. Based on the actual recovery of illegal 
firearms and their criminal use, the threat is real, it is not the deliberate 
spreading of insecurity to increase securitisation, which is what Bigo indicates 
some ILOs take part in (2000). Neither is it an elevation of risk to justify the 
existence of a network (Ericson and Haggerty 1997, Bigo 2000).  
To deal with the firearms threat, intelligence is collected and police action is 
taken locally and transnationally by the UK public police working in partnership 
with other UK and other nation state organisations. The main partnership is 
between the UK public police and other UK Government agencies. The case 
study on the BBM is a good example of a pluralistic transnational solution to a 
community problem in the UK nation state. 
Bayley and Shearing (2001) set out to review what was known about the 
restructuring of policing and based their findings on synthesising what others 
had already discovered from policing research around the world. This thesis has 
produced first-hand evidence from people involved in the Network and it is 
supported by OSINT and my own experiences of the Network and policing. 
Although this thesis only focuses on one area of policing from the standpoint of 
one nation state, the aim of the thesis is similar to Bayley and Shearing's (2001) 
in that it identifies and then analyses any reconstruction that is taking place. It 
does that by placing the findings in themes that examine the threat, how the 
Network is constructed, and how it is facilitated. The themes were continually 
analysed to see what impact the Network has on the reconstruction of policing.  
The thesis findings differ from Bayley and Shearing's (2001) analysis. The 
concepts and terminology that are drawn from the findings by way of grounded 
theory analysis are that the glocal nature of the Network is a response to a 
glocal nature of the threat. That response is by way of pluralistic transnational 
public policing, which is part of a wider glocal response, by people who are 
motivated to do their best for the communities in the UK; in particular  the 
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victims of firearms crime. Those people have been identified as late modern 
cops and they are the 'willing and able' who Heeres (2012, p118) seeks out as 
the culture required to take glocal policing forward. 
Bayley and Shearing (2001) find that policing has changed and that nation state 
governments no longer hold the monopoly on the auspices and provision of 
policing. They point to multilateralization by governments as a reason for this 
move. The thesis findings show that the UK Government do encourage 
multilateralization through plural policing with other partners. However, the 
government continue to set out the policing agenda and in respect of the 
Network and transnational policing in general, they provide a framework in 
which the police have operational independence.  
The UK Government set up TRBs and the NCA to work on a local to global 
basis. The TRBs have led to the control of transnational policing and 
intelligence gathering activity by public police who operate independently of the 
government. In dealing with the threat, the police decide to work in partnership 
with other UK public organisations within a nodal network and with the public 
police in other nation states. They have contact with private commercial 
providers, such as FTI, who provide policing products, but only because they 
choose to do so after careful assessment of the value of the product in helping 
to deal with the threat.  
The police also have contact with other private commercial providers such as 
Bruni in Italy, but only from the point of view of diplomatic encouragement to 
deal with the criminogenic nature of the firearms industry, by asking Bruni to 
refrain from providing a product to the UK that is used in criminal activity there. 
Therefore, the government steer the policing of firearms in the UK and the 
police have the operational independence to deal with it.  
There is no evidence of any other private organisations groups like FTI or 
private policing providers such as G4S, taking responsibility for authorising and 
providing the policing of the firearms threat. Multilateralization of UK policing 
has not led to privatisation of policing through the Network and there is no 
evidence of the UK police taking part in any private transnational policing in 
general. The Network leans towards national sovereignty, mainly due to the 
people who facilitate the Network being loyal to the UK nation state nodes, 
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governed by UK law, policy and procedure, which prioritise the threat to the UK 
and its communities, rather than being drawn into a subculture of self-interest 
contributing to a global network of insecurity that undermines nation state 
policing. As emphasised by Geri and others: 
"Anything that (we) do on a transnational basis has to adhere to UK law, 
policy and procedure."  
The police in the UK still reflect the will of the sovereign nation state and 
represent government policy in action (Rumbaut and Bittner 1979). It is, 
however, important to remain vigilant (Bayley and Shearing 2001) to ensure that 
policing through the Network remains legitimate. That legitimacy must exist 
(Bottoms and Tankebe 2012), whether the people of the UK choose to remain 
sovereign in their policing, as this thesis suggests, or if they choose to allow a 
move towards a more global form of policing, which Bayley and Shearing (2001) 
and the wider literature suggest is already in existence.   
9.3 Enhancing Clarke (1997) and others, Glocal Criminogenic Threats 
and Rational Choices 
According to Bowling and Sheptycki (2012, p128) ‘The Global Cops Have 
Arrived’. This thesis agrees that global cops exist but they have a strong 
allegiance to the nation state and they are driven by the threat to the nation 
state. Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) indicate that firearms are one threat among 
many that global cops deal with. They add that if as much effort and resources 
were put into policing firearms trafficking as into the policing of drug trafficking 
then certain areas of the world where socially excluded nation states exist 
would be better for it. Violence occurs on a regular basis in those nation states 
as a result of a number of factors, which include the availability of firearms and 
drug trafficking. 
Transnational policing does cover a number of crime types (Reichel 2005). 
However, the firearms threat is the focus of this thesis. The literature identifies a 
threat to society from firearms used and supplied, in the main, by organised 
criminals; but also by terrorists (Bruggeman 2008, Jojarth 2009, Rollins 2010). 
That threat extends to the UK with recent reporting of a potential Mumbai style 
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massacre threat109 (Hayman 2010 - B30, BBC 2010a and 2010b - B30, Police 
News 2010a and 2010c - B30). In fact, the terrorist murder of a soldier in 
Woolwich, in May 2013, involved a terrorist wielding a hand gun; although it is 
suspected that his aim was (other than terrorising the large public audience he 
attracted through the media) to draw the police into shooting him dead. The 
firearm used was an antique and it is not clear whether the terrorists intended or 
tried to obtain reliable firearms to kill more people. However, one inference 
which could be drawn and is in need of further research, is that al-Qaeda 
inspired terrorists in the UK do seek to use firearms, but they lack a readily 
available stock of up to date firearms and ammunition. 
The lack of availability of reliable live firearms is also evidenced in the research 
findings with a study of Operation Barker, where one terrorist suspect, having 
no other obvious means of obtaining a firearm, went to an OCG to obtain the 
raw materials to reactivate a deactivated firearm. He did this despite the fact 
that reactivated and converted firearms, although deadly, can be unreliable (as 
evidenced by Alex in chapter 5.2) and the fact that there is a school of thought 
that terrorists with al-Qaeda sympathies are discouraged from dealing with 
OCGs. That discouragement does, however, come with a caveat that such 
terrorists can deal with OCGs if they have to do so (Rollins 2010, p27). 
The literature indicates that the illicit firearms market is glocal. However, the 
findings give more detailed evidence on how it is glocal. It is well evidenced by 
Operation Barker, the BBM problem and the views of the research participants. 
The legal global dealing in live firearms and blank firearms provides local 
people, with criminal intentions, the ability to adapt and legally access that 
global market. UK dealers with the appropriate licence import the live firearms 
traded on the global market by armed forces and LEAs from various nation 
states that are in the process of renewing their old stock. Those licensed 
dealers then deactivate the firearms and sell them on to the collectors market 
where they are purchased for illegal reactivation by criminals. Similarly, retailers 
                                                          
109 Heightened by the recent firearms attack on the premises of Charlie Hebdo in Paris and subsequent events. They happened 
over a number of days in January 2015, when 17 people were shot dead by suspected terrorists, one purporting to represent 
Islamic State and two al-Qaeda in the Yemen (Mullin et al 2015 – B20). 
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legally import blank firers and by way of further adaptation those blank firers are 
targeted for bulk purchase, by criminals, for conversion into live firearms. 
The Woolwich attack was also evidence of the glocal threat of terrorism to the 
UK. That has been experienced on more than one occasion where persons 
local to the UK carry out independent acts of terrorism, alone or with other 
locals, having been influenced by a global religious terrorist ideology (White 
2005, Andrew 2009, Bettison 2009, Great Britain, Home Office 2011c - A15, 
MI5 2013 - A10). That glocal threat extends to organised crime where local 
criminal activity is influenced by both the licit and illicit global markets (Hobbs 
1998). It also impacts, as articulated in the findings, on the forming of the nexus 
between organised crime and terrorists (Severns 2012). 
As alluded to in explaining the glocal, the illicit firearms market is influenced by 
the licit global firearms market. It is evidence of the criminogenic nature of the 
firearms industry where legal firearms can easily become illegal and available to 
criminals for use and supply. The illicit market is regularly fed through 
reactivation, conversion, theft and fraud and this is captured in the literature 
(Hales, Lewis and Silverstone 2006, Rothe and Collins 2010) and clearly 
articulated and explained in the research findings.  
This criminogenic activity is also evidenced in the literature with reference to 
firearms purchased legally in the US and smuggled illegally into the UK 
(Harrington 2011). However, the amount and type of illegal smuggling is not as 
widely evidenced or as clearly explained as it is by the findings for this thesis. 
Overall, the literature indicates there is a firearms threat and that the illicit 
market should be policed effectively. The stock of illicit firearms and the trade in 
them is generally UK centric with some smuggling of new live firearms into the 
UK. The transnational element tends to be criminogenic with legal imports of 
blank firing and deactivated firearms being exploited by UK based criminals for 
conversion and reactivation, respectively, in the UK (Hales, Lewis and 
Silverstone 2006). The criminogenic and glocal nature of the threat can be 
broken down into a crime script involving criminals who make rational choices. 
This crime scripting of rational choice criminals enables SCP to take place by 
targeting any loop holes, or easy targets that the criminals exploit, for policing 
action (Clarke 1997, Tierney 2009). 
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Finjaut (2012) claims that the traditional view is that transnational crime is 
driven by globalisation of policing. However, he states the threat and the drive is 
underpinned by people. People are behind the threat and people drive the 
policing response. The research findings and crime script analysis complement 
this. The firearms threat drives the Network rather than the globalisation of 
policing and it is people who are behind the firearms threat. People feature in 
Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) assertion that there are complicated links 
between drug trafficking and the threat from firearms. The research findings 
show that the link occurs where small illicit shipments of firearms are found 
smuggled into the UK with larger consignments of smuggled controlled drugs. In 
addition, firearms are held by drug dealers to protect themselves and their 
interests or to enforce the collection of drug debts. Such use of firearms in the 
drugs trade accords with Levi’s (2007) definition of OCGs and their use of 
violence to protect their criminal activity and profits.  
The previously mentioned socially excluded nation states, where there is little or 
no local or transnational policing of the criminal use and supply of firearms, 
highlight the need to restrict the availability of firearms for criminal use by 
people (Bowling and Sheptyki 2012). Clearly, the UK is not a socially excluded 
nation state where there is wide availability of illicit firearms and the research 
evidence shows that firearms are well policed in the UK through strict legislation 
on legal ownership and possession, as well as on illegal firearms activity. This is 
complemented by strict control of the UK borders and Sutton, Schneider and 
Hetherington’s (2001) partnership working via the Network, to prevent market 
displacement.  
As a result, there is little availability of firearms for criminal use and supply and 
little opportunity for the smuggling of firearms. By reducing the availability of 
firearms, the capability of the criminal is reduced and that appears to be part of 
the knowledge that can be drawn from recent glocal terrorist activity impacting 
on the UK, where terrorists have tried to use firearms. Knowledge results from 
information and intelligence (Ronn and Hoffding 2012)  and intelligence is a 
core business of the Network. 
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9.4 Enhancing Kenny (2008) and others, Challenging Bowling and 
Sheptyki’s (2012) Subcultures 
According to the findings, displacement of criminal activity in the illicit firearms 
market does occur. Such displacement is identified in other illicit markets by 
Sutton, Schneider and Hetherington (2001). The lack of availability of firearms 
in the UK does cause displacement where criminals acquire metis and adapt 
their methods to find new ways of accessing firearms and staying one step 
ahead of the police. Through years of collective learning, according to Kenny 
(2008), they develop metis, which is the knowledge, cunning and ability to adapt. 
That criminal adaptation and the people involved in the crime script making 
rational choices to adapt (Cornish and Clarke 2002) are clearly identified by the 
research findings. Such articulation of how the criminals adapt gives the police 
the opportunity to adapt and develop their own metis (Kenny 2008). That 
enables them to police the firearms threat and be one step ahead of the 
criminals. 
The Network participants have a better understanding of the adapting firearms 
threat. That understanding has, in my experience, developed well since 1999 
and is well articulated by the findings; more so than in the current literature. 
According to the findings, the UK threat comes mainly from criminals being able 
to access a stock of legally available deactivated and blank firearms, which they 
are able to reactivate and convert into live firearms through a nodal networked 
market.  
That illicit market also receives a small amount of stolen firearms and smuggled 
stock from Europe and more recently from the US, as a result of criminal 
adaptation. The market is, as stated in the literature, very much UK centric. Not 
only do conversions and reactivations take place but firearms, which have 
already been converted, reactivated or otherwise illegally obtained, are stored in 
the UK by ‘quartermaster’ criminals. Those quartermasters are described by 
Network participants as another recent development. They are middlemen who 
have no particular allegiances and they make their profit by hiring out firearms 
for criminal use. 
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The illicit UK market is glocal and through increased adaptation the 
criminogenic nature of the firearms industry is exploited by criminals. It is an 
illicit nodal networked market and it is underpinned by what people do (Finjaut 
2012). The Greenwoods who were the subjects of Operation Barker were a 
node in that network. As and when required they linked with other nodes to sell 
the raw materials and requisite knowledge to reactivate a deactivated firearm, 
developing their own and others’ metis. The other nodes that they connected 
with in the network were varied and included those involved in reactivation, 
further illegal supply and criminal use of firearms. Some of the nodes included 
other OCGs and some terrorists, from more than one phase of terrorism, which 
made the illicit market a nodal networked nexus of criminals and terrorists 
motivated by profit and need respectively. All adapted in various ways, in 
response to changes in legislation or the closing down of sources, in order to be 
able to obtain firearms (Severns 2012). 
Even though the Greenwoods and a large part of the reactivation market was 
disrupted by Operation Barker and other similar operations by the UK police, 
the illicit market still exists. That market is still best explained as a nodal 
networked glocal criminogenic market with the new influential node being the 
‘middlemen’ exploiting the existing stock of illegal firearms and the occasional 
smuggled firearm. The illicit UK market is a threat that causes the police to 
respond both proactively and reactively to develop nation state policing to 
include the transnational via the Network. They develop partnerships through 
the Network to reduce the illicit market and prevent market displacement 
(Sutton, Schneider and Hetherington 2001), which includes criminals adapting 
their operating methods (Kenny 2008). 
Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) theorise the global policing response to dealing 
with crime. They state that the response is moving away from the control of 
nation state police towards global policing. It involves various subcultures of 
police actors, who lack overall governance, working within an ‘architecture’ of 
global, regional, national and glocal spheres rather than as a global police force. 
It represents a move towards a global police state, identified in the wider 
literature (see Westmarland 2010), where policing of the nation-state is 
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controlled from the outside. Bowling and Sheptyki (2012) would expect the 
Network to follow suit in response to the firearms threat. 
The police actors operate in a subculture of policing that is not always perfect 
and their metis includes learning how to cope with the demands of the policing 
job and the various parameters set by managers, politicians, legislation and 
advances in IT. As a result, the metis can lead to groups of police actors being 
defensive of their actions. Sometimes those actions are not carried out as they 
should be, even if the police, as most do, have a sense of mission to get the job 
done and stay one step ahead of the criminals (Kenny 2008, Bowling and 
Sheptycki 2012). 
Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) police actors operate at all levels of policing 
including the local and the global and there is evidence of their existence in the 
Network. However, the Network is populated more by a subculture of diplomatic 
problem solvers, whereas Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) suggest the existence 
of an abundance of ‘enforcers’, at all levels, who stifle problem solving. They 
shift global policing in their favour and towards a global police state of enforcers 
waging a ‘war on crime’. 
To understand how the subculture of Network actors differs from Bowling and 
Sheptycki’s (2012, p87-92) subculture of police actors, they are best analysed 
by way of a direct critical comparison: 
 ‘Technicians’ (p87) use technical surveillance to gather information for 
intelligence and evidence. They use a range of analytical tools such as 
the identification of hot spots. They can be hampered by surveillance and 
intelligence systems that are fallible. Their role in operating such systems 
can impact on the freedom of the individual (Bowling and Sheptycki 
2012).  
Such technicians exist within the Network however, they are more 
concerned with the development and governance of forensic intelligence 
systems and merging them with human intelligence systems. They are 
employed by the public police but do work on IBIS developed by the 
private commercial sector. Although there is wide acceptance that 
intelligence is fallible and has to be subject of rigorous grading (Ronn 
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and Hofding 2012), there is no indication that IBIS and the recent 
development of IBIN produced by the Network technicians has impacted 
on the freedom of anyone.  
 ‘Diplomats’ (p88) are fully aware of the law, practice and procedure in 
various areas of policing. They are experts in language and cross border 
working. According to Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) they are a rare but 
valuable commodity in policing and there should be a push for them to 
take the lead in all areas of policing. Although there is no evidence of 
their specific expertise such diplomats do exist within the Network. The 
policy of the Network appears to be intelligence led problem solving 
which relies on diplomats. Enforcers are only used when it is necessary 
and proportionate to do so, based on best practice and good intelligence. 
The research participants do not give specific details of intelligence they 
receive and are of the opinion that a lot of what is gathered on a 
transnational basis is strategic intelligence. They emphasise the use of 
the 5x5x5 intelligence assessment system and do have an eye on the 
‘why’ ‘what if’ and ‘what next’, which suggests a degree of holistic 
epistemological strategic intelligence gathering to aid problem solving 
and proactive police work as called for by Akhgar and Yates (2011a). 
There is evidence of a whole Network strategic diplomatic approach to 
policing the firearms threat. The Network participants, including the NCA 
DG, are asserting that they are fully signed up to NIM. As such, the 
strategic aims, objectives and actions will be subject to regular review, 
evaluation and management of resources in line with Johnson and 
Scholes (1998) explanation of strategy. Even though there is no agreed 
academic definition for law enforcement strategy and it depends on the 
level of government or policing where it is drawn up (Ratcliffe 2004, 
Akhgar et al 2013), by the principles of Johnson and Scholes (1998), the 
Network is a strategic problem solving network.  
 ‘Entrepreneurs’ (p88) sell policing styles such as zero tolerance policing. 
They operate like business men looking for opportunities to advance their 
product. Whilst they can promote change for the good it can leave them 
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open to corruption (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). However, there is no 
evidence of corrupt practices in the Network. Entrepreneurs exist and 
they include public police and private technicians selling advances in IT 
and the policing systems in which the IT is operated. There is a need to 
be aware of any conflict of interests that may occur (Rowe 2014) as FTI 
work with NABIS and with Interpol for their mutual benefit. However, FTI 
are not pluralised into policing. They sell a product on the global market 
which the police buy and use locally. 
 ‘Public Relations (PR) Experts’ (p89) promote success using all types of 
media. According to Bowling and Sheptycki (2012), those successes and 
the police as a whole are not always all they are made out to be by the 
PR rhetoric. This is supported by other evidence in the literature, 
particularly on the culture of policing (Paoline et al 2006) and in some 
cases the PR can be put out too soon; giving a false picture of the case 
(Greer and McLaughlin 2010). PR is used by the Network participants to 
help bring about change. It is used to show different nodes in a good 
public light. It is also used to attract other policing nodes to be fully 
engaged in the Network and NABIS are particularly adept at this. The PR 
experts and the entrepreneurs in the Network tend to be one and the 
same. 
 ‘Legal Aces’ (p90) bring cases to court to promote changes in legislation 
and increasingly look to the civil law to manage serious and organised 
crime. They are able to use the law to the best advantage of the police or 
to protect the police from counter claims (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). 
There is little evidence of actual legal aces in the Network. However, 
those working in the UK as part of the Network do rely on the legal 
expertise of those working in the NCA to formalise evidence gathering 
from other nation states through the former SLN (College of Policing 
2014a - A10, Great Britain, Home Office 2014 - A10).  
In addition, there is evidence of UK participants, who could also be 
defined as entrepreneurs, making evidence based applications to 
introduce new legislation to prevent and detect firearms crimes. Cases 
such as the Operation Baker case are also thoroughly reviewed by CPS 
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case workers, lawyers and barristers to bring offenders to justice in the 
correct way. Those other criminal justice workers regularly work with the 
police to help them understand legal technicalities of a case and the 
police themselves have a good understanding of the law within their 
metis110. 
 ‘Spies’, (p91) usually in the form of undercover officers are grounded in 
occupational subculture. Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) cite Gary Marx in 
describing undercover policing as a ‘necessary evil’ (p91) that can be 
managed. Even though undercover policing has been accepted, Bowling 
and Sheptycki (2012) claim it creates insecurity and ‘colours the 
legitimacy’ (p91) of policing.  
It was necessary and proportionate to use a form of undercover policing, 
at the test purchase level, to gather evidence for Operation Barker. The 
tactic was tested at the High Court in London, before it was allowed in 
evidence at the Crown Court trial. In addition, some information on the 
supply of firearms gathered through the Network will originate from police 
informants in other states. As evidenced by Network participants, the 
information is subject to the NIM 5x5x5 assessment as well as testing by 
the courts through the disclosure rules. However, cases such as the one 
involving undercover officer Mark Kennedy (BBC 2012c – B35) show that 
the checks and balances on undercover work, as with intelligence, are 
fallible which favours Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) assertion that the 
police use of spies in the UK is tainted. 
 ‘Field Operators’ (p91) are usually involved in community policing 
initiatives such as partnership working and Neighbourhood Policing 
Teams (NPT). They also contribute to problem solving and carry out the 
everyday visible aspects of policing at a local level. They police by 
consent but the role is shunned by police in general in favour of 
enforcement by the enforcers (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012) who do ‘real 
crime fighting police work’ and take the lead in all spheres of policing. 
                                                          
110 I received regular training in police law and was forever referring to my Butterworths and Blackstone’s manuals (produced by 
police legal aces)  to keep up to date on definitions and points to prove; especially in relation to firearms law for Operation Barker. 
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‘Real police work’ is a subculture of policing identified in the literature 
where some groups of officers see anything other than the role of visible 
crime fighting enforcer as a waste of time (Paoline et al 2006, p578).  
The Network would not, however, operate if enforcers were taking the 
lead. The Network needs every day meticulous field operators whether 
they are at the local UK level, gathering information for intelligence, or 
analysts and intelligence officers making sense of the information to 
produce intelligence at the local and transnational level. There is no 
doubt that the police in the UK operate in a community policing 
philosophy (Baggot 2007). Therefore, whatever their rank, experience or 
sphere of operation they will carry some of that philosophy with them. 
That philosophy appears to exist within the Network with the mission to 
prevent and detect gun crime on behalf of victims and their families. 
Those victims live in the community and firearms crime is a community 
problem that requires intelligence as part of the problem solving process.  
The best information comes from the community (Gregg 2014 - A15) and 
that is underlined in the inquiry into whether the death of Lee Rigby could 
have been prevented. The Intelligence and Security Committee 
recommended that: 
 "…given the challenge of identifying 'self-starting terrorists'… MI5 
will become increasingly reliant on intelligence from local 
communities. Given the importance of such intelligence they will 
need to give further thought to working with the police to increase 
community engagement" (Great Britain, Parliament, House of 
Commons 2014, p5 - A15).  
Intelligence and problem solving in the UK is underpinned by NIM. As 
already stated, the UK nodes within the Network, including the 
transnational nodes, are fully signed up to NIM. Even though NIM is 
subject to some criticisms around working in silos and failing to engage 
with partners (as identified with intelligence systems in general by 
Sheptycki 2004), I had a positive experience of the process through daily 
and monthly tasking. Despite a lack of resources to meet all the 
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demands of NIM, an effort was made to bring together all areas of 
policing and consider issues in terms of problem solving and community 
policing. It helped me to prioritise resources to manage crime.  
NIM has been reproduced as ECIM at the European level and the 
suggestion, according to Harfield (2008, p499) is ECIM, ‘could be a 
vehicle for organising and co-ordinating investigations into transnational 
organised crime in Europe’. NIM could therefore be the closest the UK 
police has to organising organised crime policing. It can be adapted to 
become part of wider knowledge policing in line with the Norwegian 
model (mentioned by Harfield and Kleiven 2008, p239) that puts ILP, 
problem orientated policing, community policing and other models of 
policing under the umbrella of knowledge policing. NIM is set up to 
capture knowledge products from all areas of policing. The Network 
feeds into NIM through nodes such as NABIS. NABIS also run a 
knowledge department alongside an intelligence department and have 
been shown to use knowledge to bring about legislative change. 
 ‘Enforcers’ (p92) tend to take the lead and want to be the most visible of 
police officers. They fully embrace the monopoly of force and see it as 
the way to get the job done. They work on the premise of guilty until 
proven innocent. They see the criminals as the enemy and have a 
tendency to abuse their power and their use of force. The outcome of the 
enforcer taking the lead is bad policing. They have become prominent, 
especially where the rhetoric is about a war on crime (Bowling and 
Sheptycki 2012). 
My experience is that police like to engage in enforcement and even 
though it has been used by some UK police officers and politicians, the 
rhetoric of a war on crime is more prominent amongst the media111. 
Enforcement is obviously needed, however, it is best delivered when it is 
based on well researched intelligence from reliable well managed 
                                                          
111 Please see articles in ‘The Liverpool Echo’ entitled ‘Three Sefton houses raided as Merseyside Police step up war on gun crime’ 
(Graves – B30), ‘The Manchester Evening News’ entitled ‘Conservatives in Manchester 2011: Theresa May declares war on gang 
culture in wake of riots’  (Manchester Evening News 2011 – D50) and ‘The Express’ entitled ‘Gurkhas declare war on criminals’ 
(Abbott 2008 – D50). Also see Liberal Democrat blog entitled, ‘Nick Clegg and Richard Branson write: The global war on drugs has 
been an abject failure’ (Clegg and Branson 2015 – B10). 
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sources and the resulting outcome is positive112. This is evidenced by 
Operation Barker, where enforcement was just a small part of a wider 
long term intelligence gathering and problem solving phase and the 
enforcers were led and managed by those engaged in the intelligence 
field. That is also how the Network has been shown to operate with the 
successful resolution of the BBM problem. The fact that enforcers are led 
by and managed by those engaged in intelligence, reinforces the 
importance of intelligence and supports Grieve’s (2008) assertion that 
‘analysed intelligence is more potent than coercive force for policing’ 
(p17) and Phillip’s (2008) assertion that enforcement intervention is only 
a small part of the overall policing picture. 
In summary, Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) policing subcultures do exist within 
the Network. Those subcultures can be labelled in the same way. However, 
there are some subtle differences in the Network that indicate that the UK 
nation state controls the global policing tidal flow in favour of the nation sate. 
That is opposite to the ‘higher order comparisons’ (Nelken 2012) made by 
Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) where the transnational police subcultures 
undermine nation state policing. There is a clear indication that the actors in the 
Network work together as part of the team culture identified by Glomseth, 
Gottschalk and Solli-Saether (2007). They work to deal with the threat which is 
their mission and are motivated by supporting victims. As a result they appear 
to drive pluralistic transnational policing and a glocal reconstruction of policing 
from the UK nation state. They develop metis and continually adapt to be one 
step ahead of the criminals (Kenny 2008). 
All the subculture actors play their part but there is more of an emphasis on the 
team culture by the entrepreneurs, diplomats and field operatives of the 
Network. They pull together and merge with the other roles that have been 
outlined by Bowling and Sheptycki (2012). The Network actors are an example 
of a willing and able culture sought by Heeres (2012) to underpin glocal 
policing. The UK based Network participants believe they are working for the 
                                                          
112 Meaning someone is brought to justice through the courts or a community problem is solved ethically and to everyone's 
satisfaction. 
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good of the nation state in the furtherance of legitimacy (Bottoms and Tankebe 
2012).  
To understand the further differences between the Network and Bowling and 
Sheptycki's (2012) analysis of global policing it is necessary to compare the 
findings from the research with Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) architecture of 
global policing and the wider literature on that architecture. 
9.5 Challenging Bowling and Sheptyki’s (2012) Architecture: Global 
Policing Theory v Glocal Policing Reality 
The architecture of global policing in which Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) 
police actors operate are the global, regional, transnational and national 
spheres. They include a number of policing nodes in the Network identified by 
the findings. One such node is Interpol, an independent supranational 
organisation which facilitates communication between member state public 
police. Some nation state members are more powerful than others and have 
greater influence over what is a supranational influential organisation with 
minimal outside governance. 
Interpol is identified by the research findings as a node in the Network that 
facilitates some advances in IT to further the development of the Network. From 
a UK point of view, Interpol is not as influential on the Network as other nodes 
and that finding is underpinned by the literature. Walker (2008) states Interpol is 
a professional club and information exchange that does not dominate the shape 
of policing. Neither does it have any territory to impose jurisdictional law to 
make it a supranational global police force (Bronnitt 2012). 
Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) argue that the World Customs Organisation 
(WCO) is global and it is an example of the prioritisation of global governance. It 
is seen as the ‘enforcement arm’ (p58) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
which works with member states to ensure the enforcement of the rules of 
international trade (World Trade Organization 2015 – A10). The WCO works in 
partnership with 180 members to ‘secure and facilitate international trade’ 
(World Customs Organization 2015 – A10). WCO members (such as HMRC) 
have similar powers and privileges to the police.  
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WCO members controlled the flow of people and goods through ports and 
airports and ensured collection of duties and the declaration of taxable goods. 
Then, with the introduction of the free flow of goods across some borders, the 
emphasis moved towards ‘global monitoring and the total surveillance of the 
supply chain’ to distinguish between the licit and illicit and intervene with 
enforcement against the illicit trade (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012, p57).The 
WCO facilitates the emphasis on monitoring and total surveillance by its 
members and to do so they have formed a transnational policing network. This 
includes co-operation with Interpol through a MOU. The WCO does not enjoy 
the same independence as Interpol as it is bound by the nation state 
parameters of its membership. However, where it oversees the flow of free 
trade on behalf of the WTO it has been known to facilitate the global interests of 
corporations over the interests of some smaller nation states (Bowling and 
Sheptycki 2012). 
HMRC are a customs node within the Network. They have powers that assist in 
policing the firearms threat. They support the operation of the Network rather 
than influence it in anyway. The FATF is also a supportive node within the 
Network, which Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) highlight as a global policing 
organisation. It was introduced following a G7 meeting, working to 
representative ministers from nation states with the aim of policing the flow of 
money around the world to deal with the transnational money laundering of the 
proceeds of crime. It has, however, fallen short of achieving its aim (Bowling 
and Sheptycki 2012). 
The UN is identified as a node in the Network due to its implementation of the 
PoA SALW.  It is also identified as being part of the global sphere by Bowling 
and Sheptycki (2012). The UN has a police division with a small staff of police 
advisors available to member states to advise on all aspects of policing. The UN 
Security Council can deploy police units, formed from police seconded from 
member states, on peace keeping missions; usually in failed states. The first 
peace keeping mission was deployed to the Congo in 1960 and the vision at the 
time was for the UN to have a permanent police force for peace keeping 
deployment but that has never materialised (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). 
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Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) do not discuss influential protocols such as the 
UN PoA SALW. The PoA SALW is identified by the findings and the wider 
literature, as being drawn up as a result of NGO and nation state lobbying. It 
involves regular nation state reviews of the PoA (Jojarth 2009) and in the UK 
that is the responsibility of the FCO. However, as shown by the findings and 
Golding and McClory (2008), there is some disconnection between the UK 
police and UN PoA SALW reporting, due to the FCO bias and their focus on 
foreign affairs. 
According to Bowling and Sheptycki (2012, p62) the investigation division of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) has a ‘fully global mandate’. The ICC is 
based on a treaty, with a membership of 123 nation states (International 
Criminal Court 2015 – A10), it is governed by the ‘Rome Statute’ (UN General 
Assembly 1998) and it is a court of last resort that investigates and prosecutes 
the most serious cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
The UK signed the Rome Statute in 1998 and are members of the treaty 
(International Criminal Court 2015 – a10).  
Working to the ICC, its investigators interview suspects, witnesses and victims 
and facilitate a network of local and national police forces that co-operate in the 
investigation of crimes designated by the Rome Statute. Investigators do not, 
however, have any power of arrest they have to facilitate action by nation state 
police to execute any arrest warrants issued by the ICC, which limits the global 
reach of ICC investigators to nation states that have not condemned the ICC’s 
action. The ICC’s powers and area of investigation are limited by national 
sovereignty and some nation states, such as the US, declined to sign the Rome 
Statute because they believed ICC investigators would challenge national 
sovereignty, especially if they were given a universal power of arrest, which 
many of those who supported the ICC argued for (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012, 
p63). 
Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) assert that the power of nation state politicians 
impede the development of global policing organisations such as the ICC, 
suggesting there is still a strong pull towards the nation state rather than global 
policing. That assertion appears contrary to their overall conclusion that there is 
a move away from the nation state to full global policing. It is more in line with 
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the research findings that the initiative remains within the nation state. However, 
the findings from the research suggest that it is police actors working on a 
practical policeization basis (Deflem 2002) that anchors policing in the nation 
state, rather than politicians defending their power and the sovereignty of the 
nation state. 
At Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) regional level of the architecture of global 
policing are agencies such as Europol, which has a particular geographical 
sphere of influence in Europe. Their view is, however, that Europol is run as an 
old boys’ network and although accountable to the EU it has little transparency. 
The wider literature also points to some Europol failings where despite several 
attempts to improve its operational capability, especially through the 
development of JITs, it has been dogged by nation state differences and 
remains a simple facilitator of police communications (de Buck 2007, Yates et al 
2011).  
Europol supports rather than generates action, which makes it less likely to 
influence nation state policing (de Buck 2007). That is also the conclusion 
drawn from the findings and, it must be stated, that is the limit of Europol’s 
mandate (EU Council Decision 2009). Europol only facilitates communication 
for nation states engaged in transnational policing. Nodes formed by nation 
state police through independent police bureaucrat to bureaucrat policeization, 
such as EFE, generate the action. EFE develop transnational policing from the 
nation state outwards to deal with common nation state threats and, as such, 
drive the operation of Europol. 
There is evidence in the literature that Europol’s implementation of ECIM, which 
is based on the UK NIM, has helped to organise organised crime policing 
(Harfield 2008). This, in itself, suggests some nation state police influence on 
Europol. However, the research participants are silent on ECIM and are more 
concerned with NIM, as is the NCA DG. This is more evidence of the nation 
state parameter setting on transnational action. That does not mean 
transnational organised crime policing is not organised. NIM and ILP has 
become grounded in UK policing (Maguire and John 2006) and as the EFE 
shows, its participants, who work on OCG issues, are governed by UK policy 
and procedure, which includes the organisational features of NIM. Overall, the 
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development of nation state policing by the Network equates to a better 
organisation of organised crime policing called for by Harfield (2008). 
Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) architecture then extends to the national, where 
it describes nodes such as SOCA as being the link to a ‘transnational state 
system’ (p68). According to the research, rather than being part of a 
transnational state, the NCA, which has absorbed SOCA, has a firm base in the 
UK nation state. It only acts at the transnational level in accordance with UK 
laws, policies and procedures (including NIM). The NCA is also firmly held to 
account by the nation state through its own governance systems and by way of 
being held to account by other nodes in the Network such as the TRB and the 
Home Affairs Select Committee. 
Stenning and Shearing (2012) and Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) also include 
private transnational policing as an area of policing that should be considered 
when examining the architecture of global policing. Bowling and Sheptycki 
(2012) include it but with a warning that there is little in the literature on the 
subject. They critically analyse the likes of the Pinkerton Detective Agency and 
Blackwater as private agencies who work across nation states and who are one 
example of the blurring between public and private policing. Like Bayley and 
Sheering (2001) they see public and private policing as ‘permeating the global 
policing architecture from top to bottom’ (Bowling and Sheptyki 2012, p72). This 
is done by contracting out certain policing functions to the private sector or 
where private investigations into industrial espionage overlap with espionage 
that endangers national security and is subject to high policing (Bowling and 
Sheptycki 2012). 
Little, however, in the way of private transnational policing of the firearms threat 
is evidenced by the literature and the findings suggest the involvement of only 
one private node in the Network. That node is the FTI whose entrepreneurs 
promote their own company product, whilst at the same time facilitating the 
coming together of nodes in the Network enabling further facilitation of the 
Network by other people and the best use of quality IT. They do not direct or 
provide policing. They provide a product on the global market that some of the 
Network participants chose as an aid to deal with local and transnational 
policing problems. There is no blurring between public and private as has been 
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suggested by Bayley and Sheering (2001). In fact Alex sums the involvement of 
FTI best: 
"They sell hard ware. What they don't sell is the bit that goes with it, how 
to use what you understand by these two cartridge cases…. methods of 
detection, methods of prevention etc. … to sell kit all around the world at 
enormous sums of money they use that lifestyle picture that says if you 
use this system in the way that NABIS uses the system you can work 
with other countries you can understand gun crime…." 
Some might use FTI as evidence of a private node exerting influence on the 
Network that undermines sovereignty and nation state policing. However, that is 
not the way that the Network participants see it. They are fully aware of FTI and 
evidence them as suppliers of a product who want to make a profit by selling 
that product. The police have always had to buy their kit from somewhere and 
FTI are just another company that supplies that kit and looks for every 
opportunity to market their wares. Globalisation has enabled the police to have 
greater access to better kit and companies such as FTI to market that kit more 
effectively. In this instance there is a definite firewall between supply and use. 
Bowling and Sheptyki (2012) also include high and low policing in their 
architectural analysis. High policing secures the interests of the state and 
national security and low policing involves day-to-day police patrolling, crime 
investigation and solving community policing problems (Brodeur and Leman-
Langlois 2003, Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). Despite the assertion from 
Brodeur (2007) and MacVean (2008) that high policing is still distinctive through 
its intelligence absorption as opposed to case building, the wider literature 
states high and low policing are becoming increasingly blurred particularly 
through pluralisation of government policing nodes (Jones and Newburn 2006, 
O’Reilly and Ellison 2006).  
That blurring between high and low policing is confirmed by the research 
findings. CT is classed as high policing (Brodeur and Leman-Langlois 2003, 
Brodeur 2007) but so is organised crime. In 2010, serious organised crime was 
classed as a tier 2 national security threat in the UK (Great Britain, Home Office 
2010 – A10) and is high on the agenda at the 2015 national security summit 
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when the key note speech will be made by the NCA DG on serious and 
organised crime as a threat to national security (National Security Summit 2015 
– A10). Both CT and organised crime are a priority for the Network and both 
have a local impact. Therefore, because of the influence of the TRB node, both 
receive low policing action through community policing and intelligence 
gathering at the local level with support from Network intelligence. The aim of 
the Network (including nodes such as MI5) is to collect intelligence to build 
cases to bring people to justice unless earlier disruptive action is needed to 
protect life. Again, this amounts to ‘intelligence led’ low policing of, potentially, 
high policing crimes (Brodeur and Leman-Langlois 2003, p15). 
Recent internal enquiries in the US have led to a report on the involvement of 
the CIA in the torturing of terrorist suspects to gather intelligence and there are 
indications that UK intelligence agencies may have made use of that 
intelligence (BBC Breakfast Time 2014 – B30). The nature of terrorist activity 
means that if intelligence obtained as a result of torture by the US was shared 
with the UK, it could find its way into the Network via the MI5 node. However, 
there is no indication from this research that such intelligence has been used by 
the Network and more research, beyond the access gained for this thesis, 
would be required to understand if the CIA's high policing activity has had any 
impact on the Network.  
The indications from the media commentary on the US report on the CIA, which 
has not been fully released (Ackerman, Rushe and Borger 2014 – B30, BBC 
Breakfast Time 2014 – B30) do, however, show, in the view of the close 
working relationship between UK and US intelligence agencies and MI5’s link to 
the Network, that there is a need to understand who or what the nodes in the 
Network are. Also, what influence those nodes have and what other nodal 
networks they are involved in. This is required in order to understand who is 
exerting influence on policing and to be able to fully assess the quality and 
provenance of any intelligence that is used.  
Finally, Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) discuss glocal policing as part of the 
architecture. They evidence how global decisions in policing affect the local 
reconstruction of policing rather than, as drawn out from the findings, glocal 
policing being the actual overall reconstruction that is taking place.  
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Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) state that local reconstruction of command and 
control systems now allows direct contact between local officers and Interpol 
because of the glocal influence. Such influences have been facilitated by the 
neo liberal movement of the nation state welfare system to the open market 
system and the introduction of advanced IT and communication. That facilitation 
enables policy transfer of ideas, such as zero tolerance policing, from one 
nation state to the other so that the global impacts on the local (Bowling and 
Sheptycki 2012). However, the findings show that at the local level the UK 
police are operationally independent and make their own decisions on what to 
use from the global. The wider literature also states that policy transfer like zero 
tolerance policing was used as rhetoric by UK politicians such as Jack Straw, 
when he was shadow Home Secretary 1995, and Tony Blair, just prior to him 
becoming Prime Minister in 1997 (Punch 2007, p24). Zero tolerance policy was 
received with little enthusiasm on the part of the UK police (Jones and Newburn 
2007). 
As indicated, the findings draw out the existence of the glocal, but as the actual 
reconstruction that is taking place rather than as part of the global policing 
demonstrated by Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) various architectural building 
blocks. Rather than the global controlling the local, through the likes of policy 
transfer, the move is from the local to the global using the transnational for the 
benefit of the local. The nation state policing nodes in the Network have 
controlled the foray into the global in order to police the firearms threat. In 
addition, the threat itself has been shown by the research to be glocal. The 
tendency is for the criminals to move out from their local base to shop in a 
global market and then use the product locally in order to adapt to be one step 
ahead of the police and continue with their criminal enterprise. 
The fundamental difference then between the findings and Bowling and 
Sheptycki’s (2012) global policing and the wider literature and theory, including 
that of Bayley and Shearing (2001), is that the findings draw out a glocal 
reconstruction of policing that includes transnational policing. The transnational 
policing includes an element of networked pluralisation across UK public 
organisations rather than a pluralistic public/private global police delivering 
predominantly private policing and breaking down the sovereignty of the nation 
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state. That glocal policing is controlled by the nation state for the benefit of the 
nation state. The UK nation state police, through the Network, recognise that 
there is a global market of policing. When it is necessary to police the firearms 
threat, using something from the global market, the police use the Network to 
acquire what is needed. 
Apart from Heeres (2012), the wider literature does not recognise or promote 
the glocal reconstruction of policing as the main move that is taking place or as 
a philosophy for policing. The literature including Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) 
recognise it as part of other building blocks that make up global policing in 
favour of the global. Heeres (2012) on the other hand, states that nation state 
police should understand the glocal nature of crime and policing and move 
outwards into the global world using that understanding to deal with crime. The 
UK police clearly already do that and it is well evidenced in the findings on the 
BBM problem and the negotiation of the MOU with the ATF. 
Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) provide useful evidence of the existence of global 
policing and that is supported by O’Reilly and Ellison (2006) who state that 
nodal networks take away the power from the nation state. However, when their 
evidence is compared with the findings and the wider literature, global policing 
can impact in different ways in different nation states who might also view the 
impact in different ways. Nation states are different and have different needs, 
which should be taken into account (Nelken 2012). Nation state nodes still have 
power to influence and control networks such as the one researched here.  
According to Nelken (2012), when higher order comparisons are made, there is 
a need to be aware of local truths. This thesis clearly demonstrates that fact. It 
challenges Bowling and Sheptyki’s (2012) global policing theory by emphasising 
the glocal in the UK nation state above the global. This thesis suggests the 
existence of glocal policing that Heeres (2012) is looking for. It also evidences 
the need to be aware of local truths, by recognising all the levels of policeization 
that exist in nodal form between the nation state, the regional and the 
supranational. That is clearly demonstrated with the existence of the EFE, a 
nation state sponsored node that drives the regional Europol node. 
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Chapter 10 - Conclusion: Glocal not Global 
The aim of this thesis was to identify any reconstruction of policing that takes 
place because of the Network. That aim has been achieved by answering the 
CRQ, which was:  
‘Does the Network contribute to a reconstruction of policing?’ 
The evidence from the findings indicates that the Network is contributing to a 
glocal reconstruction of policing. The nation state firearms threat is not policed 
from the outside by supranational forces, private corporations or global police 
acting on their own initiative.  
The firearms threat causes the police to adapt. Through a process of 
policeization (Deflem 2002), late modern cops using the tools from late 
modernity (Levi 2007) and wanting to do their best for the victims, facilitate the 
development and operation of the Network.  
As a result, the Network is a co-operative organisation of transnational 
organised crime policing anchored within the nation state. It is a development of 
nation state policing, involving some pluralisation with other public 
organisations, rather than a top down global reconstruction of policing from the 
outside facilitated by pluralisation with private providers. It is the glocal 
reconstruction of policing called for by Heeres (2012). 
In achieving the aim, the following objectives have been met: 
 Theoretically, the Network has been explained as a glocal reconstruction 
of policing. From a UK point of view, the Network fits with Bowling and 
Sheptycki’s (2012) theory of global policing. However, a detailed analysis 
of how the Network operates shows the late modern world to be global 
and diverse in nature. As stated by Nelken (2012), each nation state has 
its own needs and that has been confirmed by the analysis. Therefore, 
diverse nation states, let alone the lack of a global criminal code for the 
police to enforce, make it difficult for policing to become truly global.  
The emphasis is on glocal policing. UK police are aware of the global 
impact of crime and respond to it accordingly. The response is based on 
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the prevailing policing philosophy and the local assessment of the 
intelligence and the threat. Hence, the first priority is to the nation state 
and the local impact of crime. As such, the UK police work on a pluralistic 
transnational basis with other UK public organisations. They use private 
resources, marketed on a global basis, to support local policing, but only 
in so much as it helps the police understand and deal with the threat to 
their own nation state. 
A glocal development of nation state policing exists rather than a 
reconstruction of policing from the outside by a global police state. 
Transnational policing is part of the glocal process. Its origins are an 
adaptation of Weber’s bureaucratisation, where people develop the 
bureaucracy through Deflem’s (2002) policeization.  
There is a bottom up approach within the Network that drives 
transnational policing of the firearms threat. It involves various nation 
state nodes that are loyal to the nation state, forming partnerships, some 
of which become nodes, in themselves, within the Network (i.e. EFE). 
They do this as part of the wider process of glocal policing. Such nodes 
are the willing and able transnational cogs that drive transnational 
policing of the firearms threat. As such, they drive the regional and 
supranational nodes such as Europol and Interpol. In addition, those 
transnational cogs support global policing initiatives such as the (nation 
state and NGO sponsored) UN PoA SALW.  
 In relation to policy, the objective was to identify and share best practice 
from the Network on how policy is developed and who develops it. The 
UK participants in the Network develop policy in response to the firearms 
threat and that shapes the wider Network policy. That wider policy is in 
line with UK laws and procedures and any action taken, in or by the UK 
police, is governed by the UK nodes in the Network.  
It is, however, important to continually assess who is involved in the 
Network and the source of the intelligence to ensure that the Network 
and any policy raised as a consequence is legitimate. As stated by 
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Bottoms and Tankebe (2012), legitimacy must exist in policing and 
should be at the forefront of all policing research.  
When best practice in legitimate policing is found, it should be shared. 
The Network has been shown to be a useful blueprint for developing a 
legitimate glocal policing policy, which could be transposed to other 
transnational policing networks. The Network also provides evidence for 
some practical recommendations. 
 Practically, a number of key recommendations have been made below.  
Those recommendations are based on evidence in this research and 
support glocal policing. For example, in line with recommendation 7, 
knowledge of glocal policing networks can inform the research and 
debate on the future structure of policing in England and Wales. That 
debate has been called for by the IPC, who state the current structure of 
43 Forces is not fit for purpose (Stevens 2013, Gregg 2014 - A15).  
This thesis has evidenced that policing is glocally networked between a 
number of public policing nodes and other public nodes. As part of any 
restructure the IPC have recommended that BCUs, which are the 
building blocks of policing in the UK, become legally co-terminus with 
local councils. That recommendation needs to be widely accepted, as it 
emphasises the local in a glocal network. BCUs, working with local 
partners, can be linked in a number of ways from the local to the 
national, transnational and global to develop nation state policing and 
deal with the glocal threat of crime by way of glocal policing. 
Overall, this thesis has analysed the current literature on the firearms threat and 
the Network and, using grounded theory and nodal network analysis, has drawn 
out themes to challenge and enhance the literature. To draw out the themes, 
this thesis has developed grounded theory practice by combining insider 
detective skills with academic research skills to produce and analyse data using 
HOLMES methods. The use of OSINT has also proved to be useful 
corroborative data and useful in bringing conclusions from the interview data as 
up to date as possible. 
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The thesis does not make generalisations about transnational policing per se. 
However, it adds to the knowledge on the UK police who police the firearms 
threat and how they do that as part of the wider continuum of policing. This 
includes the transnational gathering and sharing of intelligence on the criminal 
use and supply of firearms. In addition, the findings add to the theoretical 
debate on global policing and the reconstruction of policing. The thesis 
conclusion is that, from a UK point of view, the policing of firearms threat is 
glocal and as such that contributes to a glocal reconstruction of policing by 
public policing nodes, rather than  a mix of public and private nodes which are 
part of a global network that undermines nation state policing. 
The firearms threat has been articulated, as have the nodes that make up the 
Network and positive aspects of police culture have been drawn out that 
contribute to the organised facilitation of the Network. Those positive aspects of 
police culture in the Network corroborated by my wider policing experiences and 
OSINT, add to the debate on police culture by examining it from the point of 
view of the police working as a team to deal with a policing problem. 
The contributions made to knowledge by this thesis also add to professional 
practice. As well as being a useful case study that could be used to teach the 
criminology of policing and international criminal justice at undergraduate and 
postgraduate level, there is evidence within the thesis, which can lead to 
improvements in professional police practice. Those improvements, together 
with potential future research to further advance the contribution made to 
knowledge by this thesis, can be by implemented through the following 
recommendations: 
1. Make the Illicit firearms market, and in particular the OCG/terrorist 
nexus, which is a source of terrorist firearms, a priority for 
intelligence gathering and academic research. This is to ensure 
the market is fully understood and can be policed correctly. If 
terrorists need firearms in the UK or on mainland Europe the 
developing knowledge is that they appear to go to OCGs to 
purchase the firearms. It is not clear whether the OCGs in such 
instances know or suspect they are dealing with terrorists. 
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2. UK Government to develop and implement legislation on the 
control of deactivated firearms. This will reduce opportunities for 
criminals to reactivate deactivated firearms in line with Clarke's 
(1997) SCP. 
 
3. Incorporate NABIS to be part of the NCA. This will strengthen the 
transnational part of the Network and ensure NCA resources are 
used to deal with local firearms problems resulting from organised 
crime activity. It will also bind the NCA closer to the tripartite 
system of governance. 
 
4. FCO to take an active part in the TRB process and the TRB to be 
fully aware of the need to report the work of UK police, other LEAs 
and intelligence services towards achieving relevant actions in the 
UN PoA SALW. This will ensure a smooth interface between UK 
policing and the UN PoA SALW. 
 
5. PCCs to take an active part in the TRB process. This will add 
further tripartite police governance to the Network. 
 
6. All UK Chief Constables to support the NCA tasking process. This 
will support the glocal policing philosophy by giving clear 
leadership to the NCA. 
 
7. It has been suggested that BCU nodes should be co-terminus with 
local councils as part of a new structure for the police in England 
and Wales (Stevens 2013). In considering what the new structure 
should be, the BCUs should be the building blocks of the 
structure. Those BCUs should then be networked through a series 
of regional command hubs (at the current regional police unit 
levels113) to a UK or England and Wales central policing command 
that houses current national organisations such as the NCA and 
NABIS. Such a network of policing would allow for the tripartite 
                                                          
113 I.e. East Midlands, Yorkshire and Humber etc. 
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system of governance to continue. It would also remain 
compatible with NIM and transnational networks such as the 
Network studied for this thesis. 
 
8. Further research to be carried out on the motivation of the 
government towards introducing legislation and policy on crime 
control to make sure it is proportionate, relevant, evidence based 
and intelligence led. This will ensure legislation, such as that on 
deactivated firearms, is passed in a timely manner. 
 
9. Further research to be carried out comparing the Network with 
other networks formed to deal with other types of crime. This will 
further test the existence of glocal policing in the UK (i.e. if the 
TRBs for other crime threats to the UK are operating in the same 
way as in the Network then that glocal policing philosophy is 
present throughout all areas of UK policing). 
 
10. Further research to be carried out examining the Network from the 
point of view of a nation state other than the UK. Make 
comparisons with the UK but be aware of the diversity of other 
nation states and the power they wield on the world stage (Nelken 
2012, BBC 2014 – B21). This will also test the glocal policing 
theory against the widely perceived move towards the existence of 
a global police state. 
This thesis was not designed to justify the Network or the activities of the police 
involved in it. The research was carried out with an open mind and the Network 
was picked as an area of crime and policing through which the reconstruction of 
policing could be examined. This has resulted in a development of knowledge 
and a contribution to professional practice. 
The UK police are one step ahead of the firearms threat and can be confident 
that organised crime policing is continuing to develop through transnational 
policing as part of a glocal reconstruction of policing that is embedded in the 
Network. The Network has contributed towards reducing the amount of firearms 
available for criminal use, which makes it difficult for terrorists to use firearms to 
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mount an attack in the UK. Similarly, it is difficult for OCGs or any other 
criminals to access and use firearms.  
However, strong leadership is required to make sure that what is happening in 
respect of the glocalisation of policing of the firearms threat is general across all 
aspects of transnational organised crime policing. To keep the glocal 
reconstruction on track, the NCA need to do ‘what is says on the tin’ and take 
the lead in glocal policing; even if it does mean local Chief Constables being 
tasked, by the NCA DG, to keep them one step ahead of the criminals. 
The Network and the police in general, need to continue to focus on the positive 
aspects of police culture to make sure that organisational learning takes place 
in the correct way in order to achieve legitimacy. To remain one step ahead, the 
police need to be willing and able to adapt to change and continue to mould 
Weber’s underlying theory of bureaucracy, to develop transnational networked 
policing, which makes global policing predominantly glocal. 
 
(84,321 words) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard John Severns 19035736 The 'Network' 
  
250 
11 Appendices 
11.1 The Network from a UK Point of View (based on the literature review) 
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11.2 Semi-Structured Interview Plan 
The transnational firearms intelligence network - how it works, what 
drives it and how much does it focus on OCG/terrorist nexuses. 
I am researching how the transnational policing network on gathering and 
disseminating of firearms intelligence works and hope that you can help 
me with that research. Although I will focus on networks that impact on 
OCG/terrorist nexuses, I would like to hear about any involvement you 
have in any transnational policing networks.  
Please only discuss your work in general terms and do not identify 
current operations, disclose information that is not in the public domain 
or any sensitive operational techniques. 
Please confirm that you understand the aims and objectives of the 
research and that you are willing to take part in this discussion. Also that 
you are happy for the discussion to be tape recorded. The discussion will 
be transcribed and nothing will be used from it in any publication or 
thesis without your consent. 
First, please tell me about your career back ground and your current role.  
What is your career history? 
What is your current role? 
Who is your line manager? 
What staff do you manage?  
Who are you accountable to in your role? 
Who or what governs what you do? 
Please tell me about any transnational policing network that you 
contribute to. 
 What transnational network exists, that you or your organisation take part in, 
through which intelligence, on the illicit use, supply and manufacture of firearms 
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and knowledge on the investigation of such crimes, can be gathered and 
disseminated? 
Who takes part in the network? 
Who set up the network?  
Why was the network set up? 
When was the network set up? 
How was the network set up?   
How was membership of the network decided? 
Who is the network accountable to? 
Who governs the network?  
How do you contribute to the gathering and dissemination of knowledge and 
intelligence with foreign law enforcement agencies, transnational law 
enforcement agencies or other foreign agencies? 
What contact do you have with foreign law enforcement agencies or 
transnational law enforcement agencies? 
What other foreign contacts do you have? 
Who is involved in the process of gathering and disseminating knowledge and 
intelligence? 
Where and how do you come into contact with foreign law enforcement 
agencies, transnational law enforcement agencies or other foreign agencies? 
What do you gather and disseminate knowledge and intelligence on?  
What knowledge and intelligence do you gather and disseminate on terrorists, 
organised criminals and the nexus between the two? 
What type of intelligence is that (Humint etc.) and has it resulted in bringing 
anyone to justice in the UK or elsewhere? 
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How big a proportion of the knowledge and intelligence you deal in relates to 
terrorism, organised crime and the nexus between the two? 
How do you evaluate the knowledge and intelligence that is shared? 
How do you disseminate knowledge and intelligence received from abroad with 
UK law enforcement agencies? 
Who do you disseminate that knowledge and intelligence to? 
Who or what controls the gathering and dissemination of knowledge and 
intelligence? 
What drives you to participate in any transnational network? 
Who influences what you do? 
What influence does ACPO CUF have on what you do? 
What influence does the UN SALW  POA have on what you do? 
What influence does EUROPOL and/or INTERPOL have on what you do? 
What influence do any intelligence agencies such as MI5/6 have on what you 
do? 
What influence does the foreign office have on what you do? 
What influence does the Home office have on what you do? 
What influence do SOCA have on what you do? 
What influence does UK law have on what you do? 
What influence does European law have on what you do? 
What influence does any other nation state law or international law have on 
what you do? 
What policies influence what you do and who makes them? 
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Please give me your opinion on how effective the transnational network 
is. 
What outcomes and outputs are achieved from the gathering and dissemination 
of knowledge and intelligence? 
What policy has resulted from the gathering and dissemination of firearms 
knowledge and intelligence on a transnational basis? 
How can the transnational network be improved to prevent the criminal use, 
supply and manufacture of firearms in the UK and elsewhere? 
Is there anything else you wish to add to our discussion 
Research aims and objectives. 
Aim - To identify any reconstruction of transnational policing that exists as a 
result of the transnational firearms intelligence network. 
Objective - To research the transnational firearms intelligence network. 
Objective - To focus on the transnational police network gathering and 
disseminating intelligence on organised crime group (OCG)/terrorist nexuses 
involved in the illicit firearms market.  
Objective - To identify the role and function of the people in the network. 
Objective - To explain, using adaptive grounded theory, how the network 
operates and what drives it. 
Explanation of terms: 
Transnational Intelligence Network - Those making decisions on the 
gathering and dissemination of knowledge and intelligence between law 
enforcement agencies in the UK and one or more other nation states. 
Law enforcement agencies - The public police. 
Knowledge - Best practice on offender identification, investigation and the use 
of intelligence. 
Intelligence - Information that has been subject to a defined evaluation and risk 
assessment process, in order to assist the police with decision making, is 
defined as intelligence. From such intelligence, decisions can be made on 
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enforcement, prevention and further intelligence gathering strategies (Harfield 
2009). 
Outcomes - The way a thing turns out; a consequence. (Oxford Dictionary of 
English). i.e. no more illicit firearms are produced. 
Outputs - The amount of something produced. (Oxford Dictionary of English). 
i.e. number of arrests. 
Organised crime - More than one person working together over a period of 
time to commit crime for personal gain. By committing crime, or in order to 
protect their criminal enterprise, those criminals present a serious threat to 
society by way of violence, corruption or damage to the economy.  
Terrorism - Any crime, including any preparatory crime that has the ultimate 
aim of instilling mass fear amongst opponents, in order to bring about regime 
change or impose a particular political or religious will. Terrorists are those 
persons who aspire to and carryout, or are party to, acts of terrorism. 
OCG/terrorist nexus - any direct bond, link or third party junction, which 
connects organised crime with terrorism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard John Severns 19035736 The 'Network' 
  
258 
11.3 Extract from Research Database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Title Progress Reference Document 
Type 
Evidence  Grade 
Interview 
with Alex 
Themed SEVERNS, Richard 
(2012). Series of 
interviews with 
persons connected 
with transnational 
police network on 
criminal use of 
firearms. Completed 
in 2012. 
Interview. Discusses 
transnation
al firearms 
intelligence 
network. 
A11 
Lit Review Research Code/Category (Master 
category)/Theme/BROAD 
LITERATURE 
THEME/BROAD 
GROUNDED THEMES 
Code/Category (Master 
category)/Theme/BROAD 
LITERATURE 
THEME/BROAD GROUNDED 
THEMES 
  Research 
Interview. 
NABIS staff can search 
Interpol server without 
reference to originating 
country. Interpol. Function. 
IT. NABIS.  Driver. 
Reconstruction of policing. 
LM (Became The People 
and 'The Tools of Late 
Modernity' that facilitate 
the Network)  
Home Office has influence 
on what NABIS does 
particularly through the new 
Threat Reduction Boards. 
Home Office. TRB. NABIS. 
Threat.  Driver. Nation State. 
Node. DNS (Became 
Transnational Nodes in the 
Network that Develop Nation 
State Policing)  
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11.4 The Network from a UK Point of View (based on research evidence) 
 
 
 
Drives Policeization 
and UK Police 
involvement in the 
Network 
Glocal Firearm Threat to the UK 
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Late modern cops who are loyal to the state make best use of the tools of 
late modernity. 
Key UK Nation State 
Nodes in the 
Network develop 
nation state policing 
by co-operation. 
Late modern cops who are loyal to the nation 
state make best use of the tools of late 
modernity. 
Facilitate the Network 
based on the mission / 
motivated by doing best 
for victims. 
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Global 
policing 
products/
services 
A co-operative organisation of organised crime policing by nodes in the Network 
A development of nation state policing by way of glocal policing  
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11.5 Snapshot of Example Actions  
Allocated actions 
Current priority actions  
Resulted actions 
Pended actions 
Date critical 
 
Title Ref Progress 
If openly available, obtain a 
copy of the European firearms 
threat assessment. 
 39 EFE are mentioned at the below site which needs 
indexing: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-
trafficking/trafficking-in-firearms/index_en.htm 
As of 101212 no evidence of the European 
Firearms Threat Assessment being openly 
published 
Pended awaiting publication. 
Review grounded theory 
memos to ensure all relevant 
evidence is captured and 
analysed.  
 56   
Prepare a chart that shows the 
Network and how it links to 
wider organisations such WCO, 
Interpol etc. (Consider using it 
to teach the workshop on 
Global Crime and insecurity on 
070413). 
 126  This has now become part of the ongoing nodal 
network analysis. 
  
Action Resulted 
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11.6 Snapshot of Example Policy Decisions 
 
P9 - Policy entry of 1225 on Tuesday 25th October 2011 - Use of grounded 
theory means keeping the literature review until after data has been 
discovered (Chamaz 2006). However, to declare my existing knowledge 
and potential for preconceived ideas, also to say 'where we are now' I will 
do a literature review before, then a further one after, the data has been 
discovered. The first literature review will be focused on my current 
knowledge of the existence of the OCG/terrorist illicit firearms market 
nexus, the threat it poses, any current literature on the transnational 
firearms intelligence network and the bureaucratization and policeization 
theories that explain that network. (Agreed with Dr Paterson). 
  
This will enable potential for preconceived ideas and forced data to be clearly 
identified and put on one side so that the research can continue with an open 
mind, in line with the grounded theory philosophy. The proof of that will be in the 
findings and will need commenting on in the final analysis. 
  
Even though pure grounded theory researchers promote leaving the literature 
review until after the data has been gathered, any strategy, starts with knowing 
where we are now, before we get to where we want to be. That has to follow 
when explaining the transnational policing network for gathering intelligence on 
the OCG/terrorist nexus market in illicit firearms. So there has to be an initial 
literature review to see where we are now, then a further one when the 
collection and analysis is complete in order to understand whether any 
grounded theory, that has been developed, stands alone, adds to, links with or 
is a part of, already existing theories. Working like this does not close the mind, 
you can still keep an open mind in your investigations. This is similar to crime 
investigation (part of the standpoint that I come from). In any crime investigation 
you start with an amount of knowledge and establish where you are with what 
you already know about what has happened. You then move on gathering 
further evidence. That evidence is analysed as you progress using HOLMES. 
However, you continue to keep an open mind and develop lines of enquiry 
based on analysing the evidence/knowledge that you hold and gather along the 
way. You only start to close in on grounding out any charges when the evidence 
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gathered moves you in that direction; where charges can be laid based on the 
evidence that is discovered and the application of law to that evidence. At that 
point you produce a file of evidence (the thesis) to support the charges (the 
grounded theory) subject to the law (existing theory). Whilst a charge is subject 
to existing law each individual case is unique in its circumstances as well as at 
the same time having aspects of generalised modus operandi. 
 
P19 - Policy entry of 2330 on Wednesday 23rd May 2012 - Current priority 
is to interview (redacted to preserve anonymity) and make contact with 
(redacted to preserve anonymity) the UN SALW SPOC at the FCO. 
  
Delivered presentation on current state of research to Dr Craig Paterson and Dr 
Ed Pollock. Their advice is that I have collected original material from the three 
interviews that I have already undertaken. As I can corroborate the material 
collected with evidence from OSINT research, the two further interviews should 
provide sufficient data to be able to submit the DICJ/2.  
  
Contact with the FCO will either open up further opportunities for interview or 
confirm my evidenced belief that they focus on international arms dealing by UK 
nationals to prohibited countries and leave internal supply within and into the 
UK to the police. As such they are not part of the network I am currently 
researching. However; an open mind will be kept as they are part of the UN 
SALW network that does 'police' the illicit supply of small arms and light 
weapons and it is not clear how they link in with UK law enforcement. It may be 
that the FCO just report relevant law enforcement activity around their area of 
interest to the UN. 
P31 - Policy entry of 1030 on Sunday 21st April 2013 - Start writing the 
methodology chapter… Ideas are fresh in the mind from the LCSS conference 
(which includes the principle of golden hour daily writing opportunities as per Dr 
Fahri Karakas workshop 'The big picture and academic careers' at LCSS 
conference on 190413). Analysis will continue at the same time. Now 
supervision of UG dissertation students and PG Teaching is complete there will 
be more time to write and analyse and with using OSINT for grounded theory 
theme population such analysis should continue any way. 
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P32 - Policy entry of 0945 on Wednesday 1st May 2013 - The themes to be 
saturated in line with grounded theory analysis and presented in the 
thesis, presentation of findings chapter, are: 
5.1. The Firearms Threat to the United Kingdom (UK) 
5.2. The Key UK Nation State Nodes in the Network 
5.3. Transnational Nodes in the Network that Develop Nation State 
Policing 
5.4. The People and 'The Tools of Late Modernity' that facilitate the 
Network 
The focus of the database analysis, nodal network analysis and 
outstanding actions will be reviewed in line with this decision… Current 
analysis and writing up, in line with grounded theory analysis, shows these are 
the main themes to emerge. Nodal analysis also shows them to be connected 
and to support the emerging thesis. The threat to the UK shapes and drives the 
operation of the Network which is a development of nation state policing 
facilitated by people and the tools of late modernity. The threat causes the 
police to adapt and by way of policeization, people and 'the tools of late 
modernity’ develop the Network which is a co-operative organisation of 
organised crime policing anchored within the nation state. As such it is a 
positive development of nation state policing rather than a negative 
reconstruction of policing from the outside. 
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11.7 Extract from Groupings under Broader Grounded Themes  
LM..THE PEOPLE AND THE TOOLS OF LATE MODERNITY DRIVE THE 
NETWORK.  TRANSNATIONAL NODAL NETWORK. 
BUREAUCRATIZATION. RECONSTRUCTION OF POLICING.  Node. 
Intelligence led problem solving policing. Policeization. Nation state. 
Network. Driver. Police reconstruction. Intelligence. Transnational. EU. 
Firearms. NABIS. SOCA. ACPO. EFEG. Police. UK. Integrated Ballistics 
Intelligence System. Ballistics intelligence. Private provider. Transnational 
intelligence. Intelligence evaluation. Transnational policing. Core function. 
Role. TRB. TRAF. NABIS intelligence. Strategy. Role. Function. Crime 
types. Good practice. Border Agency. IT. SLN. ATF. MOU. SOCA 
Intelligence. Gun. Criminal use of firearms. POLKA. ACPO CUF. PoA. 
Home Office. Want to be the best. Policy. Legislation. INTERPOL. 
Technology. Trace. IBIS. Lead Scientist. Intelligence manager. Function. 
Ballistics intelligence. Conventional intelligence. Individuals. Fast time 
intelligence. The way we do stuff. NABIS should be the centre of 
excellence for everything to do with the criminal use of firearms. Our 
perspective. Intelligence perspective. Chair John Murphy the Chief 
Constable of Merseyside. Violence and Public Protection Portfolio. Chair 
Brian Moore Chief Constable of Wiltshire. ACPO Criminal use of Firearms 
Group (ACPO CUF). Chair Sue Fish. ACPO Criminal use of firearms 
steering group. ACCs (Assistant Chief Constables) from the majority of 
gun crime forces. Threat Reduction Board. Unit Head of NABIS. ACPO 
CUF Practioner's group. (Chaired by Paul James.) Home Office Strategy 
has 12 different programmes of activity. I report upwards into ACPO CUF. 
I almost report downwards into the practioners group Coming together to 
identify a problem and tackle it through the practioners group. Interpol in 
Lyon have international server for IBIS which allows cross-national 
checks. Number of countries (about 7 or 8) signed  up to IBIS international 
server i.e. Holland, Ireland. Interpol driving IBIS as a technological 
advance. ATF liaison officer for the UK. Counterpart to the NABIS 
Intelligence manager is called John Cooper. Good working relationship….. 
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11.8 The Operation Barker Criminal Network 
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